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Integration politics in the Netherlands has changed dramatically between 
1990 and 2005. Whereas ethnic and religious differences were hitherto paci-
fied through accommodation, a new and increasingly powerful current in 
Dutch politics problematized the presence of minorities. This development 
represents a challenge to sociologists and political scientists: how to map 
and explain drastic changes? Arguing that extant approaches are better at 
explaining continuity than change, this book develops a relational discourse 
analysis to understand dynamic power relations in national as well as local 
politics.
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1 Introduction: Integration politics
and the enigma of power
Movements for cultural protectionism have proliferated in recent
years throughout Europe and many other parts of the world. The
idea that immigration and multiculturalism are the natural and
inevitable side effects of globalization has been discredited. The
arrival of poor migrants is no longer seen as the logical conse-
quence of an internationalizing labor market but as an invasion of
aliens. Multiculturalism is no longer seen as the epitome of liberal
democracy but as an ideology that undermines society’s ability to
respond to the reprehensible ideas and practices of minorities.
Parties on the left reluctantly accede that immigration causes
problems, while right-wing parties adamantly argue that liberal
democracies have been too soft, too accommodating, too under-
standing. I refer to these notions as Culturalism, a discourse orga-
nized around the idea that the world is divided into cultures and
that our enlightened, liberal culture should be defended against
the claims of minorities committed to illiberal religions and ideol-
ogies.
The Netherlands is often considered an exemplary case of a
country where multiculturalism has been abandoned in favor of
policies that demand and enforce integration. In 1991, Frits Bolk-
estein, the leader of the right-wing Liberals, argued that the cul-
ture of the West was very different from – and vastly superior to –
the culture of Islam. He claimed that the integration of minorities
had failed and that this was due to the overly accommodating
stance of multiculturalists and welfare workers. Since Bolkestein
made his intervention in 1991, discursive assaults against multi-
culturalism, Islam, welfare workers and the left have proliferated.
After Frits Bolkestein came Paul Scheffer, followed by Pim For-
tuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders. What matters now is not
the background of these individuals or the particulars of their
ideas (we will come to that) but the fact that they were, without
exception, culturalists. It is therefore not surprising that Baukje
Prins argued in 2004 that “Bolkestein’s plea against taboos, for
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the defense of Western values and for the necessity of tough meas-
ures … has achieved a definite victory” (Prins 2004: 13). Many
other observers have come to the same conclusion, even if they
have not used the same terms. Ellie Vasta (2007) speaks of a trans-
formation of the “minorities policy” into a “majority policy”; Han
Entzinger (2003) chronicles the “fall of multiculturalism”; Willem
Schinkel (2008) argues that a discourse that he refers to as “cul-
turism” has been dominant since the 1990s; and Peter Scholten
(2007) speaks of the “rise of assimilationism”. These scholarly ob-
servations echo journalistic accounts that portray the Netherlands
as a country that has moved from tolerance to intolerance or – if
the journalist leaned more towards Culturalism – from naïveté to-
wards realism.
The question that immediately impresses itself upon the ana-
lyst of integration politics is: why? Why did Culturalism come to
dominate in a country that was so accommodating of minorities?
This question concerns me here as well, though I will have reason
to rephrase it. But before answering or even rephrasing the ques-
tion, we need to attend to a claim that usually appears so trivial
that it remains unexamined. When commentators claim that Cul-
turalism (or any other discourse, ideology or sentiment) “domi-
nates”, they rarely, if ever, elaborate on what this domination en-
tails. What, exactly, is a discourse? What do we mean when we say
that a discourse is “strong” or “dominant”? How do we measure
the growth or decline in the power of a discourse? And how do we
explain such dynamics of power? These questions have relevance
far beyond the case of integration politics in the Netherlands, as
they touch upon problems that have plagued (and inspired) social
science from its inception, such as the interplay of the material
and symbolic dimensions of politics and the causes of social
change. Because of its volatility and dynamism, Dutch integration
politics provides an interesting and challenging case to think
through some of the theoretical, conceptual and methodological
questions that emerge when we want to understand the dynamics
of power better.
Since policy concerns motivate much of the research on inte-
gration, it is perhaps helpful if I indicate straight away that my
goal is not to develop a view on integration or to propose measures
to promote it. Neither is my goal to criticize Culturalism or any
other discourse. If we want to understand why a discourse gener-
ates support, the last thing we want to do is to qualify or correct
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the arguments of its proponents. However frustrating it may be
for analysts to postpone judgment, the key to explaining why ac-
tors promote certain discourses is to understand why they do so,
not why they should not. This also implies that we should not ana-
lyze discourses as emerging from uncivil motives, as antagonists
in integration politics routinely do when they posit that their op-
ponents support a certain position because they are prejudiced,
naive, scared, ignorant, racist, opportunistic and so on. My goal is
not to take sides but to understand why actors take sides and to
explain why they win or lose. I want to develop an approach for
analyzing dynamic power relations and apply it to a case study of
the vexing transformations in Dutch integration politics.
How, then, do we explain the emergence of Culturalism or, for
that matter, other developments in integration politics? Conven-
tional approaches, I argue in the next chapter, have difficulty an-
swering this question because they assume continuity rather than
change, domination rather than contention. Although I draw
heavily on Pierre Bourdieu, his work, too, sometimes lapses into
an absolutist and static understanding of power relations. His no-
tion of symbolic power, for instance, is defined in such a way that
it refers only to power relations that are accepted by the dominant
as well as the dominated. The major benefit of such a conceptuali-
zation is that it enables the researcher to identify one – crucial,
foundational, essential – logic of power. But especially when we
consider a case as dynamic and contentious as Dutch integration
politics, we should start from the assumption that there is no sin-
gle logic governing conflict. It is precisely the struggle between dif-
ferent ideas and notions – articulated through integration dis-
courses and embodied by antagonists – that this study examines.
The purpose of this study is therefore to foreground the politics
of integration and to develop an approach that captures the con-
tentious dynamics of struggles over religion and culture. Politics
is, as Harold Lasswell famously said, about “who gets what, when
and how” (1936). But it is also about how people see things and
how they are seen. Politics does not consist exclusively of the or-
dering and processing of endogenous preferences but is also
about the interpretation of reality, the demarcation of symbolic
boundaries and the mobilization of sentiments. While politics has
never been entirely instrumental, it has become more ostenta-
tiously symbolic now that the media communicate images and
sounds with increasing intensity and velocity (Hajer 2009). The
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media, in turn, is not a unified apparatus but a complex constella-
tion of stages, producers and publics. The questions that Lasswell
associated with the political sciences are now inextricably interwo-
ven with the questions he associated with communication: “who
says what, to whom, in what channel, and with what effect?” (Lass-
well 1948: 37).
Precisely for these reasons, a political sociology of integration
cannot do without discourse analysis. Discourse analysis shows
how classifications, categorizations and labels serve to maintain
or transform power relations, how settings of communication in-
fluence interactions and how the meaning of events becomes sub-
ject to discursive struggle. Discourse analysis has advanced the
study of politics by opening up to investigation the ways in which
actors negotiate their understandings, not just their interests. I
feel, however, that its practitioners have too often presented dis-
course analysis as an alternative to more traditional approaches
that aim to uncover objective relations. Whereas the systematic,
quantitative analyses of traditional researchers are systematically
blind to the meaning and drama of politics, discourse analysis –
with some notable exceptions – has focused on the interpretation
of images, performances and texts. To avoid the easy but lethal
criticism that discourse analysis presents “just another take” on
reality, it is necessary to ground interpretative analysis in an ap-
proach that acknowledges and identifies the objective relations
that structure subjective interpretations. This study therefore in-
corporates the analysis of social inequalities and institutional
structures into discourse analysis. To understand why discourses
originate and why they prevail, we need to systematically research
the figurations in which they are mobilized and through which
they accrue meaning. This implies that we should not study Cul-
turalism as a singular discursive order that engulfs the totality of
society but rather as a force that emerges from, and transforms,
political fault lines. To understand its rise to power and to appreci-
ate the ambivalences and limitations of that power, we need to
develop a relational perspective and probe the interactions be-
tween this discourse (actors promoting it) and other discourses
(actors promoting them). The central question that this book thus
seeks to answer is: How and why did power relations transform in
Dutch integration politics between 1980 and 2006?1
The plan of the current study is to first elaborate, in Chapter 2,
my approach to answering this central question. The question is
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then divided into two parts. Part II focuses on the integration de-
bate and analyzes opinion articles on integration that were pub-
lished in three broadsheet newspapers. Part III investigates the
governance of integration and focuses specifically on the relations
between the government and minority associations in Amsterdam
and Rotterdam. Part IV draws together the main findings, pro-
vides answers to the research question and explores the study’s
relevance beyond Dutch integration politics.
19

2 The struggle for civil power
This chapter’s purpose is to develop conceptual lenses that allow
us to ask empirical questions about the dynamics of power in in-
tegration politics. The chapter begins with a discussion of Jeffrey
Alexander’s work on the civil sphere and how it can be used to
study integration politics. It then posits Bourdieu’s field analysis
as a fruitful avenue for examining power relations in the civil
sphere. I subsequently argue that discourse analysis and network
analysis can increase the explanatory leverage of field analysis.
The result is an approach that provides a relational understanding
of civil power, enabling us to examine transformations of power
relations in a variety of different settings. Towards the end of the
chapter, I argue that other approaches to the study of integration
politics – while providing insight into power relations – do not
sufficiently account for its dynamism. Finally, I indicate how this
study’s research question will be answered.
Integration: A national fascination
After it became clear that labor and post-colonial immigrants were
here to stay, Western European countries developed comprehen-
sive institutional practices and discursive frameworks to deter-
mine if and how these outsiders would be recognized as citizens.
The response to the presence of immigrants reflected each coun-
try’s conceptions of nationhood and citizenship. In the United
Kingdom, immigrants were classified mainly in terms of “race”.
In France, they were labeled as “citizens” in the tradition of the
Republic. Immigrants in Germany were excluded from citizen-
ship as a result of the ethnic understanding institutionalized in its
citizenship regime, while in the Netherlands ethnic diversity was
accommodated according to the indigenous logic of “pillarization”
(Brubaker 1992; Favell 2001; Joppke 1996; Koopmans et al.
2005).1
While national idiosyncrasies endure, there seems to be a con-
vergence in citizenship regimes across Western Europe. Most na-
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tional governments now explicitly aim to reduce the immigration
of low-skilled (family) migrants and have developed comprehen-
sive programs to turn those who do immigrate into self-sufficient
and autonomous citizens (Joppke 2007). The desired outcome is
individual and societal integration (Favell 2003). Joppke is quite
right when he suggests that talk of ‘national models’ sounds old-
fashioned (Joppke 2004: 452). Left- and right-leaning parties now
also seem to agree on the basic ingredients of successful integra-
tion policy: the immigration of poor migrants must be curtailed,
discrimination should be combated, and a set of incentives and
disincentives put in place to induce immigrants to become eco-
nomically productive and culturally assimilated citizens (Joppke
2007).
This international convergence and cross-party consensus on
the necessity of integration does not, however, preclude conten-
tion. While there is certainly convergence between countries and
parties when it comes to integration policies, integration politics
has grown more contentious. Integration politics has burst out of
its specific policy domain and entered into what Jeffrey Alexander
(2006) refers to as the civil sphere – those institutions and com-
municative channels where actors negotiate the conditions and
nature of civil belonging. The assassinations of the populist politi-
cian Pim Fortuyn and the filmmaker Theo van Gogh (see Chapter
5) are just two of the most extreme examples of a constant stream
of mediatized incidents somehow associated with the presence of
immigrants and especially Muslims. Newspapers and television
programs constantly cover integration issues and the struggle to
define what incidents and events mean: what does an assassina-
tion mean for the integration of Muslims, how should we inter-
pret high crime rates among immigrants, what do we think of the
fears among natives, what can or should the government ask of
immigrants regarding their adaptation or assimilation? The an-
swers to these questions define and redefine civil solidarities, de-
termining who is in and who is out.
Discursive struggles in the civil sphere
Jeffrey Alexander’s conceptualization of the civil sphere – com-
prised of institutions and communicative channels that “generate
the capacity for social criticism and democratic integration” (Alex-
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ander 2006: 4) – allows analysis of struggles over inclusion and
exclusion. “Such a sphere,” Alexander posits, “relies on solidarity,
on feelings for others whom we do not know but whom we res-
pect out of principle, not experience, because of our putative com-
mitment to a common secular faith” (ibid). As with any faith, how-
ever, sacredness implies the existence of profanity. The civil
sphere is akin to religion in that it has institutions and rituals
through which some actions, motives or relations are rendered
pure, and others polluted. Alexander identifies a distinctive sym-
bolic code of the civil sphere that:
supplies the structured categories of pure and impure into which
every member, or potential member, of civil society is made to fit.
… Members of national communities firmly believe that “the
world,” and this notably includes their own nation, is filled with
people who either do not deserve freedom and communal sup-
port or are not capable of sustaining them… they do not wish to
include them, protect them, or offer them rights, for they con-
ceive them as being unworthy and amoral, as in some sense “un-
civilized”. (2006: 55)
Much has been written about the procedures through which na-
tions define and defend their formal membership.2 But here my
concern is with integration politics, i.e. with the struggles through
which differences and inequalities are constructed between indi-
viduals and groups that share the same nationality, namely the
Dutch one. More specifically, I want to examine how some identi-
ties and acts are construed as civil, while others are not. As Alex-
ander argues, civil politics is:
a discursive struggle. It is about the distribution of leader and
followers, groups and institutions, not only in terms of material
hierarchies but across highly structured symbolic sets. Power
conflicts are not simply about who gets what and how much.
They are about who will be what, and for how long. Representa-
tion is critical. In the interplay between communicative institu-
tions and their public audiences, will a group be represented in
terms of one set of symbolic categories rather than another? This
is the critical question.
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The meanings ascribed through discourses are by no means neu-
tral: they not only define certain identities and problems but also
ascribe civil value to some identities, actions or behaviors while
degrading others. Civil discourses define who belongs to a civil
community. A civil community is analytically and empirically dis-
tinct from a national community. While people with passports and
full citizenship rights are formally full members, many are re-
garded as being outside society – which is why they have to be
contained (prisoners) or integrated (immigrants, the unemployed)
(see also Schinkel 2007). Integration discourses stipulate how the
civil community will be protected and who or what will be sancti-
fied or sacrificed in the process. Integration discourses also sug-
gest ways to design state institutions so that they better sanction
civil identities and practices. Through laws, regulations and mate-
rial support, the ideas and notions that compose integration dis-
courses can be inscribed into the state. Researching civil politics
as a process of continuous discursive struggle means studying
how actors categorize one another and why they succeed or fail to
impose their definition of the situation on policies and debates.
The limitations of Alexander’s strong program
While this study employs many of Jeffrey Alexander’s concepts to
analyze integration politics, it does not adopt his explanatory strat-
egy. His analysis in The Civil Sphere (2006) is emblematic of his
“strong program” in cultural sociology developed over recent years
with several colleagues at Yale University. The type of cultural so-
ciology Alexander advocates requires, first, that other “non-sym-
bolic social relations” are “bracketed out” in order to reconstruct
“the culture structure as a social text” (Alexander & Smith 2001:
n.p.). The analyst then examines the impact of “culture structures”
on social practices by anchoring “causality in proximate actors and
agencies” (ibid). In his analysis of the civil sphere, this means that
Alexander identifies some types of actors as agents of civil repair.
Through metaphors and performances, social movements and
other actors can entice “core groups” – i.e. historically dominant
groups – to view previously stigmatized groups as full members of
the civil community. Even though Alexander acknowledges that
the drive for exclusion is as foundational for the construction of
the civil sphere as the drive for inclusion, he designates only pro-
gressive movements as “civil”. But as several reviewers of Alexan-
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der’s work have pointed out, nativist movements of the past as
well as the contemporary new right articulate their demands in a
civil vocabulary (e.g. Wolve 2007; Hurenkamp 2009). Much the
same is true for movements that mobilize against Muslims and
other minorities. While Alexander would undoubtedly consider
them “backlash movements”, this is not how they view and pre-
sent themselves. Chapter 5 shows, for instance, that culturalists
employ a symbolically rich discourse in which they frame their
own interventions as a force for reason, truth and freedom. To
claim that culturalists have grown stronger because civil or uncivil
forces have prevailed does not offer an explanation but merely
helps to politically locate the analyst who bestows such labels.
Alexander’s work – while providing rich descriptions of the
struggles over the status and incorporation of women, blacks and
Jews – glosses over power. His framework explains how but not
why social movements proliferate or falter at particular moments;
nor does it enable us to gauge the impact of power within the civil
sphere since civil relations are, by (Alexander’s) definition, charac-
terized by equality and solidarity. Though Alexander recognizes
the impact of social inequalities on the distribution of civil power
(see below), his strong program in cultural sociology demands
that he “brackets out” these relations. In short, Alexander’s con-
cepts are useful to describe what integration politics consists of,
but are insufficient to identify and explain dynamic power rela-
tions.
Field analysis and inequalities in the civil sphere
Whereas Alexander’s project is to identify the “possibilities of jus-
tice” in liberal democracies, Pierre Bourdieu’s work demonstrates
the limitations of liberal democracy.3 Bourdieu focuses on how
seemingly universal institutions – religion, education, democracy
– can work to legitimate and conceal social inequalities (Bourdieu,
2005). His work can thus help us to incorporate the analysis of
inequality in the study of the civil sphere – a necessary step to
analyze integration politics. Synthesizing the work of both theor-
ists, I argue, yields considerable theoretical returns, as the weak-
ness of one author is the strength of the other. Alexander provides
a vocabulary to explain the formation of solidarities between ac-
tors with divergent interests; Bourdieu shows how particular inter-
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ests motivate universal claims (cf. Bourdieu 1990). But how can
we achieve this synthesis? My argument is that the concept of the
“civil sphere” can be borrowed from Alexander’s cultural sociology
and inserted into Bourdieu’s field theory so that the civil sphere
can be analyzed as a field. This theoretical move is possible be-
cause the civil sphere, as identified by Alexander, has two structur-
al properties that Bourdieu associates with fields.
First, like fields, the civil sphere has a measure of autonomy: it
has a distinct logic through which hierarchies are constructed be-
tween different actors who partake in a struggle. Like science, re-
ligion or art, the civil sphere has a vocabulary that all who wish to
partake in it must speak. They must speak in the name of democ-
racy, freedom and justice, and against those groups and dis-
courses that threaten these values. Actors engage in struggles
over classification as they try to impose their particular visions of
the social world while devaluing those of their opponents (Bour-
dieu 1991: 170; Wacquant 1992: 14). A culturalist, for instance,
might argue that the Islamic world has not yet experienced en-
lightenment and that its believers therefore suffer from irrational-
ity and a distorted view of society. A critic of Culturalism, in con-
trast, might argue that fear of Islam amounts to hysteria and that
civil integration is possible if all parties calmly look for solutions.
In the specific vocabulary of the civil sphere, antagonists portray
their opponents as a threat to the civil community, its democratic
relationships and its capacities for rational reasoning (Alexander
2006: 57-62).
Second, like fields, the civil sphere only has relative autonomy: it
refracts the power relations and inequalities of the surrounding
environment. This point is crucial for Bourdieu, since he argues
that the struggle for legitimation within fields is determined by
the mobilization and conversion of different forms of capital.
While Alexander’s “strong program” precludes analysis of the ef-
fects of such inequalities on power relations within the civil
sphere, he acknowledges that its autonomy is relative. The out-
come of struggles within the civil sphere “depends on resources
and inputs from other spheres… In this sense it can be said that
civil society is dependent upon these spheres” (Alexander 2006:
54-55). Alexander’s account of the performances and symbolism
of the civil rights movement, for instance, complements rather
than contradicts explanations that center on the growing econom-
ic power of the Southern black population or the organizational
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strength of the black churches. While Alexander’s strong program
of cultural sociology demands that we “bracket out” such material
and organizational factors, his conceptualization of the civil
sphere does not require us to do so.
The concept of civil sphere thus understood is very close to
Bourdieu’s understanding of the “field of power”4 – “the public
sphere situated at the intersection of the political field and the bu-
reaucratic field” (Wacquant 2007: 1). This concept, designed to
overcome the substantialist notion of a “ruling class,” allows the
relational analysis of struggles between elites rooted in different
locations of various fields (Bourdieu 1985; Wacquant 1993). I thus
conceive of the civil sphere as a space of struggle where actors
compete and cooperate to define who belongs to the civil commu-
nity and what its problems are. The civil sphere is a meta-field
where logics from different fields collide or coalesce (Couldry
2003). Actors from different fields (academia, parliamentary poli-
tics, journalism, civil society associations, literature) try to pro-
mote their particular visions of the social world in public debates
and to inscribe these visions into state institutions. Integration
politics therefore does not primarily revolve around the relations
between different ethnic or religious groups but between actors
who promote different views of minorities and integration issues.
At stake in the struggles is the value of embodied views and per-
spectives. We will see in Part II, for instance, that sociologists in
the integration debate5 advocate empirical research and apprecia-
tion of local contingencies against the tendency of culturalists to
think in terms of civilizational or cultural conflict. Since sociolo-
gists have historically played an important role in advising the
state on how to solve integration problems, it is hardly surprising
that they advocate calm assessment to produce effective policy. In
contrast, philosophers in the Dutch integration debate tend to fo-
cus on the fundamental principles that should inform integration
politics and argue that the sacred texts – rather than the social
practices – of Muslims should be subject to scrutiny. They usually
do not detail how policies should be implemented, but instead
argue, with reference to exemplary cases, the need to protect or
reject a general principle. Representatives of both disciplines thus
do not simply advance arguments about minority integration, they
also try to show the value of the schemes of perception over which
they have expert control. Divisions within academia are thus re-
fracted and renegotiated in the civil sphere where actors translate
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views cultivated in particular fields into discourses on how to un-
derstand and govern diversity.
Discourses, networks and the limitations of Bourdieu’s analysis of
symbolic power
Bourdieu’s work provides the basic concepts and strategies to ana-
lyze struggles within the civil sphere and to undertake the sort of
political sociology that Alexander’s principled neglect of things
non-symbolic prevents. The idea that integration politics is essen-
tially about classificatory struggles and the inscription of these
classifications into bodies and institutions is central to this study,
as is the idea that actors mobilize different quantities and types of
capital in their struggle to make their particular discourse domi-
nant. Although Bourdieu has often been characterized as a repro-
duction theorist, his work offers ample analytical tools to map and
explain historical change (Gorski 2012a). Nevertheless, the criti-
cism that Bourdieu does not account for transformation – though
not entirely accurate – does apply to his concept of symbolic
power. While many of Bourdieu’s key concepts are designed to
map the gradations, differentiations and dynamics of power, his
writings have continued to rely on an overly structuralist concep-
tion of symbolic power.
“Symbolic power” for Bourdieu “is that invisible power which
can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not
want to know that they are subject to it or even they themselves
exercise it” (1991: 164). The dominated are complacent in their
own subordination because they do not have the capacity to think
outside of the discourses that historically powerful actors have im-
posed on them. In Bourdieu’s view, the state is the harbinger of
such power because state institutions can inculcate subjects with
schemes of perception which cue them to view the arbitrary power
of the state as authoritative (1997: 175-176). This conception of
symbolic power, however, is too absolutist: it does not help to iden-
tify power where there is open discursive conflict, as is the case in
Dutch integration politics. The same criticism applies to the dis-
course analysis of Willem Schinkel who, inspired by Bourdieu,
analyzes the integration discourse (Schinkel 2008). Schinkel ar-
gues that while actors in integration politics may appear to be viru-
lently opposed to each other, their positions in fact emanate from
one and the same discourse. In this type of analysis, actors’ posi-
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tions are over-determined by a discourse that so curtails the range
of available options that the differences between actors become
mere surface appearances. Without being able to account for the
substantive differences between actors, it becomes impossible to
analyze the relations of power between them.
Bourdieu’s understanding of symbolic power not only absolu-
tizes discourse, it also absolutizes power. For Bourdieu, power ex-
presses itself most forcefully in the absence of conflict. While I
accept this argument, a case as contentious as Dutch integration
politics requires not only looking beneath the surface of political
life for shared doxa but also analysis of actual conflict (cf. Bour-
dieu 1998a: 57). When Bourdieu maps power differentials be-
tween actors, he tends to equate power with capital. Rather than
focusing on actors’ interactions or strategies, Bourdieu proposes
to study the distribution of capital which, in his view, constitutes
the objective relations that structure a field. Bourdieu’s principled
unwillingness to examine interactions6 reduces his capacity to un-
derstand the dynamics of collective action (cf. Crossley 2003; Gir-
ling 2004). Though the distribution of capital obviously shapes
social action, the networks formed through interaction have an in-
dependent effect on power relations (Wellman 1988). The power
of groups depends in part on their capacity to function as a group
– that is, to channel resources and to coordinate action (Brugge-
man 2008). Considering discourses and networks, I argue, com-
plements Bourdieu’s conception of symbolic power and allows us
to better grasp the dynamics and ambivalence of power relations.
Discourses and discursive power
I define discourse as a coherent ensemble of framing and feeling rules
through which meaning and emotion are ascribed to material and so-
cial realities. Let us examine these terms one at a time. I speak of a
coherent ensemble to indicate that we cannot speak of a discourse if
the attribution of meaning is entirely random (Hajer 1995: 44).
Discourse implies that there are discernible patterns: a position
on one issue corresponds to a position on another. For instance,
people who argue that Islam and democracy are incompatible are
also likely to believe that immigrants should be obliged to learn
Dutch, that integration policies have failed, that Israel occupies
Palestinian territories out of self-defense, that there should be less
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attention paid to the atrocities committed in the Netherlands’ colo-
nial past, that Turkey should not join the European Union and
that Dutch elites are imprisoned in a culture of political correct-
ness. The correspondence of positions on these seemingly dispa-
rate issues justifies speaking of a discourse (a culturalist discourse
in my terminology) in the same way that correspondence between
scores on different variables indicates the presence of a shared
dimension.
The notion of framing is used extensively in the social move-
ment literature to highlight the importance of signification. A
frame is “an interpretative schemata that signifies and condenses
‘the world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding ob-
jects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences in one’s pre-
sent or past environments” (Snow & Benford 1992: 137; Goffman
1974). In my understanding, a frame is composed of ideas, no-
tions and symbols. “Ideas” refer to explicit assumptions and cau-
sal reasoning. We may call this the intellectual element of dis-
course, as ideas stipulate how the world works and suggest
certain ways to identify and explain patterns of social behavior.
“Notions” refer to immediate conceptions or impressions. Notions
very often remain implicit but can be expressed as statements that
immediately reveal the position of actors. When actors remark
that “the West has experienced enlightenment” or posit that “inte-
gration requires mutual respect”, they immediately reveal their
adherence to a certain discourse (respectively, a culturalist dis-
course and a pragmatist discourse in the terminology I develop in
Chapter 3). “Symbols” are visual or verbal representations of
values or collectives, such as the Christian cross, the Quran or the
constitution. The meaning of these symbols is not stable but de-
pends on how they are mobilized. The Quran, for instance, fig-
ures prominently in the discourse of both Muslims and cultural-
ists but in very different ways.
Depending on the frame through which they ascribe meaning
to reality,7 actors not only see but also feel different things. Hochs-
child’s notion of “feeling and framing rules” captures nicely how
emotions are implicated in processes of signification. Framing
rules stipulate how we ascribe definitions or meanings to situa-
tions; feeling rules “refer to guidelines for the assessment of fits
and misfits between feeling and situation” (Hochschild 1979:
566). I frequently use words like “feel” or “sense” to indicate that
what actors “think” is not merely a matter of cognition but also a
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sensual process. The routine ascription of meaning-emotion nor-
mally referred to as “common sense” is different for actors em-
bodying different discourses. As the experiments of John Bargh
and other psychologists and neuroscientists have shown, embod-
ied schemes of perception serve to assign positive or negative sen-
timents to persons, actions or statements in an instant reflex (e.g.
Bargh & Chartrand 1999; Kaplan et al. 2006: 55). Apart from
these instantaneous emotional responses, different discourses
also stipulate how emotions should be managed (Hochschild
1979). For instance, one influential promoter of Culturalism, Paul
Scheffer, incessantly criticizes politicians and administrators for
failing to communicate a “sense of urgency” about the unfolding
“multicultural drama” that poses “the biggest threat to social
peace” (Scheffer 2000).8 Others warn against too much anxiety
over integration issues and argue that we need to suppress preju-
dice to allow calm deliberation (see Part II).
A political geography of discourse
Discourses are produced in settings located in particular parts of a
field or at the intersection of different fields. To grasp such situa-
tional differentiation, we need to think of the civil sphere not only
as a symbolic universe or an abstract space but as a physical space
with a distinct geography.9 Integration discourses are formed in
and through social practices in different settings (cf. Bourdieu
1980). The particular demands of the situation in these different
settings induce actors to adopt discourses that serve some instru-
mental, material or emotional interest (Swidler 1994). For in-
stance, diversity management professionals tend to adopt a parti-
cular integration discourse designed to capitalize on diversity
within businesses or communities. These diversity managers,
Chapter 9 shows, portray the city as a vibrant and diverse metro-
pole where citizens are united in their pride of place. This integra-
tion discourse is cultivated in a different ecology of settings than,
say, Culturalism. Culturalism is cultivated within right-leaning
periodicals, right-leaning political parties and other specific set-
tings discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Every discourse has its
strongholds, its milieus, where participants share symbolic and
class interests and are able to articulate a civil discourse from their
perspective. Beyond these milieus, discourses clash and collide in
arenas, i.e. settings where promoters of different discourses clash
31
before a remote audience. All fields have settings that resemble
milieus and ones that resemble arenas. Generally speaking, the
central settings of the civil sphere (the parliament, the media)
have large, diverse audiences and function as arenas, while the
more marginal settings of the civil sphere (civil society associa-
tions, university departments) have smaller and more select audi-
ences and function more as milieus. The distinction between mili-
eus and arenas, while crude, allows us to specify the nature of
discourse production in different settings and to indicate how dif-
ferent actors generate or mobilize discourses within them. With
these conceptualizations of discourse in place, we can provision-
ally define discursive power as the capacity of a discourse, or the
actor mobilizing it, to ascribe meaning and emotion to material
and social realities. Struggles in the civil sphere then revolve
around civil power – the power to define who belongs to a civil
community and what its problems are. But how can we conceptua-
lize power?
Networks – a relational conception of power
I conceptualize power as an emergent property of relations that
emanates from, and structures, social interactions (Elias 1978).
Power is the “outgrowth of the positions that social actors occupy
in one or more networks... Far from being an attribute or property
of actors, then, power is unthinkable outside matrices of force re-
lations; it emerges out of the very way in which figurations ... of
relationships are patterned and operate” (Emirbayer 1997: 292).
Actors “have” (or rather, concentrate) power to the extent that
others in their networks feel forced, induced or seduced to infuse
them with attention, funds, practical help or other power re-
sources. Central actors are powerful because they serve as brokers
and mediators of the resources available within figurations. Ex-
actly what sort of power is at stake depends on the context: the
sources and workings of power differ between, say, intellectual
conflicts, military conflicts and struggles within bureaucracies.
While such differences add complexity, in all these figurations
power emerges from asymmetrical interactions that concentrate
resources in central actors while withholding them from marginal
actors.
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This relational understanding of power has implications for dis-
course analysis. Discourse is thoroughly relational in that individ-
ual positions, words or symbols cannot be understood outside the
matrices of power relations in which they accrue significance. Dis-
courses reflect and mediate the power of groups that imbue them
with meaning; they are the interface through which actors come
to understand their relation to others and the vehicle through
which they try to redefine these relations.10 In Dutch integration
politics, we see that culturalists attempted – quite successfully – to
cleanse their group of the stigma of racism and prejudice. They
engaged in counter-stigmatization by painting their opponents as
dogmatic multiculturalists who censor truthful and sincere critics.
The introduction of new words (“multiculturalist” entered the
Dutch debate in the mid-1990s as a slur) and changes to the
meaning of existing words (accusations of “racism” became taboo
in the 1990s) thus signify a changing balance of power. This latter
concept allows us to see “shades and grades in the power differen-
tials of human groups. Tradition has confined us too long to static
polarities, such as ruled and rulers, where one obviously needs the
imaginary of a gliding approach, the ability to say ‘more’ or ‘less’”
(Elias 1998: 189).11
Research strategy
How can we employ this relational conception of power to analyze
change in integration politics? Parts II and III investigate the dy-
namics of power in two different civil sphere settings: the opinion
pages of three broadsheet newspapers and the governance net-
works of the Netherlands’ two largest cities. Although the settings
are very different, Parts II and III both analyze moments in the
formation and transformation of power relations within fields (cf.
Gorski 2012b).
The genesis of fields. The starting point for my analysis is the gen-
esis of the fields in which integration politics has historically
played out: the civil sphere and the state bureaucracy. To explain
the inception and early development of a policy field for minority
integration within the state bureaucracy, I locate its genesis within
the broader development of the Dutch civil sphere (cf. Bourdieu
1992). I show how power relations within the civil sphere at large
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were refracted in particular ways in different settings and how the
policy field developed its distinct power relations and contradic-
tions.
The identification of positions and oppositions. After delineating the
genesis and formation of a field, we can identify the actors within
it and the positions they take. Interpretative analysis can be used
to identify the positions of individual actors and to uncover the
civil hierarchies implicit in discourse. How do actors define inte-
gration? How do they think it should be achieved? What problems
do they identify, who do they blame and what kind of solutions do
they suggest? Part II answers these questions through a qualitative
examination of the trajectory of key actors through social space.
Vignettes describe the milieus in which actors cultivated their dis-
positions and how they took a position in relation to others. Part II
uses two relational quantitative techniques – correspondence ana-
lysis and community detection – to identify oppositions, while
Part III relies on qualitative data to map positions in governance
figurations. Through vignettes, interviews and secondary data,
Part III analyzes the milieus where discourses and actors originate
and reconstructs the formation of alliances and conflicts between
actors from different settings.
The identification of power relations. Once we have identified posi-
tions and oppositions, how do we measure the relations of power
between them? How do we determine whether a discourse is
weak or strong? The abundance of integration discourse makes it
possible, and indeed tempting, to substantiate preconceived ideas
about the power of discourses. It is, for instance, easy to find evi-
dence for both the strength and weakness of anti-racist discourse.
To address this problem, my interpretative analysis is embedded
in a quantitative analysis that unearths the relative power of actors
by examining their positions within figurations. To remain with
the example of anti-racist discourse, the question is not whether
anti-racists have a presence in broadsheet newspapers or receive
subsidies. The question is whether the promoters of Anti-racism
are more or less central than the promoters of other discourses. To
investigate the balance of power between discourses and actors
through time, Parts II and III draw upon databases that contain
quantitative indicators of civil power.
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Three possible causes of transformation. After reconstructing the de-
velopment of fields, we can ask why changes did or did not occur.
While the causes of change in power relations can only be identi-
fied empirically, here I anticipate some of my findings and use
Bourdieu’s work to identify three causal mechanisms (cf. Bour-
dieu 1984a, 1991, 1992; Gorski 2012b). I first introduce examples
from Bourdieu’s work and then discuss their relevance for ex-
plaining the formation and transformation of power relations in
the civil sphere.
The first possible cause of transformation is the reconfiguration
of relations between different fields so that the rules of the game
in the civil sphere change. In his later work, Bourdieu criticized
the subjugation of the logic of different fields to the neoliberal
logic of the market (Bourdieu 1998b, 2003). Similar processes
have taken place in integration politics: while in the 1980s it was
largely contained in a policy field, media attention intensified in
the early 1990s and especially in the first half of the 2000s. The
logic of integration politics thus became increasingly determined
by the logic of the media (Bourdieu 1998b; see also Hajer 2009;
Uitermark & Duyvendak 2008a). The involvement of the media
and the concomitant dramatization of integration politics played
into the hands of actors with the will and ability to act in the public
spotlight and to perform civil drama. Extravagant politicians like
Pim Fortuyn could challenge established elites and routines with
spectacular performances in new or increasingly important set-
tings, such as talk shows (Lunt & Stenner 2005). Mediatization
not only changed the modalities of integration politics, it also
changed the interests involved as distant audiences were pulled
into local politics. This meant that governance actors could no
longer exclusively focus on their local constituents or supporters;
remote audiences with different concerns had to be considered.
For instance, Islamic associations in a city like Amsterdam are
likely to be deeply concerned about the stigmatization of Muslims,
while large parts of the predominantly native media audience are
more likely to feel anxious about the presence and radicalization
of Muslims (Uitermark & Gielen 2010).
The second possible cause for transformation is a change in the
bases of support of actors within a field. An example from Bour-
dieu’s research is the explosive increase in the number of students
entering universities in the 1950s and early 1960s. Especially in
the new disciplines such as sociology, students had no prospects
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for a job that afforded status and stability (Bourdieu 1984a). Stu-
dents and junior teachers in these disciplines were “weakly inte-
grated” into the university system and “liable to resentment” due
to the contradiction between their “elevated expectations” and the
“disappointment of these expectations entailed by the mainte-
nance in the lowest ranks of the university hierarchy” (Bourdieu
1984a: 170). This analysis enables Bourdieu to locate the revolu-
tionary sentiment of May 1968 in those parts of the university
system where increased enrollment had created a pool of students
for whom adherence to academic orthodoxy did not pay off. Simi-
lar examples can be found at different points in the current study.
Part II discusses the example of Pim Fortuyn who was able to mo-
bilize a part of the growing segment of the population disap-
pointed with parliamentary politics. The erosion of the institu-
tions of pillarization and the growing importance of commercial
media had created a pool of potential supporters who – because of
their low levels of cultural capital and their cynicism towards es-
tablished parties – were longing for a radical and spectacular alter-
native. Part III discusses the example of the left-wing minority
associations; the aging and increasing unemployment of guest
workers led to the contraction of the traditional base of support
for left-wing minority associations and thus to their eventual de-
mise in governance networks.
The third possible cause for transformation is the making or
unmaking of alliances within or between fields. Interactions with-
in fields create asymmetrical figurations of different groups. Rela-
tions between fields are especially important for understanding
how elites interact across different fields. Towards the end of
Homo Academicus, Bourdieu developed an “embryo of a theory of
symbolic revolutions”; his hypothesis is that synchronized crises
in disparate fields can cause systemic crisis (Bourdieu & Wac-
quant 1992: 81; Bourdieu 1984a: 159-193). I would add that this
process of synchronization is not mechanical; it is the result of
coordination between elites operating in different fields. Part II
illustrates this by showing how Culturalism became a powerful
force when it gained support from an inter-field coalition of pre-
viously disparate actors including far-right politicians against mi-
gration, artists espousing the freedom of expression, philosophers
promoting enlightenment values and Social Democrats reinvent-
ing the civilizing missions of the 19th century. Similarly, Part III
shows how a coalition combining diversity managers, Labor party
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officials and Islamic associations emerged in Amsterdam follow-
ing the assassination of Theo van Gogh. The formation of these
coalitions cannot be explained solely as an outcome of changing
distributions of capital. There is no alternative to investigating
how actors’ strategic interactions produced figurations that
brought some actors together while pulling others apart.
It is perhaps important to emphasize that whether these trans-
formations occur, and in what way, depends on both actors’ strate-
gies and on sheer chance. The hijackers of 9/11 and the assassins
of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn succeeded in executing their
plans, and their acts had a major impact on integration politics.
But what if the 9/11 hijackers were caught before boarding the
planes? What if Theo van Gogh had not refused protection (as he
did) after receiving death threats? What if Fortuyn had been killed
by a radical Muslim rather than by a native Dutch environmental
activist? While these questions are impossible to answer, it is clear
that integration politics would not have been the same. Such sen-
sitivity to indeterminacy, however, does not imply that history
should be seen as a series of contingencies. Oppositions are not
formed by incidents but are remade in response to incidents
through a process of contentious sense-making. The best we can
do is to reconstruct this process of discursive struggle and show
why some actors gained power while others lost it.
Discussion: How to investigate integration politics?
The purpose of this chapter has been to develop a conceptual fra-
mework that can inform specific research questions and meth-
odologies. Drawing on the work of Alexander, Bourdieu and Elias,
I have suggested that a field analysis of civil politics provides a
promising vantage point from which to analyze the dynamics of
power in Dutch integration politics. To recapitulate: I view integra-
tion politics as a series of struggles within the civil sphere. The
civil sphere is a meta-field where actors rooted in different fields
struggle to make their particular discourses dominant. The stake
in these struggles is civil power: the power to define who belongs
to a civil community and what its problems are. This power is not
an attribute of an actor or a system but an emergent property of
social interactions between actors unequally invested with re-
sources. Actors mobilize different kinds of capital to articulate
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and institutionalize their particular definitions of the civil commu-
nity and its problems. At the most abstract level, transformations
occur (1) when the rules of the game change so that some views or
resources are revalued, (2) when actors form or break alliances to
promote a certain discourse, and (3) when actors mobilize larger
quantities and different types of resources to challenge estab-
lished interests. How will this framework add to our understand-
ing of integration politics? Let us compare the approach I have
outlined to five other streams of research that center around citi-
zenship regimes, racial domination, cultural clashes, pluralism
and the politics of recognition, respectively.
National models and minority mobilization
In comparative and historical research, integration politics is often
conceived of in terms of national citizenship regimes. Rogers Bru-
baker has shown how conceptions of nationhood find their way
into institutions and structure the access and conditions of citi-
zenship (Brubaker 1992). The research of Sydney Verba and his
colleagues demonstrates that different nations have distinct cul-
tures and institutions that determine how social and economic in-
equalities affect the level and nature of civil engagement (Verba et
al. 1987). A number of researchers have furthermore demon-
strated that state institutions influence the extent to which minor-
ities mobilize, and through them identities (Ireland 1994, 2004;
Favell 2001; Fetzer & Soper 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005). These
studies work on (and often corroborate) the hypothesis that there
are distinct discursive and institutional political opportunity struc-
tures that enable and constrain actors to make certain claims.
Many observers note that the dominant notion of “race relations”
in the United Kingdom has encouraged political actors to mobi-
lize around racial identities (as blacks or Asians) rather than, for
example, religious identities (Modood 2005). French state institu-
tions, in contrast, encourage political actors to mobilize as citizens
of the Republic rather than, say, as ethnic minorities (Chambon
2002; Garbaye 2002).
I draw upon these insights in Part III, where I show that the
opportunities inherent in local governance figurations shape
power relations between governance actors. Nevertheless, the lit-
erature on institutions, political opportunities and citizenship re-
gimes tends to focus on continuity rather than change (Goodwin
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& Jasper 1999; Duyvendak et al. 2005). As a result, researchers
often give short shrift to explanations of why political opportu-
nities change. While inherited institutional figurations obviously
influence the agenda and identities of actors, they cannot account
for their dynamism.
Can the explanation in terms of national models be “saved” if
we consider that models change with voter attitudes? Did – as
Koopmans and his colleagues suggest (Koopmans et al. 2005) –
growing public dissatisfaction with multiculturalism and hostility
towards Islam lead politicians to reconsider and transform past
institutional frameworks? Survey results in fact show that atti-
tudes are remarkably constant; they do not show a clear trend of
decreasing support for multiculturalism or growing hostility to-
wards minorities (Gijsberts & Vervoort 2007; Van de Vijver et al.
2007). Although a considerable share of the population (especially
those segments with low levels of cultural capital) express xeno-
phobic or anti-migration sentiments, this share has not grown
over time, implying that changes in public opinion cannot explain
the turbulence and volatility of integration politics.
In this study, the attitudes and sentiments of the population
come into view, but only to the extent that they are mobilized by
civil actors. Dynamism is understood as a play of discursive power
in different settings where actors try to garner support and to dis-
credit their opponents. The outcome is a matter of civil power, not
of intrinsic merit. If we look at integration politics in this way, it is
no longer possible to speak of “a model that has failed” or to say
that “the Dutch” have changed. Instead, we need to examine
where discourses come from, how they were mobilized in strug-
gles and how the actors promoting them came to dominate or fal-
ter in different settings. Instead of assuming that Dutch (or Am-
sterdam or Rotterdam) policies and debates originate from a
single logic (a “model”), we need to investigate how different ac-
tors struggle to make their logic dominant and why they succeed
or fail.
The study of racial domination
Researchers like Philomena Essed and Teun van Dijk have exten-
sively investigated racism and discourses on racism in the Nether-
lands and elsewhere. Teun van Dijk’s analysis of elite discourse in
the 1980s and 1990s shows how some actors attempted to broad-
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en the discursive space for culturalist discourses through the dis-
crediting of the anti-racist movement (Van Dijk 1993, 2003; see
also Van der Valk 2002). My analysis in Part II confirms that
Anti-racism was, indeed, a marginal discourse and that it re-
mained so throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Essed’s re-
search on the experiences of black women in the Netherlands,
moreover, shows how discursive domination can be researched
through the experiences of its victims (Essed 1991). But though I
use or confirm certain insights from the anti-racist literature, I do
not adopt it wholesale for at least two reasons.
The first reason is that concepts like “new racism” and “cultural
racism” capture new discourses of alterity in the old language of
color racism (Schinkel 2008: 85). While this serves the purpose of
showing the continuity and similarity of exclusions produced by
seemingly different discourses, it does not sufficiently capture
their civil dimension. Integration discourses, including most var-
iants of Culturalism, do not serve (only) to demarcate the bound-
aries of a white nation but (also) seek to expand and restore a civil
community. While thinking in terms of a civil community is ana-
logous to racism in that it hinges on the division between insiders
and outsiders, it is also an alternative to racist discourse in that it
creates possibilities for outsiders to be defined, and to define
themselves, as worthy members of the community. Indeed, some
of the major players in integration politics we will encounter in
Part II are newcomers who turn their stigma into a mark of dis-
tinction as they dissociate themselves from their ethnic commu-
nities and reaffirm the Dutch civil community.
The second reason is that the literature on racism focuses its
analysis of discourses on how they contribute to racial domina-
tion. Van Dijk, for instance, examines how the media construct
and legitimate racist domination through their choice of topics
and their framing of the news. His research on news reports in
Dutch newspapers in the 1980s conclusively shows that minor-
ities are portrayed as uncivil – as alien, violent or dependent. No
doubt similar results would be found for the 1990s and 2000s.
But studying the effects and modalities of discourses on racial or
ethnic hierarchies does not reveal their origins; nor does it explain
the power of discourses or changes within power relations among
actors. To explain the genesis, development and transformation of
discourse, we need to attend to power relations between elites in
public debates and in governance networks. Divisions within
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these debates and networks do not necessarily develop along eth-
nic or racial lines; they can develop between actors with different
disciplinary backgrounds (philosophers versus sociologists), dif-
ferent party affiliations (left and right) or different class back-
grounds (guest worker associations versus diversity managers).
Given my aim of explaining why some of these visions prevail,
describing what these actors say or do in terms of different forms
and degrees of racial domination is of limited use.
Cultural analysis
A very different set of approaches examines integration politics
through the prism of culture. The most well-known variant of cul-
tural analysis is based on the idea of civilizational conflict. The
leader of the right-wing Liberals, Frits Bolkestein, popularized the
idea of a civilizational conflict in the early 1990s when he argued
that Islam was an ideological threat to the values of liberalism
(Bolkestein 1991). In the United States, Samuel Huntington
coined the phrase “clash of civilizations” in the mid-1990s (Hun-
tington 1997). According to the idea of civilizational clash, the
fundamental division in the Netherlands as well as around the
world is between Islam and the West or between pre-Enlighten-
ment and enlightened cultures. This approach fails to account for
diversity not just within minority communities but among Dutch
natives as well (e.g., Guadeloupe & Van de Rooij 2007). The sub-
sequent chapters will reveal strong oppositions within the debate
and within governance networks that cannot be reduced to clash-
ing cultures, for the simple reason that they take place in what
Huntington or Bolkestein would regard as a single culture. Rather
than providing an explanation of the dynamics of integration poli-
tics, the promoters of this frame are a party in such conflicts. Or,
as Willem Schinkel puts it, “the clash of civilizations does not re-
sult from cultural differences but from the political recodification
and strategic mobilization of these differences” (Schinkel 2008:
103). My goal is not to decide whether there really are cultural
differences (or, for that matter, structures of racist domination)
but to explain why Culturalism emerged, from where it drew sup-
port and how it was mobilized in the discursive struggle.
Another variant of cultural analysis does not divide the world
into two separate entities but foregrounds the importance of poli-
tical and religious culture. Ian Buruma gives detailed accounts of
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the main characters in Dutch integration politics and writes exten-
sively about the evolution of Dutch political culture (Buruma
2006). Ron Eyerman takes a similar approach as he investigates
the multiple meanings of the assassination of Theo van Gogh
against the background of the Dutch “postwar psyche” (Eyerman
2008). While I incorporate insights from this literature when ana-
lyzing the evolution of the Dutch civil sphere and interpreting the
civil dramas that followed the Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh
assassinations, my aim is not to interpret meanings but to explain
why some interpretations came to prevail in the integration debate
and how state institutions were restructured as a result.
A third variant of cultural analysis has a long history in Dutch
integration research and focuses on differences between ethnic
groups. The minorities policy of the 1980s targeted the four lar-
gest immigrant groups (Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans and Surina-
mese); they have been compared to each other and to the native
Dutch on countless items, including labor market participation,
media consumption, crime rates, educational performance, ex-
perience of discrimination, etc. (see for example Penninx 1988b;
Veenman 1994; Van Tubergen & Maas 2006). Since data is gath-
ered per ethnic group, ethnicity – rather than, for instance, class –
naturally emerges as the explanation for the divergent scores (for
critiques, see Rath 1991; Essed & Nimako 2006; Schinkel 2007). I
make use of these data at various points, especially in Part III. At
times I also consider the cultural and political environment of the
sending countries: coalitions and oppositions between associa-
tions from the same ethnic group often reflect those of the politi-
cal field in Morocco and Turkey. But though actors’ backgrounds
may partly explain their positions, they do not explain the transfor-
mations that have occurred in the integration debate or within
governance figurations.
The pluralist tradition
Researchers in the pluralist tradition of political science (not to be
confused with philosophical proponents of ethnic or cultural plur-
alism) argue that power in (American) politics is not concentrated
in the hands of a single, coherent elite but distributed over a num-
ber of groups (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1980). A group with power in
one domain may have none in another. In the pluralist tradition
of Robert Dahl, Jaco Berveling’s analysis of power relations within
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Amsterdam’s governance networks (Berveling 1994) employed
numerous indicators which allowed him to determine actors’ rela-
tive power in the decision-making process. Such data on actors’
preferences and policy decisions reveal a key aspect of power rela-
tions: actors whose preferences are realized are obviously more
powerful than those whose preferences are inconsequential. The
approach, however, restricts power to such an extent that it glosses
over some of its more insidious expressions (Lukes 2005). Staying
with Berveling’s study, some actors were found to have more deci-
sion-making power than others within projects on immigrant
education and employment. But this still leaves unanswered the
most important question, namely how these actors accrued their
power in the first place. To appreciate Berveling’s finding that the
Moroccan council and the Turkish council influenced decision-
making, we need to understand how these councils were estab-
lished, their internal struggles and positions within wider figura-
tions. These historical and relational dimensions of power escape
from view when we focus solely on the extent to which actors’ pre-
ferences influence decisions – we also want to know how prefer-
ences are formed, which kinds of capital actors mobilize and how
they work together or oppose one another.
The politics of recognition
Another strand of integration research – under the rubric of “the
politics of recognition” – focuses on whether and how diversity
should be recognized (cf. Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Benhabib
2002; Prins 2002). Empirical cases here mainly serve as stepping
stones for normative analysis; the literature – which is prescriptive
rather than descriptive, normative rather than explanatory – ana-
lyzes political struggles with the purpose of resolving them. I have
no intention to propose how identities should be recognized or
which cultural practices should be condoned or accommodated.
Rather than focusing on the dilemmas of recognition, I analyze
conflicts over minority integration against the backdrop of more
general developments and dynamics in the civil sphere. I do not
seek to abstract from reality those elements that exclusively relate
to ethnic and religious diversity but instead examine how the rules
of the game in different settings allow some actors to promote
their understanding of integration while marginalizing others.
While this may seem obvious, it is an important corrective to phi-
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losophical analyses of integration politics that tend to bracket di-
mensions of social life that shape power inequalities, such as the
introduction of market mechanisms within state institutions.
Conclusion
This chapter has prepared the conceptual groundwork for the re-
mainder of the study. Extant approaches to the study of integration
politics do not offer enough analytical leverage to explain transfor-
mations within power relations. To address this lacuna, I have
suggested a field analysis of civil politics. The approach developed
here understands integration politics as a series of struggles in
different settings. This implies that we do not search for a linear
development of integration politics in “the Netherlands” but
rather investigate where particular discourses garner support or
encounter opposition. While this research strategy does not pre-
clude the possibility that one or another discourse will be identi-
fied as “dominant,” it does invite us to detail when, where, how, to
what extent and to what effect discourses are powerful. The ap-
proach is designed to detect power inequalities but to simulta-
neously alert us to the ambivalence and limitations of domination.
To take due account of differences between settings, the main
question of this study – How and why did power relations transform
in Dutch integration politics? – will be addressed in two parts. Part
II deals with the (national) debate and Part III focuses on (local)
governance. Needless to say, the national debate and local govern-
ance are not mutually autonomous. Many prominent actors in the
debate are based in Amsterdam or Rotterdam, while the debate
feeds back into local governance figurations. Both Parts II and III
analyze the genesis of the contexts in which integration politics
take place, map transformations of power relations over time, and
provide explanations for these transformations. However, since
they pose slightly different questions and look at different sorts of




3 Introduction to Part II: Civil
power and the integration debate
This chapter explains how the first part of the research question
posed in Chapter 1 will be answered: how and why did power rela-
tions transform in the debate on integration? I focus specifically
on the debate on the opinion pages of broadsheet newspapers.
This setting formally approximates Habermas’s ideal speech situa-
tion in the sense that all persons with the “competence to speak”
can submit articles, express attitudes, desires and needs, and
question the assertions of others (Habermas 1990: 86). What We-
ber considered the essence of power – the capacity of actors to
carry out their will in spite of resistance from others – is absent
from the opinion pages, since actors in this setting cannot use
formal authority or physical force to coerce their opponents (We-
ber 1964: 156).
To investigate power within debates on integration – and within
the civil sphere more generally – we thus have to develop and op-
erationalize concepts that do not presuppose the exercise of physi-
cal force or formal authority but that nevertheless capture inequal-
ities. The goal is to map power relations in the integration debate,
to identify the sources of power and to explain transformations.
This chapter first indicates how positions and oppositions in the
debate are identified and presents the databases used in this part
of the study. It then identifies different types of power and indi-
cates how they can be examined through network methodology.
The final section of the chapter explores some general develop-
ments in the debate and specifies the research questions.
Positions and oppositions in the integration debate
“Integration” was not a hot topic until 1991. But to understand
developments in the debate since then, it is essential to recon-
struct the evolution of the context in which the debate unfolded.
The next chapter therefore provides an overview of the evolution
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of the Dutch civil sphere at large and reconstructs the genesis of a
policy field through which minorities were to be governed. This
analysis is based on the work of other researchers, archival re-
search and my own interviews. Reliable, detailed data on debates
on the opinion pages are only available after 1990; this is fortu-
nately also the period when integration politics proliferated.
To identify positions and oppositions in the integration debate
after 1990, I use a corpus of opinion articles, in-depth interviews
with actors in the debate and secondary literature. The articles are
drawn from three broadsheet newspapers: Trouw, NRC Handels-
blad and de Volkskrant. It should be clear from the outset that I do
not consider the opinion pieces in these newspapers reflective of
“public opinion” or “the integration debate” at large. As I argued
in Chapter 2, the civil sphere is composed of a variety of settings,
each with their specific rules and relations of power. Substantialist
notions like “public opinion” or “the integration debate” reduce
heterogeneity within the civil sphere to an arbitrary average.
When I speak of “the” integration debate, the reader should bear
in mind that it is really “a” debate in a specific setting. I have cho-
sen this setting because the opinion pages are one core setting of
the civil sphere where elites from different fields compete to de-
fine issues of general interest. They serve as a discursive arena
where the meaning and purpose of public policies are contested.
For journalists and editors, opinion pages are a source of news,
viewpoints and personalities: they browse opinion pages for cut-
ting-edge and authoritative analyses. For authors, the opinion
pages are a channel for communicating particular points of view
to an elite audience and a portal to much larger audiences that can
be reached via gatekeepers of other mass media. The opinion
pages thus serve as one of the switchboards between on the one
hand the policy field with its bureaucratic routines and its expert
authority, and on the other hand the media with its drive for spec-
tacle and charismatic authority. I do not study the media field in
its entirety (which would necessitate inclusion of many more
newspapers and other media), nor do I study the policy field in its
entirety (which would necessitate the investigation of many advi-
sory councils, government departments and other state or quasi-
state actors). Instead, I focus on one of the settings where these
worlds meet: the opinion pages of NRC Handelsblad, de Volkskrant
and Trouw form the intellectual core of the civil sphere where dis-
courses are brokered and contested.
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Databases
The corpus includes articles published in the three newspapers
that were retrieved from the LexisNexis database with three com-
binations of key words: “minorities AND integration”, “foreigners
AND integration”, and “Muslims AND integration”. The Lexis-
Nexis database contains articles from NRC Handelsblad since
1989, Trouw since 1991 and de Volkskrant since 1994. Only articles
over 1,000 words were selected in order to focus on those contri-
butions that are, according to the newspapers’ gatekeepers, highly
significant within ongoing debates. A further round of selection
excluded articles that did not relate to minority integration, such
as articles dealing exclusively with European integration. The cor-
pus includes interviews.1 These selection procedures rendered a
corpus of 729 articles. With this corpus, I constructed two data-
bases (detailed in Appendices 1 and 2). Here I briefly introduce
the databases and indicate how I used them to identify positions
and oppositions in the debate.
The properties database contains properties of the 729 articles,
which include the name of the authors and their sex, affiliation
and ethnicity. The database has information on co-authors, but
for most of the analyses only the data pertaining to the first author
is processed. I also assigned a discursive category to the articles,
distinguishing between five discourses: Culturalism (see Chapter
1), Pragmatism (characterized by its conception of minorities as a
potential underclass), Anti-racism (characterized by its portrayal
of minorities as structurally victimized or stigmatized), the Diver-
sity Discourse (characterized by its portrayal of diversity as an op-
portunity rather than a threat) and Civil Islam (characterized by its
emphasis on the compatibility of Islam and liberal democracy).
While these coarse categorizations inevitably lack the subtleties of
the discourse of individual actors, they enable us to identify the
correspondence between the backgrounds of authors and the dis-
courses they promote (cf. Bourdieu 1984a, 1984b). Correspon-
dence analysis is an exploratory technique designed to analyze
simple two-way and multi-way tables containing some measure of
correspondence between the rows and columns. Its goal is to rep-
resent the entries in a table of relative frequencies showing dis-
tances in a two-dimensional space, which can be visualized with a
plot (Statsoft 2008). Correspondence analysis is a relational tech-
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nique that maps bundles of properties in a relational space instead
of isolating them as variables (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 96).
The benefit of this technique is that we can investigate whether
some types of actors (with particular affiliations or ethnic back-
grounds) distinguish themselves through the support of one or
another discourse. Correspondence analysis thus provides one
way to map positions and oppositions in the debate and to identify
the bases of support for different discourses.
The relational database includes references that actors make to
other actors. The database includes 5,397 explicit references. Al-
most half of the references are categorized as neutral (n = 2,523 or
46.7 per cent), while there are many more negative references
(n = 2,007 or 37.2 per cent) than positive ones (n = 867 or 16.1 per
cent). These micro-interactions lead to the formation of figura-
tions where actors group together in clusters. For a long time, it
was impossible to identify these clusters because algorithms for
community detection did not distinguish between positive and
negative references, making them unsuitable for studying (discur-
sive) conflict. However, I make use of an algorithm for commu-
nity detection recently developed by Vincent Traag in collaboration
with Jeroen Bruggeman (for technicalities, see Traag & Brugge-
man 2009). The algorithm provides an inductive technique to de-
tect patterns of conflict and cooperation by maximizing positive
ties and minimizing negative ties within clusters2. The algorithm
also takes into account indirect linkages, following the principle
that two opponents (or two supporters) of the same actor cluster
together. This is useful, as such indirect linkages often tell us
something about patterns of conflict and cooperation not immedi-
ately apparent from the identification of shared discourses.3 For
instance, the radical left and the radical right may end up in a
cluster when both attack the mainstream left and right without
attacking each other. While this result may seem counterintuitive,
it is valid in the sense that it signals (in this hypothetical figura-
tion) that the opposition between radicals and the mainstream is
stronger than the opposition between the left and the right.
Polarization
The algorithm identifies clusters of actors who cooperate with
each other and oppose others. From a relational perspective, polar-
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ization refers to the intensity of the opposition between clusters.
However, the literature on political and social polarization gener-
ally conceptualizes polarization as divergence – that is, the extent
to which different groups within a population have divergent opi-
nions (e.g. Baldassarri & Bearman 2007; Baldassarri & Gelman
2008; Fiorina et al. 2005). A divergence of opinions may be a
cause of polarization, but it is not the same as polarization. For
instance, strong differences of opinion can be put aside in the
case of an external threat (like a terrorist attack), while partisans
can exploit even small differences of opinion to divide a popula-
tion. A more relational conceptualization of polarization under-
stands the process as the simultaneous clustering of allies and re-
pulsion between antagonists. Rather than looking at scores that
indicate the convergence or divergence of opinions on certain is-
sues, I consider polarization as resulting from the positive and
negative interactions within a figuration (Uitermark et al. 2009).
The measure for discursive polarization reflects the idea that clus-
ters are only recognized as poles when they are associated with
symbols, in this case, discursive leaders – individuals who receive
recognition from their cluster members and therefore come to
stand for the group. The score for discursive leadership is calcu-
lated as the number of cluster members who, on balance, refer
positively to an actor. With this measure, we can investigate the
extent to which cluster members rally around leaders. Discursive
polarization in a figuration is operationalized as the mean value of
discursive leadership, where high scores indicate that members of
antagonistic clusters rally around leaders.
Mapping power relations
How does power operate within public debates? Following the ar-
gument laid out in Chapter 2, I conceive of power in relational
terms, as an outgrowth of interactions rather than a property of
actors. I distinguish between three qualitatively different aspects
of power that correspond to different positions within discursive
figurations.
Articulation power refers to the capacity to make an interven-
tion.4 In the context of the debate raging on the opinion pages, it
means that gatekeepers have afforded an actor space because they
feel that the individual and his or her discourse are interesting or
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authoritative enough to warrant publication. Using the properties
database, we can determine the number and share of articles writ-
ten by an actor (for instance, Frits Bolkestein) or a group of actors
(for instance, right-wing politicians) or that have been coded as
belonging to a certain discourse (for instance, Culturalism). With
the relational database, the articulation power of a cluster can be
measured as the number of active members – those who actively
position themselves in relation to others (operationalized as the
number of actors who refer to others).
Consonance power refers to the capacity to articulate a discourse
with which others actively agree (cf. Koopmans 2004a: 374). This
power is activated when actors “strike a chord” with their audi-
ences and transform them into collaborators, followers or friends.
For the debate on the opinion pages, consonance can be measured
by the ratio of positive to negative references. Actors or discourses
with high consonance power have an identifiable base of support:
groups of actors that tend to support one actor or discourse rather
than another. Individual actors’ bases of support can be identified
by tracing those who made positive references to them in the rela-
tional database; where different discourses find support can be
identified by applying correspondence analysis to the properties
database.5
Resonance power refers to the capacity to attract attention. It is
important to make a sharp analytical distinction between conso-
nance and resonance: the first is generated by supporters and the
latter by supporters, neutral observers and opponents. Resonance
can be grasped through measures of centrality: the more refer-
ences an actor receives, the higher his or her resonance power.6
Centrality measures are commonly used to identify network bene-
fits that emerge from positive interactions (Bruggeman 2008).
However, civil arenas – and this certainly holds true for the opin-
ion pages of newspapers – thrive on social criticism and the con-
stant creation and recreation of oppositions. This means that the
ability to solicit responses indicates power, albeit in a very specific
form: resonance power. When an actor receives attention from
others, the latter help to disseminate the actor’s discourse, even
when criticizing it. The conventional measure for centrality is the
number of references an actor receives. One problem with this
measure, however, is that it does not discriminate between refer-
ents. In practice, it matters whether an actor is cited by a marginal
or central actor. When Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende re-
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fers to someone, this indicates a much higher level of resonance
power than when an unknown figure refers to that same person.
To capture this aspect of centrality, I measure power centrality
with a Page Rank algorithm (see Page et al. 1999; Bruggeman
2008). As in a Google search, the Page Rank orders actors accord-
ing to the number and prominence of references to them. When
the Page Rank scores are normalized, we can express the score as
a percentage and say that a particular actor has a certain share of
resonance power in a given figuration.
Qualitative techniques
These relational techniques for mapping discursive space in this
particular setting of the civil sphere provide insights into the
structure and evolution of figurations. In addition, I use qualita-
tive techniques. Interpretative analysis of newspaper articles shows
how different actors and discourses project the binaries of the civil
sphere upon reality. What are the threats that they identify? To
which groups do they ascribe uncivil motives? Which groups do
they praise as agents of repair? How do they make sense of key
events (like assassinations) or controversial statements (on the
superiority of one culture over another, for example)? Interpreta-
tive analysis of civil drama can help to uncover the hierarchies im-
plicit in a discourse and can illuminate how civil solidarity is ex-
tended to some and not to others.
Interviews provide information on the micro-strategies that pro-
duce macro-structures. Through interviews it is possible to un-
earth how actors view the world and how they try to change it. I
conducted in-depth interviews with around 30 individuals in-
volved in the integration debate as participants or gatekeepers.7
Respondents included politicians, intellectuals and academics
who frequently appear on television, on the radio or in the news-
papers to air their views on integration issues (and often on other
issues as well). Interviews typically began with questions on the
interviewees’ backgrounds and how they got to where they are
now. The interviews reconstructed the evolution of their schemes
of perceptions through questions on the milieus in which they
cultivated their views and the experiences or events that shaped
their life course. I also tried to identify their power resources,
such as their sources of income and the institutions that invited
them to talk or write (cf. Lamont 1987). The interviews addressed
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the debate in the newspapers but also explored the position of ac-
tors in other settings, such as policy networks, political parties or
university departments. To understand their intervention in one
setting, we have to investigate how that intervention originated
from – and feeds back into – other settings. Interviews with gate-
keepers, such as editors at newspapers and programmers of de-
bates, included questions on the setting whose access they regu-
lated (e.g., “What is distinctive about this newspaper section?”)
and on their methods for selecting and recruiting contributors.
Next to the interviews that I conducted myself, I used secondary
data and secondary literature including interviews, biographies and
autobiographies written by and on participants in integration poli-
tics. With the aid of these primary and secondary sources of data,
we can reconstruct how individuals came to take a certain posi-
tion. The text boxes interspersed through the text and the sections
on experiences of power probe the processes of habitus formation
of the most central figures,8 the feelings that animate integration
politics and the different positions that actors take in different
fields.
Explaining power relations
The distinction between the three forms of power makes it possi-
ble to indicate with considerable precision how strong a discourse,
actor or group of actors is at any particular moment in time. Qual-
itative techniques help to identify the micro-foundations of macro-
structures and to make an inventory of the subjective impacts and
experiences of power relations. But how can we explain transfor-
mations within power relations? The social forces that affect the
debate are numerous and diverse. So, too, are developments in
the debate itself. Many different strategies with origins in differ-
ent settings push in various directions. For instance, the editors of
the newspaper de Volkskrant have afforded relatively more space to
critics of minority cultures over the years, whereas the editors of
NRC Handelsblad have not. Providing a proper explanation of such
divergent developments requires a number of investigations into
the different settings in which integration discourses are pro-
duced. These complexities imply that we should not expect a sin-
gle, straightforward development. Nevertheless, Chapter 2 identi-
fied several possible causes of transformation that can explain the
course and outcome of discursive struggles on the opinion pages.
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A reconfiguration of relations between different fields is one possible
cause of transformation. While the format of the opinion pages has
changed little, they are part of a larger field that has experienced
drastic transformations. One general development that structures
power relations is the mediatization of integration politics and the
simultaneous sensationalization of the media. In the early 1990s,
the media landscape was still dominated by broadcasting associa-
tions and newspapers with roots in the era of pillarization (see
Chapter 4). But over time, commercial broadcasting associations
and (more recently) the Internet have become more important.
Some actors are better disposed to respond to this development
than others and are therefore more likely to gain power. While my
analysis alludes to the importance of these new modalities and set-
tings for integration politics, data has been systematically collected
only in one setting (the opinion pages). The allusions thus cannot
be systematically elaborated. However, two other possible causes of
transformation – changing bases of support and changing relations
among groups – can be studied in greater detail.
Changing bases of support. Class transformations can impact the
integration discourse as ascendant groups and their representa-
tives feel they can challenge established elites and denounce their
ways as anachronistic or undemocratic. Transformations result
from the growth or decline – or the activation and deactivation –
of class fractions. For instance, right-leaning philosophers entered
the integration debate following the assassination of Theo van
Gogh in favor of Culturalism. Whereas they had previously been
inactive, they now had a strong impact. Something similar is true
for Fortuyn’s core constituency. The group of natives with low le-
vels of cultural capital, distrustful of government and harboring
negative attitudes towards immigrants had grown in the 1980s
and 1990s. Data on electoral participation shows they remained
inactive until Fortuyn pulled them into the political arena (see
Chapter 5). The key to explaining change, then, is to investigate
how civil elites succeed or fail to mobilize different class fractions.
Or to put it in more positivist terms, the interaction effect of a
growing support base and the articulation of a discourse that can
appeal to that base translates into greater civil power. I investigate
such processes through vignettes that describe how actors culti-
vated the dispositions that enabled them to appeal to specific class
fractions. Although the central figures in integration politics tend
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to have idiosyncratic personalities and life histories, investigating
the milieus from which they originated can reveal how their indi-
vidual trajectories developed in relation to general processes of
class transformation (cf. Bourdieu 1984a: 113, 1992).
Changing alliances. Drastic transformations can occur when the re-
lationship between class fractions is reconfigured. If civil elites
turn their absent or antagonistic relationship into a cooperative
one, they can focus their attention on a shared goal or on opposing
a common opponent. This strategic dimension of integration poli-
tics can be examined through the structure of networks, which can
explain why certain clusters appear more or less powerful than
would be expected on the basis of sheer numbers. I therefore ana-
lyze three mechanisms that tie actors together. First, do members
of a cluster share (only) opponents or do they (also) maintain inter-
nal relations? I use density as a proxy for this feature of clusters,
operationalized as the number of positive ties shared by the total
number of possible ties. Second, do clusters have discursive leaders
– people who come to stand for the group? We can relationally re-
conceive Weber’s “charisma” as the result of a process through
which actors invest their energies and emotions into leaders who
then come to stand for the group (Weber 1978: 1158-1159). I label
actors “discursive leaders” when their net score for discursive lea-
dership (see above) is at least five. Third, and related to the above,
do clusters concentrate discursive power in some actors or do they
distribute it evenly? To answer this question, I refer to the variance
of discursive leadership within a cluster, with high scores indicat-
ing a concentration of discursive power in a select number of actors
and low scores indicating an egalitarian distribution of discursive
power. The growth or decline of civil power can thus be explained,
in part, as a function of changing network patterns within and be-
tween different clusters. If previously disparate or antagonistic ac-
tors start working together (a change that would itself have to be
explained) then they – and the discourses they promote – gain in
power. If previously cohesive clusters of actors fragment into dispa-
rate or antagonistic groups, then these actors, and the discourses
they support, lose in power.
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General trends and specific questions
To get a rough idea of the transformations we want to account for,
a general overview of the debate is helpful. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1
present some initial findings that make it possible to specify the
general question posed at the beginning of this chapter: How and
why did power relations transform in the debate on integration?
Table 3.1 Relative and absolute support for five integration dis-
courses in five different periods (unknown/other [n = 118]
not shown)
Culturalism Pragmatism Civil Islam Anti-racism Diversity Total
N % N % N % N % N % N
1990 to 1994 17 14.8 73 63.5 11 9.6 10 8.7 4 3.5 115
1995 to 1999 11 17.5 27 42.9 9 14.3 6 9.5 10 15.9 63
2000 to 9/11 15 23.1 41 63.1 4 6.2 2 3.1 3 4.6 65
9/11 to Fortuyn murder
(6 May 2002)
16 34.0 17 36.2 9 19.1 1 2.1 4 8.5 47
6 May 2002 to
1 January 2006
95 29.6 157 48.9 42 13.1 16 5.0 11 3.4 321
Total 154 25.2 315 51.6 75 12.3 35 5.7 32 5.2 611
Figure 3.1 shows that the intensity of the integration debate fluctu-
ates over time. The debate flares up when actors struggle over the
interpretation of a dramatic event or a shocking intervention. To
organize the discussion and data, I distinguish between five peri-
ods based on the interventions or events that marked an intensifi-
cation or pacification of the debate:
Period 1: 1990-1994. This period covers the debate following Frits
Bolkestein’s intervention in which he argued that integration poli-
cies had been too soft and there was a need to make clear that the
values of the Enlightenment were not up for negotiation.
Although Bolkestein focused his criticisms on Islam, the debate
mainly revolved around “minorities” and “foreigners”. The end of
the period is marked by the entry of the right-wing Liberals into
the Cabinet.
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The number of hits refers to search results in the LexisNexis database. The number of articles in the
corpus is much lower than the number of hits because short articles and news items are filtered out.
* Data for 1990-1991 is only available for NRC. To give an approximation of the total coverage, the num-
ber of hits has been tripled.
** Data for 1992-1994 is only available for Trouw and NRC. To give an approximation of the total cover-
age, the number of hits for Trouw and NRC have been multiplied by 1.5.
Period 2: 1995-1999. In this period there is no change in the sub-
stance of the debate. Its intensity remains comparatively low.
Period 3: 2000 to 11 September 2001. This period runs from the
publication of Scheffer’s article on the “multicultural drama” to
the attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon. The de-
bate at this point revolved mainly around (ethnic) minorities.
Muslims were discussed but not so much.
Period 4: 11 September 2001 to Pim Fortuyn’s assassination on 6
May 2002. In this period, the populist politician Fortuyn roared
onto the political scene. As a result of the events of 9/11 and a
number of his remarks, the debate focused more on “Muslims”
than before, though “minorities” are still mentioned twice as of-
ten.
Period 5: 6 May 2002 to 31 December 2005. The assassination of
Fortuyn more or less coincided with the installation of a new cabi-
net and inaugurated a period of sustained conflict propelled by a
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series of incidents. The most important of these was the murder
of Islam critic and filmmaker Theo van Gogh on 2 November
2004. Together with the Somali refugee and right-wing politician
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Van Gogh had made a movie, Submission, which
sought to demonstrate that the Quran justifies the maltreatment
of women. In this period, the debate revolves more around “Mus-
lims” than “minorities”. The end date is chosen for practical rea-
sons.
The descriptions of these periods already suggest that a select
number of actors have leading roles. In spite of their differences,
Frits Bolkestein, Paul Scheffer, Pim Fortuyn and Ayaan Hirsi Ali
all support Culturalism. The fact that their names are so well-
known compared to their opponents indicates that they have
strong resonance – a conjecture confirmed by their Page Rank
scores: Bolkestein concentrated no less than 17 per cent of reso-
nance power in the period between his intervention in 1991 and
2000, while Scheffer had 10 per cent between his intervention in
2000 and the events of 9/11. Hirsi Ali (6 per cent) and Pim For-
tuyn (4 per cent) were the most central persons after 9/11. Table
3.1 shows, moreover, that the number and share of articles sup-
porting Culturalism have increased drastically over time. Given
the growing power of Culturalism, the first set of questions – to
be answered in Chapter 5 – is: What are the ideas, notions and
symbols of culturalist integration discourse? From where does
Culturalism draw its increasing power?
The results in Table 3.1 provide a first indication of the growing
power of culturalist discourse. But they also show that it would be
imprecise to say, without further qualification, that Culturalism is
dominant. Its power is limited because culturalists receive much
more criticism than praise. For example, Bolkestein was criticized
93 times and praised 28 times (a ratio of 3.3) in the early 1990s
while Hirsi Ali was criticized 116 times and praised 59 times (a
ratio of 2.0) in the period following the assassination of Pim For-
tuyn. Culturalism is also not dominant in the sense that a majority
of participants in the debate promote it; more authors support
Pragmatism or one of the other integration discourses. The dom-
inance of Culturalism is furthermore ambivalent because its sup-
port, as measured by the number of articles, goes up and down
alongside the number of non-culturalist articles. Rather than Cul-
turalism crowding out other discourses, integration discourses
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seem to be unequal yet symbiotic, though this is truer for some dis-
courses than others. Hence the second set of questions that Chap-
ter 6 seeks to answer: Which discourses provide an alternative to
Culturalism? What are their ideas, notions and symbols? How did
promoters of these discourses respond to the culturalist ascent?
The answers to these sub-questions will provide us with specific
answers to the general question of how the balance of power be-
tween discourses and actors evolved, and detail the mechanisms
and strategies through which power relations were reproduced or
transformed. The following chapters also set the stage for Part III
where we examine the discursive struggle in the governance of
diversity in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Obviously, the govern-
ance of diversity in the two largest Dutch cities plays a role in the
national integration debate and vice versa. But before we can
probe such relations and implications, we have to unpack this
monolith – “the debate” – and investigate, in detail, how actors
articulate discourses, how they acquire power and how they inter-
act.
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4 The evolution of the Dutch civil
sphere
Culturalism has been a powerful force in the Netherlands since
1991, but it did not emerge out of thin air. To understand integra-
tion politics after 1991, we need to reconstruct the evolution of the
Dutch civil sphere and the genesis of a policy field through which
minorities were to be governed. How did power relations form in
the civil sphere and how were these refracted in the policy field?
This chapter answers this question through an examination of the
proliferation and resolution of three formative conflicts in the
Dutch civil sphere: the emergence and incorporation of Catholic
and Socialist challengers in the early 20th century, the emergence
and incorporation of new social movements in the 1960s and
1970s, and the Moluccan revolt of the 1970s and the subsequent
inception of the minorities policy. Although these conflicts were
very different, each was resolved through the accommodation of
different interests and groups. The chapter concludes that the fail-
ure of the minorities policy to successfully accommodate immi-
grants in the 1980s prefigured the emergence of Culturalism in
the 1990s.
Pillarization and Pragmatism
During the 17th century, a period often referred to as “the golden
age” of the Netherlands, the Dutch Republic was a loose federa-
tion of provinces rather than a unified state (Gorski 2003). While
the establishment of a monarchy in the 18th century and a consti-
tutional monarchy in the 19th century centralized powers into a
state apparatus, the distribution of power between religious
groups (Protestants, Catholics) and class fractions (mercantile ca-
pitalists, landed nobility) was so even that it was impossible for
any group to monopolize control and impose its view upon others.
Due to this balance of power, transformations took the form of re-
forms rather than revolutions; when one or the other party gained
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power and sought to inscribe its discourse into state institutions,
this usually resulted in accommodation rather than confrontation.
The creation of “pillarized” institutions was an example of such
accommodation. In the last decade of the 19th century and the
first decade of the 20th century, Catholics as well as Socialists
challenged the hegemony of Protestants and capitalists. Because
censitary suffrage and majority rule made it difficult for these
groups to enter the parliamentary system, they increasingly orga-
nized outside of it. To prevent the kind of revolutionary develop-
ments that had taken place elsewhere, Protestant and capitalist
elites agreed to the introduction of universal suffrage and drastic
constitutional reforms (Stuurman 1983). Both the (divided) estab-
lished elites and the (equally divided) challengers favored a system
that accommodated different interests and incorporated even
small minorities. The result was an extremely proportional elec-
toral system in which even small Protestant sects and radical left-
wing parties could gain seats in parliament; no less than 17 parties
entered parliament after the elections of 1918. Since then, there
has been a balance of power between three large currents: Chris-
tian Democracy (initially subdivided into Catholic and various
Protestant parties, later united in the CDA – Christen Democratisch
Appèl or Christian Democratic Appeal), the right-wing Liberals
(VVD – Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie or People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy) and the Social Democrats (PvdA – Partij
van de Arbeid or Labor Party). Without exception, the Netherlands
has been governed by coalition governments since the introduc-
tion of universal suffrage.
In 1918, the major parties reached an agreement stipulating
that each subcultural group was entitled to manage its own service
infrastructure with full financial support from the central govern-
ment. “Pillarization” is a specific type of corporatism with distinct
societal blocs each having their own political representatives and
institutions of socialization (see Lijphart 1968). In the terms pre-
sented in Chapter 2, pillars functioned as milieus where specific
identities and schemes of perception were cultivated. Because
each pillar had its own institutions – schools, churches, sport
clubs, newspapers and political parties – there was little interac-
tion between different constituencies. The pillars remained highly
segregated – so much so that they resembled different “countries”
(Bagley 1973: 231). For instance, the newspapers examined in the
next chapter did not function as discursive arenas but as internal
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communication channels for pillars. Newspapers devoted dispro-
portionate attention to “their” parties and either ignored or criti-
cized competing parties (Roele, cited in Brants & Van Praag 2006:
33). In this segregated civil sphere, the elites of the different pillars
interacted with opponents but there was a generally accepted set
of rules that guaranteed that these interactions would not evolve
into open conflict (Lijphart 1968). The institutions of pillarized
corporatism encouraged elites to compromise, negotiate and ac-
commodate, thereby fostering a political culture of Pragmatism.
Magnifying cultural or political differences or arousing discontent
was not done.
Pillarization was characterized by a high level of communal
autonomy at the national level and an equally high level of local
paternalism. Services were provided by private charities that
tended to see their clients as constituents of pillars. Over time,
many of these private initiatives were placed under state control,
while rapid secularization in the 1960s put further pressure on
pillarized institutions. The Christian Democratic parties at this
point changed their strategy. While they had resisted state interfer-
ence before the war, they now argued for policies that not only
benefited workers (the main constituents of the Social Democrats)
but also other groups (such as self-employed entrepreneurs and
housewives). As a result of this peculiar form of inter-party com-
petition, the Dutch welfare state expanded explosively after the
Second World War (Cox 1995; Gladdish 1991: 141).
Pillarization left an institutional heritage that shapes civil poli-
tics to this day. Religious minorities still have the right to establish
institutions like schools and broadcasting stations with full finan-
cial support from the state. This explains, for instance, the rela-
tively large number of Muslim schools in the Netherlands com-
pared to other countries (see Rath et al. 2001). Another effect of
the pluralist compromise of 1918 is that it is comparatively easy
for new parties to win seats in parliament – no more than 0.67
per cent of the vote is needed. This is significant for integration
politics, as it means that the parliamentary system is open to as-
cending challengers like the progressive movements of the 1960s
or the culturalist movement that emerged in 2002. The idea of
collective emancipation (and its correlate of communal social con-
trol) central to pillarization also influenced the minorities policy of
the 1980s, though this was mediated by the new social move-
ments that emerged after the collapse of corporatism.
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De-pillarization and the new social movements
The pillars of Dutch politics started to crumble in the late 1960s
(Lijphart 1988). As the welfare state expanded, people became less
dependent on private, pillarized initiatives. The expansion of the
welfare state came with central coordination and the universaliza-
tion of standards and procedures. These processes undermined
the discretion of pillarized elites to administer and allocate ser-
vices. A rapidly growing number of youths and urbanites became
less inclined to spend their lives in the pillars (and especially in
the churches). New discursive milieus formed in the cities around
youth movements such as the Provos, hippies and squatters (Ma-
madouh 1992). New political parties such as the progressive liber-
al D66 (Democrats 1966) and the anti-authoritarian PPR (Politieke
Partij Radikalen – Radical Political Party) organized around new
issues and managed to win support from voters who had no affi-
nity with pillars. Within the Labor Party, the new left argued for a
more passionate and oppositional style of politics.
De-pillarization affected all pillarized institutions, including the
newspapers studied in the following chapters. All three have sha-
ken off their ideological feathers to reach out to the growing num-
ber of people who do not wish to read the news from a particular –
pillarized or ideological – perspective. The necessity to open up to
new markets combined with a growing sense of journalistic pro-
fessionalism resulted in the three newspapers becoming much
more alike – they covered similar issues and allowed a similar
range of actors to voice their opinions. A side effect of this process
of de-segmentation is that the opinion pages now function as a
single civil arena1 that caters to the general – Dutch – public rather
than to Catholic, Protestant, Socialist or Liberal subgroups. In fact,
all three newspapers’ daily opinion pages were introduced around
1990.
The new social movements of the 1970s were accommodated in
much the same way as socialist and confessional movements in
the 1920s. While the pillars were crumbling, the culture of prag-
matic compromise and consultation had become ingrained in the
Dutch civil sphere, sustained through the institutions of propor-
tional representation (Hoogenboom 1996). Through newly estab-
lished parties, the new movements directly influenced parliamen-
tary politics; their ideas were inscribed into bureaucratic routines
and institutional structures. The more reformist wings of the
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movements for women’s emancipation, for housing rights and for
the unemployed received subsidies and were incorporated into lo-
cal and national consultative structures. Many ideas initially con-
sidered radical became widely accepted (Inglehart 1977). During
the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, there was an informalization of cus-
toms and a growing distaste for authoritarian relationships, both
between family members as well as between government and so-
ciety (Wouters 2004). Although the new social movements had
their base in the expanding sector of (state-hired) specialists, they
received support from a range of class fractions (Kriesi 1989).
Around 1990, consensus had grown within the Dutch population
on what constitutes good conduct and acceptable ideas. When
probed in surveys, at least seventy per cent of respondents agree
that divorce is acceptable, that homosexuality is nothing special,
that they believe in freedom of religion and consciousness, and
that they support protection against discrimination. More than
seventy per cent disagree with the propositions that women should
have children to be happy, that there is a need for a strong leader,
that children should respect their parents and that we “would be
better off if we returned to traditional ways of life” (Duyvendak
2004: 5-6).
How are the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s
relevant to contemporary integration politics? James Kennedy has
suggested that the formation of a secularized “majority culture”
explains why the Dutch have so much antipathy towards religion
in general and Muslims in particular (Kennedy 2005). Jan Willem
Duyvendak argues that the Dutch “progressive consensus” makes
it easier to view Muslims as authoritarian, conservative outsiders
(Duyvendak 2004). Paul Sniderman and Loek Hagendoorn like-
wise suggest that natives and Muslims in the Netherlands have
very different ideas about cultural practices like child-rearing and
therefore enter into conflict (Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007). In
the 1970s and 1980s, however, new social movements spoke out
against discrimination and in favor of minority rights. These
movements and their ideals influenced the governance of minor-
ity integration at the local level and the formulation and imple-
mentation of the minorities policy.
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The formation and contradictions of the minorities
policy
Thus far, this chapter has analyzed the evolution of the civil
sphere in general. This section investigates how power relations
in the civil sphere at large were refracted in a new policy field that
took shape after the minorities policy was implemented in the
1980s. The section first sketches the creation and transformation
of local governance networks before the introduction of the minor-
ities policy. It then examines the genesis of the minorities policy
and power relations between different actors. Finally, it explains
why the corporatism of the minorities policy was in crisis from
the moment it was conceived.
An amalgam of local initiatives
Assistance for foreign workers was organized through private in-
itiative in the 1950s and early 1960s. While some support came
from the central government, in most cities and regions, confes-
sional charities were the first to receive guest workers. Pillarized
welfare foundations had traditionally incorporated the lower
classes through paternalistic interventions (Dercksen & Verplanke
1987); when the first post-colonial migrants and guest workers ar-
rived, they reoriented themselves to this new and rapidly expand-
ing target group (Rath 1991). Networks of welfare organizations
and civil society associations expanded in localities where immi-
grants concentrated. Confessional organizations had a strong
presence in the first stages of the development of these govern-
ance networks, while the involvement of left-leaning (anti-racist
and anti-imperialist) support groups increased over time. In the
1970s, left-leaning native activists combined forces with politi-
cized immigrants, including a small but influential group of poli-
tical refugees. Coalitions of movement organizations and minority
associations organized campaigns and created an infrastructure to
assist immigrants with legal counseling, Dutch language courses
and other services to ease the plight of guest workers. As in many
other fields, these progressive movements were incorporated in
the state through the creation of professions (the number of com-
munity workers exploded in this period), categorical provisions
(i.e., provisions for specific immigrant groups) and consultative
structures. Within the central government, the Ministry of Wel-
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fare – the “heart of the welfare state” (De Haan & Duyvendak
2002) and vestige of the progressive left – financed and united
the welfare foundations. This ministry was a central node in what
otherwise was a loosely structured field composed of an amalgam
of local networks without a clear center. Over the course of the
1980s, these local networks were drastically restructured through
the minorities policy.
The genesis of the minorities policy: standardization and centralization
The trigger for the creation of the minorities policy was the sud-
den proliferation of militant action by Moluccans, including hi-
jackings, occupations and killings. The Moluccans form a small
community with a peculiar migration history and relationship
with the Netherlands (Box 4.1). The established parties neverthe-
less felt that the Moluccan violence presaged the social unrest that
might ensue if ethnic minorities continued to suffer from social
isolation and economic deprivation. The solution, they argued,
was a policy that would help ethnic minorities socially and eco-
nomically integrate into Dutch society without shedding their cul-
tural identities. In light of the contention after 1991, it is remark-
able that in the late 1970s the main political currents – the
Liberals, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats –
could so easily agree on the necessity and content of what would
become the minorities policy. They opted for the tried and tested
strategy of cooptation through corporatism: minorities were to be
included through consultative structures and associations funded
by the central state and incorporated into local governance net-
works.
Box 4.1 A Moluccan backlash and the genesis of the
minorities policy
The Moluccas are an island group in the eastern part of the
Indonesian archipelago. The Dutch colonial enterprise
exploited the islands for spices, but when trade stagnated in
the 19th century, it shifted its attention to other islands. For
these missions, the Dutch army recruited especially from
Christian minorities such as the Menadonese and the Moluc-
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cans. “Of all the groups,” writes Bartels, “the Moluccans most
justified the trust put into them.” Not only were they “fierce
and daring” (others would say ruthless) soldiers, they also de-
veloped “an unquestioning, if not fanatical loyalty to the Dutch,
especially to the house of Orange” (Bartels 1986: 25). The Mo-
luccan soldiers helped to suppress the revolts of other (Mus-
lim) communities in Indonesia, joined the Dutch army when
the Japanese invaded during World War II and joined the cam-
paigns of the Dutch army to repress the Indonesian indepen-
dence movement.
In 1950, Soekarno proclaimed the independence of a unitary
Indonesian state. Their unwavering support for the former co-
lonizers gave the Moluccan soldiers every reason to fear retalia-
tion from the Indonesian independence movement. Many
were convinced that only a federal Indonesia with an autono-
mous Moluccan Republic would protect them. But no govern-
ment, including the Dutch one, would recognize the Moluccan
Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS). The Moluccan sol-
diers thus found themselves in a state controlled by their oppo-
nents. The soldiers and their families – 12,500 people in total –
were shipped to the Netherlands, where they would remain un-
til the day the Moluccan Republic would supposedly be estab-
lished.
The Moluccans did not receive the warm welcome they had
expected after years of loyal service. “Once having arrived in
cold, damp Holland, the soldiers were rather unceremoniously
discharged and put into camps spread all over the country –
such as the former German concentration camps of Schatten-
berg and Vught” (Bartels 1986: 29). The discharge came as a
terrible shock to the soldiers. “The Moluccans felt sold out,
treated like worthless trash. ... The proud soldiers felt emascu-
lated, quickly grabbing onto the RMS ideal to salvage meaning
in their lives” (ibid. 29).
While the leaders of the older generation still hoped that the
Dutch government would support the RMS or at least rehabili-
tate the veterans, the younger generation grew resentful to-
wards both the Dutch government for forsaking its responsibil-
ities and their leaders for keeping the community at a
standstill. After waiting in vain for more than two decades, a
part of the younger generation took recourse to radical action,
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including occupations of the Indonesian embassy and Dutch
government buildings. The most dramatic incidents were two
hijackings of passenger trains in 1975 and 1977. The Moluccan
militants killed hostages in both events to pressure the Dutch
government, but to no avail. The first action ended when the
hijackers surrendered after twelve days. The second hijacking
ended when marines stormed the train and killed all six hijack-
ers. Ed van Thijn, a Labor Party MP at the time, refers to the
violence as a “wake-up call” to politicians of his generation
(Van Thijn 2008). National policymakers felt that similar prob-
lems could develop among other minorities, whose numbers
were growing. The stage was thus set for policies that would
prevent the kind of violence that had brutally disrupted the
idea of a peaceful and liberal nation.
The minorities policy marked the inception of a field with a new
vocabulary, a new elite and new institutions. Although it is now
common practice for Dutch commentators to divide the popula-
tion into first-, second- and third-generation immigrants (allochto-
nen) and natives (autochtonen) or to distinguish between different
ethnic minorities, these concepts and categorizations only
emerged with the minorities policy. Various immigrant groups
had come to the Netherlands under very different circumstances,
spoke different languages, adhered to different religions, had dif-
ferent appearances, lived in different parts of the country and
were entangled in different networks. Social scientists were
among the first to develop a discourse that enabled the govern-
ment to make sense of all these groups and to subject them to
one and the same policy. The geographer Van Amersfoort (1974)
was the first social scientist to offer a truly generalizing discourse
through his notion of “minority formation,” which referred to the
confluence of cultural alterity and economic marginality. Highly
placed civil servants with backgrounds in the social sciences ar-
gued for policies to combat the segregation and deprivation of eth-
nic minorities (Entzinger 1975).
The Scientific Council for Government Advice was charged
with identifying the ethnic minorities to be targeted by such a pol-
icy. The Council hired Rinus – an anthropologist with Marxist
sympathies and a history of involvement with immigrant support
groups (Scholten 2007: 114) – to write a background report. The
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document he produced reads like, and in a very real sense is, the
founding statement of a policy field (Penninx 1979). The report
gave lengthy descriptions of three categories of immigrants (Mo-
luccans, Mediterranean guest workers, and Surinamese and Antil-
leans) and an extensive overview of recommended policy meas-
ures. Penninx argued for a comprehensive strategy to monitor
and improve the position of immigrants in various fields (includ-
ing housing, education and the law) and expressed his hope that
immigrants would have a strong say in the policies that targeted
them. The Scientific Council and the government accepted these
recommendations wholesale, though they placed more emphasis
on the threats potentially posed by minorities. The Scientific
Council claimed that:
It is not to be expected that such participatory processes will take
place without conflict; that would be to underestimate the prob-
lems at issue. The various cultures coming into confrontation
with one another display some attitudes and behaviors that are
not easily reconcilable and that are regarded by both sides as fun-
damental achievements. Thus, for example, very important as-
pects of our Western culture such as individual liberty and equal-
ity will be contested by another culture, sometimes militantly. In
those cases of confrontation where no practical compromise is
possible, there remains no choice but to defend the achievements
of our culture against dissenting assertions. (WRR 1979: XXI)
Jos van Kemenade, the Minister of Education for the Labor Party,
stated in 1982 that not all cultural practices should be preserved:
Although it is usually not stated very emphatically, it is crystal
clear that recognition, let alone promotion of a group’s own iden-
tity, values, normative orientation, behaviors and beliefs, finds its
limits where these come into conflict with the values that are en-
shrined in Dutch society, the constitution and the law and that are
part of the achievements of our society. Physical punishment,
polygamy, suppression of women, forced marriages of minors,
but also the evasion of compulsory education may very well be...
part of the indigenous identity or values... but do not deserve to be
promoted or preserved and, indeed, must be fought. Assimilation
to the Dutch value pattern has to come first. (cited in Mullard et
al. 1990: 61)
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The above remarks reveal that the minorities policy was driven by
a desire to prevent cultural insulation and segregation. Note that
there was never any question of policies for non-deprived commu-
nities: the impetus was not a desire to preserve or celebrate minor-
ity cultures but to make sure that ethnic communities did not fall
victim to the twin process of cultural isolation and economic de-
privation. The sentiment that informed the minorities policy was
one of anxious paternalism rather than enthusiastic multicultural-
ism.
The formation and transformation of power relations in the policy field
The minorities policy had a profound impact on power relations,
both locally and nationally. Since we explore local repercussions in
Part III, I focus here on power transformations at the national lev-
el. The most profound impact was due to the transformation of an
amalgam of institutions into a unified field; bureaucratization cre-
ated a center in the new policy field from which resources were
distributed and through which information was processed. The
minorities policy came under the responsibility of the Ministry of
Interior Affairs; its newly established Directorate of Minorities
Policy acquired control over policy formulation. The technical and
discursive skills of experts – proficiency in bureaucratic jargon,
capacity to coordinate across departments and communicate with
officials – enabled them to take up key positions as advisers, man-
agers or professionals in and around this new center. With the
desire to contain unrest and administer populations at the root of
the new policy, minority experts were well placed to meet the de-
mand for information and insight. One indication of the growing
power of experts was the explosion in the number of research
projects on minorities: from around six per year in the late 1970s
to more than 200 in the mid-1980s (Penninx 1988a: 5-11). While
many professionals first became involved in minority affairs due
to their solidarity with immigrants, bureaucratization and standar-
dization increasingly opened the field to experts with less empa-
thy; passionate advocates who argued on behalf of minorities were
gradually replaced with experts who reasoned on behalf of the
state.
The new elite entered into an increasingly antagonistic relation-
ship with the elite that had been in control before the inception of
the minorities policy. As stated above, the Ministry of Welfare had
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been a key node in the networks of welfare organizations and
minority associations. These actors were marginalized as the field
unified and centralized; the new policy was especially damaging
for the categorical welfare organizations. The Moluccan Advisory
Council, the Surinamese Welfare Council and many minority and
welfare associations protested against the abolition of categorical
provisions but were unsuccessful (Fermin 1995). As a compro-
mise, the minorities policy created consultative structures through
which minority representatives could influence policy decisions.
Minority associations moreover received funds to organize cultur-
al and social activities to maintain immigrant participation.
Minority representatives were supposed to function as intermedi-
aries and advisers in this corporatist policy figuration.
By the time the minorities policy had crystallized into institu-
tions, it was clear that the newly established policy field was rife
with contradictions. First of all, the corporatist structure pre-
sumed that ethnic groups were internally cohesive. This was only
(partially) true for the Moluccan community. The Turkish and
Moroccan communities were internally divided and lacked repre-
sentative bodies. To nevertheless make use of the possibilities of
recognition and its attendant resources, welfare organizations
helped leftist political refugees and politicized guest workers to
establish associations and to conquer places for themselves in the
expanding minorities policy bureaucracy (see Chapters 8 and 11).
Though it was convenient for administrators to recognize these
figures as representatives, they did not represent the more conser-
vative or apathetic currents within their respective ethnic commu-
nities (Köbben 1983).
Second, minority representatives and experts were unequally
invested with cultural capital. As a result of their particular migra-
tion trajectories, members of the Turkish and Moroccan commu-
nities mostly belonged to the lowest classes; the differences in
education and income with the native population were huge.
Minority representatives were caught in a double bind. On the
one hand, they were to operate within the state bureaucracy, re-
quiring higher education, proficiency in (bureaucratic) Dutch,
careful long-term planning and networking acumen. On the other
hand, they were supposed to represent their communities, con-
sisting of people in the lowest segments of the labor market. Their
legitimacy was often called into question, either because they were
not truly representative of their communities, or because they did
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not have the proper skills (see for example Köbben 1983). Minority
associations often felt that their concerns were ignored, that they
were consulted only after decisions had already been made, and
that the government did not sufficiently recognize and reward
their contributions. They often used formal hearings or consulta-
tions to lament policy decisions and to complain that they were
not being taken seriously. Conference proceedings from this peri-
od and interviews with minority representatives reveal their in-
tense frustration over the disjuncture between their formal and
actual status (e.g. Mullard et al. 1990; PBR 1991; see Box 4.2).
And the tensions between minority representatives and adminis-
trators only grew as the social position of minorities became weak-
er. Due to the contraction and relocation of industries that em-
ployed guest workers, unemployment skyrocketed. In 1979, when
the Scientific Council published its first advice on the minorities
policy, 11 percent of Moroccans and Turks were registered as un-
employed (against six per cent for natives). In 1983, when the pol-
icy was implemented, the figure had risen to a staggering 37 per
cent for Moroccans and Turks (against 14 per cent for natives)
(Wolff & Penninx 1993).
Box 4.2 Pragmatic administrators versus passionate
advocates – an example
On 23 November 1987, the national minority organizations or-
ganized a symposium to evaluate the minorities policy four
years after its inception. The program featured all the key
players in the policy field: several researchers, a civil servant, a
representative of minority associations, a governmental anti-ra-
cist organization and two ministers: L.C. Brinkman of Welfare
and C.P. van Dijk of Interior Affairs. The speakers were mostly,
though not exclusively, highly educated native Dutch men.
While the report does not list the symposium’s attendees,
most of the cited audience members were representatives of
left-leaning minority associations. Two Turkish women re-
marked that “the government does not listen well to women”
and that “scientists and policymakers should use the experi-
ences of migrant women” (cited in Lindo 1986: 5). A represen-
tative of one of the national councils for migrant representation
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stated that good intentions are not enough – “the majority also
really needs to listen to minorities” (ibid. 6). A spokesperson of
an umbrella association for guest workers stated that their
“right to consultation” did not amount to much if the govern-
ment did not want to “force itself to be consulted” (ibid. 6). A
representative of an Italian association used a more frivolous
but telling metaphor: the government, he said, had acted as a
father who buys a toy train for his son but then does not allow
him to play with it (ibid. 6).
The demand to be heard was articulated most forcefully in
the “manifesto” that Mohammed Rabbae, director of the Na-
tional Center for Foreigners, read out to Minister Van Dijk.
Rabbae suggested on behalf of “the minority organizations” a
whole range of measures that would improve the position of
minorities in the policy’s various subdomains. But the essence
of his message was that he did not feel the government was
truly committed. “The minorities policy,” he said, was about to
degenerate into “minority management, without inspiration,
routinized, and defensive” (ibid. 147). He questioned whether
there was the “political will” to put “the perspective of equality”
into practice (ibid. 152, emphasis in the original).
Van Dijk was not impressed and asked the audience to “ex-
cuse me for not responding to each and every allegation” (ibid.
154). The government, he said, had recently discovered the lim-
its of its own power: “We have come to the conclusion that we
should be a bit more modest. And this is not just true for the
minorities policy but for community work (maatschappelijk
werk) generally” (ibid. 154).
Due to these contradictions, the policy field was in crisis from its
inception. In retrospect, it is clear that by the time the minorities
policy was implemented, the movements that had shaped its de-
velopment had lost their momentum. The corporatist logic of pil-
larization, the progressive ideals of the new social movements and
the expansion of the welfare state had defined the content and
approach of the minorities policy; it was a bureaucratic remnant
of a time when the ideal of state-guided development towards a
more equal, tolerant and inclusive society was widely shared. But
already in 1987, just four years after the inception of the minor-
ities policy, the government requested the Scientific Council for
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further advice on minority integration. This time Han Entzinger –
an empirical sociologist, civil servant and member of the progres-
sive Liberals – was chiefly responsible. The advice, which came in
1989, recommended focusing on immigrants’ position in the la-
bor market – namely, civil integration courses as well as training
schemes to reduce their relative disadvantage. Immigrants were
now relabeled allochtonen (WRR 1989). They were no longer re-
garded as members of ethnic communities but as individuals
with weak positions in the labor market, handicapped by their
lack of proficiency in Dutch, by discrimination and by their mea-
ger networks.
Conclusion
This chapter has sketched the evolution of the Dutch civil sphere
and the formation and transformation of the policy field through
which minorities are administered. I show that power relations in
the Dutch civil sphere experienced sudden transformations on
two occasions: in the early 20th century when pillarization crystal-
lized and in the late 1960s and early 1970s when new social move-
ments put their stamp on the expanding welfare state. Both these
ruptures were prefigured by long-term trends that exacerbated the
contradictions of power relations in the civil sphere. I argue in the
following chapters that a similar process took place in the early
2000s when the Dutch civil sphere experienced another major
transformation – the ascendancy of Culturalism – whose condi-
tions of possibility had long been in the making.
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was little discussion of minority
integration within civil arenas. Articles occasionally appeared but
there was no intense debate among politicians or intellectuals. Be-
cause of this lack of discursive struggle, the field that evolved
around the minorities policy could develop its own distinctive
rules and positions and oppositions. I especially emphasized the
opposition between advocates and experts. The former presented
themselves as the agents of immigrants’ emancipation; the latter,
further removed from the experiences of immigrants, adopted a
more sober discourse. As categorical institutions were dissolved,
as immigrants suffered growing unemployment and as policies
increasingly focused on economic integration, the experts gained
in power at the expense of the advocates. This shifting balance of
75
power was also reflected in government discourse. Whereas Rinus
Penninx sketched the contours of a policy for collective emancipa-
tion, Han Entzinger formulated a discourse that ascribed most va-
lue to individual economic integration. These shifts were pro-
found. The ideas that had motivated the minorities policy could
no longer count on strong support when it was implemented; the
transition towards the current integration policy was well under-
way by the end of the 1980s. But despite these contradictions, in-
tegration was not an issue around which political oppositions
formed. The approach of the government was pragmatic and there
was consensus among the major currents in Dutch politics that it
should remain so. This changed in 1991.
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5 The ascendancy of Culturalism
In the image of the Dutch civil sphere sketched in the previous
chapter, there is no place for a dominant conception of Dutch
identity and culture.1 Relations between groups and their repre-
sentatives were characterized by Pragmatism and the avoidance
of conflict. The Netherlands was a country of minorities; it was
both practically difficult and morally suspect to claim that one cul-
ture is worthier than another. Culturalism thus cannot be under-
stood as a “Dutch discourse”. The promoters of Culturalism, in
fact, sought to redefine the Netherlands and transform its political
culture. This chapter shows that Culturalism is a discourse of as-
cendant elites who challenged this pragmatic political culture, its
dignitaries and its institutions of accommodation. The chapter ex-
amines which elites embraced Culturalism, why they did so, and
their relative power compared to their antagonists.
The first section identifies some of the milieus in which cultur-
alist ideas and notions were cultivated before the 1990s. The sub-
sequent sections analyze the evolution of Culturalism through an
analysis of its most prominent representatives: Frits Bolkestein in
the 1990s, Paul Scheffer immediately after 2000, Pim Fortuyn
after 9/11, and Ayaan Hirsi Ali after the assassinations of Fortuyn
(May 2002) and Theo van Gogh (November 2004). The sections
first examine the discourses of these central figures and subse-
quently identify their bases of support. Finally, the chapter identi-
fies the kind of power that culturalists exercise and the networks
and class fractions that sustain it.
A pragmatic tradition and the seeds of Culturalism
There were already signs that politics was breaking out of the
bounds of consensus and accommodation in the 1980s. While
parliamentary elites and their associates in civil society were
firmly committed to accommodation, actors on the margins were
sowing the seeds of the symbolic revolution that would occur
through shocks in 1991, 2000 and 2002-2005.2 We can distin-
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guish three distinct milieus where Culturalism was cultivated in
the 1980s, each with its own particular class composition and dis-
cursive codes.
The extreme right’s challenge
First of all, there was the extreme right. Hans Janmaat and his
Center Party (later the Center Democrats) saw minorities as intru-
ders to be removed from the civil sphere. In local elections, the
Center Democrats and the Center Party sometimes won a consid-
erable share of the vote in urban neighborhoods. In newspaper
and television interviews, lower-class natives complained about
the arrogance and impotence of the established political parties.
To voice their discontent, they cast “protest votes” – a novel phe-
nomenon that exemplified the corrosion of the traditional institu-
tions of socialization and mobilization in urban areas. In national
and European elections, the extreme right occasionally succeeded
in passing the electoral threshold.
Nevertheless, the Center Democrats and the Center Party were
tainted with the stigma of racism. Other political parties made
every effort to portray their xenophobic colleagues as reincarna-
tions of the ideologies defeated in the Second World War. They
ignored Janmaat, walking out of parliament during his speeches
and refusing to answer his questions (Koper 1995). Left-wing
groups meticulously monitored the party and used both violent
and non-violent strategies to prevent the Center Democrats and
Center Party from gathering and organizing. Public prosecutors
made every effort to convict the extreme right for “sowing hate”
and were successful on several occasions. The symbolic, physical
and legal assaults against his party frustrated Janmaat’s attempts
to communicate an image of respectability. Although the Center
Democrats formally distanced themselves from racism, some of
its key figures had been convicted of inciting hatred or racist at-
tacks. There were also obvious connections between the party lea-
dership and Nazi and fascist organizations and gangs. The party
attracted mainly disenfranchised lower-class people who were rou-
tinely portrayed as political illiterates, drunks and hooligans (see
for example Frequin 1994). Despite the efforts of the extreme
right to present itself as mainstream – through slogans like “not
left, not right” – it did not gain the acceptance of the mainstream
parties. The stigma of the extreme right was so strong, in fact, that
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culturalists either had to moderate their discourse or risk being
identified with civil pariahs. But the fact that such a thoroughly
stigmatized party could attain electoral success showed that disen-
franchised and anxious natives might support a discourse that si-
multaneously degraded established elites and minorities.
Experts against advocates
A very different kind of culturalist challenge to pragmatist politics
came from the experts involved in the minorities policy. As Chap-
ter 4 showed, tension between policy experts and minority advo-
cates was built into the minorities policy from the beginning.
Some experts complained that minority spokespersons were not
really representative of their communities but were only inter-
ested in subsidies or were overly sensitive to criticisms of minority
cultures (e.g. Köbben 1983). The journalist Herman Vuijsje was
prominent among those trying to liberate negative opinions and
statements about minorities from the stigma of racism; he
brought this discourse out of the policy field and into civil arenas
(Vuijsje 1986, 1997; see also Prins 2004). One minority research-
er told Vuijsje in the mid-1980s that “many people in this milieu
have turned away from a love for the underdog to having reserva-
tions. After some time you get more spiteful” (cited in Vuijsje
1986: 68). Another native Dutch researcher claimed that she was
“almost lynched” at a sociology conference for her study of Turk-
ish women, but that “after the session at least twenty people [ex-
pressed] their admiration for her courage” (cited in Vuijsje 1986:
46). Vuijsje’s reports, however, are so full of people proudly break-
ing the taboo of examining ethnic differences that it is difficult to
maintain that there was such a taboo. Instead, Vuijsje and his in-
terviewees were shifting the balance of discursive power: immi-
grant representatives and anti-racists were losing power at the ex-
pense of policy researchers much more likely to explain
criminality, unemployment and the like by referring to immi-
grants’ cultural backgrounds. The message of these policy experts
was that the minorities policy and its institutions were too respect-
ful of immigrants and minority cultures.
Unlike the extreme right, policy experts received positive cover-
age and were often invited to discuss their ideas in the media or at
public debates. The disputes were fierce: some in the policy field
were trying to widen the discursive space available to address im-
79
migrants’ cultural deficiencies; others were trying to foreground
issues of discrimination and racism. Experts, however, spoke as
individuals, not as representatives of movements or segments of
the population. While discussions among policymakers occasion-
ally trickled into civil arenas, there was no public debate where
different camps formed around focal points or central issues.
While professionals and experts promoting Culturalism were
gaining ground in the policy field (see Mullard et al. 1990; Prins
2004), their influence remained limited within public debates.
Intellectual flirtations with Culturalism
Literary and intellectual elites who sought to defend artistic liber-
ties against anti-racist and Islamic attempts to constrain their ex-
pression constituted a further culturalist challenge to pragmatist
politics. Intellectuals criticized cultural relativism and multicultur-
alism in periodicals like De Groene, Elsevier and Vrij Nederland. In
essays, satires, parodies and caricatures, native cultural elites ri-
diculed and criticized both Muslims and anti-racists.3 The re-
spected and best-selling writer Gerrit Komrij, for instance, felt
that “All the welfare work and the waffling about anti-racism; it
was all for nothing. A waste of effort. Money thrown away. There
is not a hint of reasonableness or tolerance in that group, which
has lived here so long, in a society that actually had much to offer”
(Komrij cited in Van Dijk 2003: 27). Artists and intellectuals who
wished to be more hard-hitting in their criticisms complained
about the cultural and legal norms that supposedly constrained
their expression.
The most bewildering manifestation of the drive for spectacle
was the appearance of an author who hid his identity behind the
pseudonym Mohammed Rasoel. “Rasoel” made his first appear-
ance on the opinion pages of the NRC Handelsblad on 6 March
1989, where he stated that he was a Muslim who had spent the
first twenty years of his life in Iran before migrating to “the coun-
try of naive fools that goes by the name of The Netherlands” (Ra-
soel cited in Van Dijk 2003: 25). The author ridiculed those who
failed to anticipate Khomeini’s fatwa. “The West could have seen
this coming. I could have predicted this response 15 years ago.
The West could have known about the kind of fanatical responses
that we Muslims are capable of and how much aggression we have
inside of us” (Rasoel cited in Tinnemans 1994: 355). A year later,
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in 1990, “Rasoel” published The Downfall of the Netherlands; Coun-
try of Naive Fools. Its simple message – Muslims are inherently
aggressive and the Dutch are too ignorant to acknowledge this –
was delivered with literary sophistication. The prose of the
pamphlet differed from the propaganda of the extreme right in
that it was fluent and witty. “Rasoel” now appeared on television
shows, on the radio and in prestigious and popular publications.
The mystery of his identity – his faced was covered with a Palesti-
nian shawl and sunglasses – further fuelled the spectacle. Rasoel’s
success was nevertheless short-lived. Several organizations filed
complaints of racism. As the joke spiraled out of hand, those be-
hind the pseudonym made every effort to remain anonymous.
Teun van Dijk’s research, however, traces “Rasoel” to a group of
respected native writers, translators and publishers, while the per-
sons posing as “Rasoel” had been hired and instructed by this
group (Van Dijk 2003). “Rasoel” had given a team of intellectual
conspirators the means to express what – in spite of, or due to,
their prominence – they could not openly state. The resonance of
Rasoel’s discourse demonstrated the demand for spectacular
Islamophobic expressions. But the fact that native intellectuals
did not dare to come out into the open illustrated that, in the late
1980s, such expressions did not accord with the norms of good
taste.
As these snapshots of the different discursive milieus demon-
strate, Culturalism was present in the 1980s and growing in
power. Culturalists in the political, bureaucratic and literary fields
claimed discursive space to criticize minority cultures for differ-
ent reasons: the extreme right capitalized on feelings of exclusion
and cynicism among the disenfranchised lower classes; experts
engaged in a struggle for professional authority with minority re-
presentatives and anti-racists; artists and intellectuals sought to
gain or regain their power to offend sensitivities. The ingredients
for the culturalist movement were thus already in place: hostility
towards the political establishment, the drive to make policies
more stringent and a desire to criticize minority cultures. How-
ever, the class and cultural differences were so great that the
forces from these disparate discursive milieus did not converge
into a single movement.
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Economic liberalism and cultural protectionism: Frits
Bolkestein in the 1990s
The idea of clashing cultures gained a strong presence in the cen-
tral arenas of the civil sphere only after 1991. Frits Bolkestein, the
leader of the right-wing Liberals, was absolutely central to the de-
bate in this period. In 1991, he argued that Western civilization is
fundamentally different from – and vastly superior to – Islamic
civilization. He unfolded his vision at a meeting of European Lib-
eral parties in the Swiss city of Luzern on 6 September. Trouw and
NRC reported on the lecture, but Bolkestein’s opinion article in de
Volkskrant – “The minorities policy needs to be handled with guts”
(Bolkestein 1991) – became the debate’s focal point. Its central
message was that the government should take robust measures to
prevent or reduce the formidable problems arising from mass mi-
gration. In his speech, Bolkestein drew upon the WRR’s first re-
port on integration issues:
Very important aspects of our Western culture like individual
freedom and equality are under pressure from another culture in
a sometimes militant way. In cases of confrontation, when a com-
promise is a practical impossibility, there is no other choice but to
defend our culture against competing claims. (WRR 1979, cited
in Bolkestein 1991)
The WRR had arrived at these conclusions in the wake of the Mo-
luccan hijackings and at the time of the incipient Islamic revolu-
tion in Iran. By the time Bolkestein delivered his speech, he could
appeal to new global signifiers generated during the Rushdie af-
fair:
Islam is not just a religion; it is a way of life. And as such it is at
odds with the liberal division between church and state. Many
Islamic countries have hardly any freedom of speech. The Salman
Rushdie affair is perhaps an extreme case, but it shows how
much we differ from one another in these matters. (Bolkestein
1991)
Bolkestein saw himself as an exponent of the Enlightenment and
Western civilization, praising the achievements of intellectual
icons like Goethe and Plato. But he also presented himself as be-
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longing to the “ordinary people” – those who had to shoulder the
consequences of mass migration (Prins 2002). Bolkestein ob-
served that Dutch natives were developing a counter discourse be-
hind the veil of private life:
There is an informal national debate that is not held in public.
Voters feel that politicians are not sufficiently aware of their prob-
lems. The minority issue is constantly discussed in places like
bars and churches. If this is not sufficiently represented in The
Hague [the seat of parliament] people will say: why should I vote
anyway? (Bolkestein cited in Prins 2004: 28)
Bolkestein had a higher class background (see Box 5.1) but never-
theless presented himself as a redeemer of unjustly marginalized
lower-class discourses: “a representative who ignores the people’s
concerns is worth nothing” (ibid). “The people” here specifically
refers to Dutch natives living in disadvantaged neighborhoods,
people with experience, knowledge and, indeed, discourses that
are not sufficiently valued in core arenas. Far from being the per-
petrators of racism, they are victims – the “autochthonous minor-
ities in poor neighborhoods in the big cities who are living in the
midst of an allochtonous majority” (ibid).
Box 5.1 Frits Bolkestein – an elite discourse for lower-
class natives
Bolkestein (1933) embodied a vast amount and variety of elite
capital. He studied mathematics, science, Greek and philoso-
phy in Amsterdam and graduated with a law degree from Lei-
den University, thus obtaining his education in both the pre-
mier milieu for cultural elites (the canal district of
Amsterdam) and the premier milieu for governmental and
business elites (the law faculty in Leiden). Bolkestein was a
member of the Amsterdam student fraternity and a president
of the student union. As a student in the late 1950s, he briefly
wrote for the satirical literary magazine Propria Cures. Like
many other editors of the magazine, he wrote on the silliness
of religion and Catholicism and cultivated a disposition for po-
lemics. But he was also an aspiring politician who, at the time,
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put his energies into solving the shortage of student housing in
Amsterdam (he failed). The farewell editorial of the magazine
described him as a “bustling young man occupied with lofty
matters” (cited in Propria Cures 1988: 6). After his education,
he began working for Shell, one of the world’s largest oil com-
panies. Some of his first encounters with Islam must have ta-
ken place in the 1970s during his time as a coordinator of Shell
Chemistry for the Middle East, Asia and Australia. Bolkestein
thus cultivated his dispositions in various elite circles and, as a
politician, was able to create a stir without losing respectability
– a privilege Hans Janmaat and others on the extreme right
lacked. After he stepped down as the leader of the right-wing
Liberals, Bolkestein became European Commissioner for the
internal market. Throughout his career, he remained at the
very top of the national market for speakers. In 2009, he re-
ceived around 15,000 euros per performance (Conijn 2009).
Culturalism counterposes superior civilizations to inferior civili-
zations and argues that the mingling of different cultures leads to
the disintegration of the national body. As many observers have
noted, this scheme has analogies to many racist ideologies
(Stolcke 1995). But precisely because Culturalism is akin to racism
in some respects, its claim to civil virtue depends upon its discur-
sive dissociation from racism. Bolkestein has repeatedly stated
that discrimination should be combated; in the early 1990s, he
participated in large anti-racist demonstrations. In fact, Bolkestein
saw his interventions as an effort against Janmaat. One of his arti-
cles is entitled: “Those who ignore the anxiety will feed the resent-
ment against minorities they oppose”; in it, he calls for the libera-
tion of the discourse on minorities from the envy, anger and
apathy that are about to take possession of the electorate: “a dis-
tasteful and xenophobic party will not stop me from voicing my
opinion. ... If we do not fix the problem, our descendants will
curse us” (Bolkestein 1992).
Bolkestein mobilized culturalist discourse to appeal to seg-
ments of the population that had previously been socialist (cf. Van
der Waal et al. 2007). The state, in Bolkestein’s view, should be
strict on immigration: to promote integration, the ‘right hand of
the state’ responsible for law and order (Bourdieu 1999: 182-187)
should strengthen its grip on those lower-class immigrants living
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in the country but outside the civil community. Bolkestein’s attack
on the minorities policy paralleled his attack on the Rhineland
economic model which, in his view, lacked flexibility and was bur-
dened by too many consultative and regulatory structures (Bolkes-
tein 1996). Bolkestein’s stated goal is the creation of a state in
which economically independent citizens can prosper in safety
(ibid). The ideal of collective and state-supported emancipation en-
shrined in the welfare state thus ran counter to his ideas. His cri-
tique of the minorities policy showed that this applied particularly
to lower-class immigrants who did not partake in the culture of
individual responsibility that Bolkestein associates with the West
(e.g. Bolkestein 1991, 2000).
Resonance and consonance
Bolkestein was severely criticized, receiving 93 negative and 28
positive references over the period 1991 to 1994. Journalists, aca-
demics, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats all argued
that he had been too blunt in his criticisms of minority cultures.
Bolkestein received praise from actors critical of his discourse
who nonetheless felt that his person and intentions were beyond
reproach. Especially Labor politicians were keen on differentiating
the legitimate Bolkestein from the illegitimate Janmaat. Promi-
nent politicians like Thijs Wöltgens and Ed van Thijn criticized
some of Bolkestein’s views but praised him for opening up the
debate (Wöltgens cited in Banning & Eppink 1991; Van Thijn
1993). Aad Kosto, the State Secretary for Immigration, similarly
made a sharp distinction between Janmaat (“an idiot”) and people
nursing xenophobic sentiments – in his view an understandable
response to the very real problems that plague multicultural
neighborhoods (Kosto 1992). Though Labor politicians and other
critics did not agree with Bolkestein’s views on Islam, many ac-
knowledged him as a worthy opponent. With one notable excep-
tion (Labor minister Hedy d’Ancona), only marginal actors ac-
cused Bolkestein of stigmatizing immigrants and playing into the
hands of the extreme right (D’Ancona 1992).
Bolkestein and the transformation of the integration debate
Frits Bolkestein is the godfather of Culturalism in the Nether-
lands. Culturalism – which had been emerging in several discur-
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sive milieus – was elevated by Bolkestein into a prominent dis-
course in the core arenas of the civil sphere. Bolkestein antici-
pated many of the ideas and notions that culturalists in later peri-
ods would promote: the notion that the lower classes deserve
cultural (rather than economic) protection was adopted by Pim
Fortuyn, the idea that Islam has yet to go through a process of
enlightenment became a cornerstone in Hirsi Ali’s discourse, and
Paul Scheffer would walk in Bolkestein’s footsteps in stressing the
importance of national self-assertion. All of Bolkestein’s succes-
sors agreed that a generous welfare state exacerbates the problems
of integration. Bolkestein’s intervention thus marked the break-
through of Culturalism in central civil arenas and its definitive
dissociation from racism. The success of the right-wing Liberals
in the elections of 1994 showed that Bolkestein’s tough stance on
immigration and integration also appealed to a substantial seg-
ment of voters (see Kleinnijenhuis & De Ridder 1998).
Bolkestein’s legitimacy and that of his discourse hinged on his
identification with the political establishment. While his interven-
tions challenged Pragmatism, Bolkestein sought to establish or
retain political consensus on minority integration. Immediately
before and after his intervention, he declared in parliament and
in private conversations with other party leaders4 that he did not
want to turn integration politics into a battle between political par-
ties. This, then, was the part-explicit, part-implicit trade-off: critics
would not associate Bolkestein with the extreme right while the
right-wing Liberals would not exploit xenophobic sentiments for
electoral purposes. Bolkestein further moderated his discourse
when the right-wing Liberals entered the so-called purple coalition
with the progressive Liberals and the Social Democrats in 1994.
In fact, the entire debate cooled after 1993 (Figure 3.1). The parties
in the purple coalition government hid their political differences
under a managerial discourse that centered on economic growth,
efficient government and job creation. The bracketing of both cul-
tural and class politics depolarized integration politics. The trans-
formation of the minorities policy into an integration policy – un-
derway since the late 1980s – was formally consolidated with the
post for a “Minister of Integration” (and big cities) within the pur-
ple cabinet in 1998, signaling broad agreement on integration be-
tween the right-wing Liberals and the Social Democrats. The pol-
icy practices and concepts were designed to suppress rather than
express meanings and emotions. Integration politics had been
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made into a managerial affair for administrators and experts
rather than an issue of civil politics for politicians and activists.
The civilizing mission of progressive elites: Paul
Scheffer’s “multicultural drama” in 2000
As a contributing editor for NRC Handelsblad and a prominent
member of the Labor Party, Paul Scheffer was an unlikely candi-
date for revitalizing Culturalism. But precisely because Cultural-
ism was associated with the political right, his page-long essay
“The multicultural drama” in NRC Handelsblad was an immediate
hit. The debate blossomed; the number of articles in the database
exploded from eight in 1999 to 43 in 2000, while the number of
hits increased from 86 to 222 (see Figure 3.1). “The multicultural
drama” became the focal point around which oppositions took
shape. The essay posited that there was a process of underclass
formation that had accelerated over the last decade:
Overseeing all the available data, one comes to a sobering conclu-
sion: unemployment, poverty, dropping out of school and crimin-
ality are increasingly concentrated among minority groups. The
prospects are not favorable, in spite of individual success stories.
The number of immigrants without prospects is enormous, and
they will increasingly burden Dutch society. (Scheffer 2000)
Scheffer could marshal extensive data on the performance of
minorities in various policy domains (see Chapter 4). The results
always showed immigrants lagging behind, though many re-
searchers concluded that there was movement in the right direc-
tion and that policy investments were paying off (e.g., Penninx
2000). Scheffer, however, saw immigrants’ underperformance
through an entirely different scheme of perception. He blamed
Dutch culture and specifically Dutch elites. In spite of the clear
and present danger posed by mass migration, the Dutch persisted
in their culture of relativism, complacency and consensus. “In
1994 the government had expressed its concerns about the posi-
tion of minorities”, but:
the solicitude has evaporated in the bliss of the polder model.
Many have the misunderstanding that the integration of ethnic
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minorities will evolve in more or less the same way as the peace-
ful reconciliation of religious groups, ... that the rules and cus-
toms of consensual democracy [pacificatiedemocratie] can be used
to assuage the new division. The situation is reminiscent of the
faith in the neutrality policy on the eve of the Second World War.
Everyone was convinced that what had succeeded a quarter cen-
tury earlier – namely to stay out of the First World War – would
have a chance of success. And thus an entire nation lost sight of
reality. (Scheffer 2000)
For Scheffer, this culture of appeasement is the thread that runs
through the minorities policy, multiculturalism, cultural relati-
vism, pillarization and the polder model. If the Dutch fail to ac-
knowledge their national identity, immigrants will not become
part of the nation:
An ease-loving multiculturalism is gaining ground because we do
not articulate what binds our society together. We do not talk en-
ough about our limits, we do not maintain a relationship with our
own past, and we treat our language carelessly. A society that be-
lies itself has nothing to offer to newcomers. A majority that de-
nies that it is a majority has no eye for the hard-handedness of
integration, which always entails a loss of one’s tradition. Those
who do not understand what is being taken do not have much to
give. (Scheffer 2000)
In Scheffer’s discourse, national awareness is the first step to-
wards civil integration, and a strong national identity the prerequi-
site for openness and cosmopolitanism (see also Scheffer 2004).
Both the traditional politics of pillarization and modern-day cul-
tural relativism must be abandoned; the nation needs to reinvent
and reassert itself in order to absorb immigrants. Though Schef-
fer shares Bolkestein’s commitment to cultural self-assertion and
his antipathy to relativism, he did not adopt Bolkestein’s economic
liberalism. Seeing parallels between the “social question” of the
early 20th century and contemporary integration issues, Scheffer
called upon Dutch elites to uplift the masses (see Box 5.2). His
article is a plea to reinvent the civilizing offensives of those times,
the difference being that now immigrants rather than the lower
classes have to be transformed into virtuous citizens.
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Box 5.2 Paul Scheffer – the anxiety of the progressive
middle classes
With his jeans, wild curly hair and casual shirt, Paul Scheffer
(1954) looks every inch the progressive Dutch intellectual (Bur-
uma 2006: 126). “If I look at my own role, I would never de-
scribe myself as a scientist, but also not as a journalist or a
politician, and certainly not as a policymaker. I like the term
‘public intellectual’. I have a rather romantic image of engaging
the world with my pen as an individual” (interview Scheffer).
Like many other intellectuals and politicians of his generation
(including Pim Fortuyn), Scheffer was a member of the Com-
munist Party and part of the student movement in the 1970s.
This is where he cultivated his critical stance towards estab-
lished interests and his appreciation for the combined power
of ideas and mass movements. Years later, after working as a
historian at several universities and for the scientific institute
of the Labor Party, his position as a regular contributor to NRC
gave him the possibility and incentive to think and act as a
guardian of the general interest vis-à-vis power holders. As in
his student days, he searched for how elites failed to live up to
their promises of accountability and responsibility. Increas-
ingly he felt that the failure of the elites was most apparent in
their treatment of the cultural and social consequences of mass
immigration. Scheffer often refers to a 1993 visit to Istanbul as
the turning point in his thinking on integration:
There I encountered the political and intellectual inner circle
and they were all extremely negative about immigration from
Anatolia. They talked of barbarians who were destroying the
open character of Istanbul with their traditional ideas about
religion and family. That was the first time that I realized that
immigration does not automatically lead to cosmopolitanism
(interview Scheffer).
Identification with the secular elite – and not with lower-class
Anatolian and Kurdish immigrants – came naturally to Schef-
fer. As with many radicals of his generation, he had become
part of the progressive elite dominating the arts, universities
and the left-leaning political parties. In his many public perfor-
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mances in front of middle-class audiences, he discovered that
they were anxious in much the same way as the Turkish elite.
He wrote the first draft of “The multicultural drama” in 1997
and noticed how it struck a chord with his audiences:
I tried out the piece as a lecture, as I often do. I noticed that
there were a lot of people in the audience who were also wor-
ried. Everywhere I talked about it, you could notice that there
were people thinking ‘ah, finally, someone with an impeccable
background who is not associated with the wrong sort (foute)
of sympathies’. (ibid)
Scheffer thus emerged as an organic intellectual of the progres-
sive middle classes, articulating and legitimizing their (pre-
viously suspect) sentiments. His opponents were not migrants
but elites who, in his view, lacked a sense of purpose. When I
asked him whom he had in mind when he wrote about the
“apologists of diversity”, he did not mention policymakers or
politicians – as I had expected – but the writer Adriaan van Dis
who had said, to Scheffer’s dismay, that “integration issues will
be solved in bed” (interview Scheffer). Such making light of the
problems of integration disturbed Scheffer. He found inspira-
tion in the works of his grandfather, who had been in charge of
spatial planning in Amsterdam, including the construction of
the postwar suburbs which in the 1990s became emblems of
integration gone wrong. As a progressive heir to this tradition
of social planning, he sought to devise an approach that would
allow governmental elites to get a grip on urban reality: “Con-
fronted with a new social problem that has, as before, an out-
spoken cultural dimension, there is no other way out than to
search anew for new ways to make the city” (Scheffer 2004:
39).
Resonance and consonance
Scheffer had a slightly higher approval/disapproval ratio than
Bolkestein in the early 1990s (Scheffer received 30 positive, 67
neutral and 84 negative references; Bolkestein 28 positive, 51 neu-
tral and 93 negative references). But more interesting are the
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backgrounds of those who supported him. The Social Democratic
element within Scheffer’s culturalist discourse (immigrants were
an underclass in need of emancipation) helped to win support
among groups who had previously opposed Bolkestein: Labor pol-
iticians, editors and journalists. The growing acceptability of Cul-
turalism among governmental elites is perhaps best illustrated by
the intervention of Paul Schnabel, the director of the Social and
Cultural Planning Agency. This government think tank had been
critical of multiculturalism for at least a decade (see SCP 1986,
1998).5 Just before Scheffer published his article, the director of
the Agency publicly spoke out in favor of assimilation (Schnabel
1999, 2000). Whereas Bolkestein’s criticism of the minorities
policy had appealed to right-wing Liberals and a few individuals
from other sectors, Scheffer’s discourse made criticisms of multi-
culturalism and minority cultures accessible and acceptable to left-
leaning cultural and governmental elites. While political parties
persisted in their technocratic understanding of integration is-
sues, newspapers endorsed Culturalism much more after Schef-
fer’s intervention, making it the most prominent discourse among
journalists and editors.6 Whereas around 15 per cent of articles
promoted Culturalism in the period 1990-2000, after Scheffer’s
intervention the figure was around 23 per cent (Table 3.1).
Scheffer and the transformation of the integration debate
Scheffer’s style radically differed from that of the purple govern-
ment and its administrators. Under the purple government, poli-
tics was more management than drama; the government’s role
was to coordinate social affairs and to promote economic growth.
Integration was a technical manner, something that had to be
monitored and managed with skill and tact – the polder strategy.
Scheffer provided a radical alternative as he articulated and called
for grand narratives about the nation and integration. The policy
discussion on minority integration became a civil debate about
envisioning a new society and redefining the Netherlands. The
number of public lectures, television programs and magazine is-
sues on minorities and integration increased rapidly. But though
integration politics proliferated and came to function as a – per-
haps the – key issue through which divisions in the civil sphere
were articulated, it still remained a debate between intellectual,
political and governmental elites. Immigrants were virtually ab-
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sent from the debate. So, too, were the popular media, such as the
tabloid newspaper De Telegraaf.7 After 9/11, the focus shifted to
the position of Muslims within society and the debate exploded.
Pim Fortuyn and the spectacularization of Culturalism
The twin towers collapsed in New York, but the Netherlands was
in crisis too. A frenetic search for meaning ensued. What was un-
der attack? Who were the perpetrators? How should governments
respond? While 9/11 raised these questions in many countries, in
the Netherlands the shock coincided with the resignation of the
purple government. This, together with the heightened anxieties
over global security, created the ideal conditions for the emer-
gence of Pim Fortuyn, whose dramatic and sensational perfor-
mances contrasted sharply with the managerialism of the purple
government.
Box 5.3 Pim Fortuyn – organic intellectual of the
nouveau riches
As long as he could remember, Fortuyn (1948) had been spe-
cial: “I wanted to belong but I did not. From my earliest child-
hood I had the experience that I was different... in speech,
dress and behavior.”He stood out and this, he said, “had some-
thing to do with his homosexuality” but also with his opinions:
“I always thought I knew better. And, it has to be said, I was
often correct” (cited in Pels 2003: 63). As a teenager and young
adult in the 1960s and 1970s, he distinguished himself with
his impeccable suits and extravagant style. Fortuyn’s autobio-
graphies and biographies show that he desperately wanted his
peers to love him as much as he loved himself. Through wit
and enthusiasm, he managed to satisfy his thirst for recogni-
tion. This sensitivity towards his cultural and social environ-
ment perhaps explains Fortuyn’s chameleon-like changes with
the times. In the 1970s he was a Marxist and member of the
Communist Party, in the 1980s he wanted to renew social and
corporatist democracy and was a member of the Labor Party,
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and in the 1990s he embraced free market ideology and was a
member of the right-wing Liberals.
While discontinuities mark Fortuyn’s ideology, in each peri-
od he aligned himself with movements growing in power and
challenging established interests. Fortuyn had the tempera-
ment and skills to divide the world into antagonistic poles and
to devote his energies to challenging established interests. Stu-
dents at Groningen University successfully campaigned to
have him appointed as assistant professor of sociology due to
his commitment to Marxism. But Fortuyn did not just want to
challenge the elites, he wanted to become one of them. He
tried to attain positions of power within the university and
mainstream political parties, but to no avail. His appetite for
conflict, his self-aggrandizement and his desire to be at the
center of attention made it impossible for party and political
elites to accommodate him.
In 1990 Fortuyn accepted a position as endowed chair at the
Erasmus University Rotterdam, which was financed by em-
ployers’ organizations and labor unions. But while Fortuyn
was writing frenetically and taking part in heated debates, he
felt that the university was no longer the place for polemics
and passion. During his time as professor, Fortuyn found a
more rewarding milieu: the rapidly expanding market for opi-
nions in the form of columns and speeches. From 1993 For-
tuyn wrote a column for the right-wing weekly Elsevier. After
1997 he was the star of the Speakers Academy, a company that
organizes speakers’ events. It arranged fifty to sixty bookings
for him per year, at 7,000 euros per performance. This is
where Fortuyn was at his best, and he felt it. He spoke without
embarrassment about his “charismatic appearance” and his ca-
pacity to “electrify a room”. The audience was “psyched and
charged” by the prospect of experiencing the “Fortuyn myth”
(Fortuyn cited in Pels 2003: 139). The columns and speeches
further cultivated Fortuyn’s talent for rhetoric and one-liners.
“A little bit of magic and charisma is required for a good per-
formance” and he learned how to “climb into hearts” with a
mixture of “humor and utmost seriousness” (ibid. 138, 139).
Fortuyn’s extravagant style was an instrument to break the
power of the people and parties that had rejected him in his
younger years. Fortuyn felt that a closed circle of around
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20,000 people had created among themselves a consensual
culture of mediocrity that worked to exclude all those who have
passion and vision (Pels 2003: 171). His discourse appealed to
nouveau riches whose wealth and status had risen but who re-
mained marginal in terms of culture and state power. They felt
excluded, degraded and exploited by the state and its servants,
and were willing and able to pay Fortuyn handsomely to discur-
sively retaliate. They made Fortuyn a self-made man. Fortuyn
provided a discourse that revalued entrepreneurship and com-
mon sense as the highest civil virtues while degrading the jar-
gon, compromises and consensus typical of accommodation
politics. Through grand narratives and spectacular perfor-
mances, he wanted to become an “incarnation of the people”
(cited in Pels 2003: 66). Of course some groups – especially
natives with lower levels of cultural capital frustrated with
taxes, minorities and bureaucracy – were much more likely to
feel that Fortuyn incarnated them.
While Fortuyn had long aspired to a political career, the estab-
lished political parties offered him little. Livable Netherlands (Leef-
baar Nederland), a newly established party rooted in local opposi-
tional politics, furnished him with a platform. In a landmark
interview in de Volkskrant, Fortuyn presented Livable Netherlands
as a challenger to the status quo: “We agitate against the culture of
the polder model. A culture that is closed to outsiders and that
does not recognize new interests” (cited in Poorthuis & Wansink
2002). But he deviated from the party line when it came to asylum
seekers, Muslims and discrimination. In violation of a motion
passed by the party assembly, Fortuyn said that the Netherlands
should no longer accept asylum seekers. He also stated that he
wanted to “stop the insanity that three-quarters of the Turks and
Moroccans who were born here get their wife from a backward
region” (ibid). Fortuyn also challenged one of the fundamental
rules of the civil sphere, namely Article 1 of the constitution, for-
mulated in 1983, which named discrimination as a civil and in-
deed legal vice: “Discrimination because of religion, convictions,
political orientation, race, sex or any other ground, is not per-
mitted.” Article 1, technically speaking, is not the one that forbids
racist or xenophobic remarks. Fortuyn nonetheless attacked it as a
symbol of discursive oppression:
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I am completely in support of Voltaire: I may find your opinion
abject but I will defend your right to voice it. I am in favor of
absolving that strange article in the constitution: thou shalt not
discriminate. Fantastic. But if it means that people cannot make
discriminatory remarks any more – and they are easily made in
this country – then I say: this is not good. Let those people make
those remarks. There is a limit, and I find that very important:
you can never incite physical violence. A state of law cannot afford
that. But if an imam likes to say that my [homosexual] way of life
is completely reprehensible and lower than that of pigs, well, he
should just say that. (cited in Poorthuis & Wansink 2002)
Fortuyn desired public debate in which gut feelings about other
groups could be voiced without restraint. In his columns for the
right-wing weekly Elsevier and in his essay on the Islamization of
our culture (1997), Fortuyn made his views on Islam crystal clear.
He characterized Islam as a backward or “retarded (achterlijke) cul-
ture” (cited in Poorthuis & Wansink 2002). The achievements of
the progressive movements of the past, he claimed, were under
threat: “I do not feel like doing the emancipation of women and
homosexuals all over again. In high schools there are numerous
teachers who do not dare to express their identity because of Mor-
occan and Turkish boys. I find that a disgrace” (Fortuyn cited in
Poorthuis & Wansink 2002).
Fortuyn was kicked out of the party for his interview in de
Volkskrant, but this only boosted his renegade image. He had no
interest in honoring the informal pact not to dramatize integra-
tion politics; his words and plans were meant to challenge the
consensus culture from which he had been excluded (see Box
5.3). With financial support from business interests, in particular
real estate and property developers, Fortuyn created his own party,
Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), less than 100 days before the elections of
May 2002 (Storm & Naastepad 2003). Fortuyn now launched a
frontal attack against the government. Instead of a party manifes-
to, he wrote an indictment of the purple coalition: The ruins of the
purple government (Fortuyn 2002). While Fortuyn’s discourse was
hard-hitting, his fame came from his media appearances. Night
after night, Fortuyn provided prime-time political drama. And
night after night, he stole the show. The occasions where he out-
performed his competitors are numerous, but two are especially
worth mentioning.
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In the first television debate (on 6 March 2002) featuring the
leaders of the five largest parties and Fortuyn, the representatives
of the established parties made a dismal impression. Fortuyn’s
place at the table was due to his astonishing electoral success in
Rotterdam (see Chapter 11) and his meteoric rise in the polls.
Nevertheless, the others made it clear that they did not want to
debate the upstart. Ad Melkert (Labor Party, PvdA), Hans Dijkstal
(right-wing Liberals, VVD) and Thom de Graaf (progressive Liber-
als, D66) sat limply in their chairs while Fortuyn veered forward
and dominated the debate. He reiterated that the purple govern-
ment had failed to stop the influx of foreigners and that the wait-
ing lists for health care were unacceptably long. Most importantly,
Fortuyn emphasized that he was the visionary who would lead the
way out of the crisis. The other debaters tried to focus on For-
tuyn’s lack of a party manifesto and detailed budget as well as his
lack of political experience – in effect treating him as an incompe-
tent and unreliable intruder into the civil sphere. But Fortuyn had
been in this position before (see Box 5.3). He presented himself as
an analyst who had written more books and articles than the other
candidates and announced the publication of his indictment of
the purple government (“192 pages, sir!”). Fortuyn’s performance
thus transgressed the discursive and performative codes that the
leaders of the purple parties embodied. The leader of the Social
Democrats, Ad Melkert, “was the biggest loser... With every inch
of his body he expressed that he did not feel like it at all. He had
an almost physical repulsion for Fortuyn” (Hartman cited in Mon-
den 2002). The failure of the other candidates was so obvious that
their campaign teams sent out statements admitting their dismal
performance. But the leaders of the purple parties clearly could
not unlearn their dispositions to appear distanced, objective and
sober. Time and again, they struggled to get television time while
the channels fought to have Fortuyn.
Another landmark performance was the debate that the leaders
of the largest parties (and Fortuyn, who polled around 20 per cent)
had in the television studios of the Sound Mix show on 28 April
2002. In a quintessential fusion of politics and entertainment, the
commercial channel RTL4 had programed a debate among the
candidates as an intermezzo for their talent hunt. The party lead-
ers had no more than 15 seconds to give their view on an issue
before the quizmaster stirred debate. Audience members could
then vote to select their favorite candidates. Fortuyn began with
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30 per cent and during the program increased his share to just
over 40 percent.
Interestingly, the leader of the Christian Democrats, Jan-Peter
Balkenende, did not suffer the brunt of Fortuyn’s scorn. While
the two had agreed not to attack each other for strategic reasons,
there were also discursive affinities between the stiff Christian
Democrat and the flamboyant populist. Balkenende explicitly re-
jected the idea that society should be multicultural and that an
Islamic pillar was something to applaud. He spearheaded a seg-
ment of the Christian Democrats that emphasized the importance
of order and thrift. Society, in his view, could not be an aggregate
of multiple cultures; it should be a coherent civil community with
shared norms and values (Balkenende 2002a). He rejected any
form of gedogen8 and argued that politicians as well as the govern-
ment were responsible for defining what was permissible and
what was not (Balkenende 2002b). While his plea for moral values
and civil norms did not immediately arouse interest when he ar-
ticulated these ideas in early 2002, it was the first step towards the
establishment of a right-leaning government of Christian Demo-
crats, Pim Fortuyn’s party and the right-wing Liberals following
the elections of 2002.
Fortuyn was shot dead on 6 May 2002. The assassin was a na-
tive Dutch environmental activist alarmed by his rise in the polls
and his omnipresence in the media. An assassination of a politi-
cian is of course quintessential civil drama. Political leaders ex-
pressed their horror over the assassination; Fortuyn’s supporters
mourned his death at mass ceremonies. He was praised as a civil
martyr who had stood up for “the people”, for which he paid with
his life. The villain in their story was not just the activist who
killed Fortuyn but the political elites and especially the left, who
were accused of demonizing Fortuyn and creating the context in
which he could be killed. Fortuyn’s supporters now began a cru-
sade against statements and ideas that had contributed to the de-
monization of culturalist discourse. As his political party dis-
agreed with a proposal to postpone the elections, they took place
nine days after the assassination.
Resonance and consonance
Fortuyn enjoyed success mainly among disenfranchised segments
of the population, not among civil elites. He nevertheless received
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no less than 355 references in the period after 9/11 (until 2006).
There is no evidence that Fortuyn was “demonized” by the main-
stream media as some commentators and many of his supporters
have suggested (see for example Bosman & d’Haenens 2008).
Had this been the case, Fortuyn would have been criticized
(much) more often than others. But the opposite was the case: his
ratio of criticism to praise (1.94) is slightly better than average
(2.31), both before (2.13) and after (1.88) his assassination. Inter-
estingly, the share of neutral references to Fortuyn is unusually
high (71.8 per cent, n = 255). This suggests that civil elites, rather
than engaging with his views, chose to reflect on the Fortuyn phe-
nomenon. Indeed, even actors who criticized or praised Fortuyn
often balanced their judgments (first praising then criticizing, or
vice versa). The result of these micro-strategies was that, in the
period between 9/11 and his assassination, there were no clear
divisions in the debate on the opinion pages. In this setting, For-
tuyn only had a handful of supporters and critics; a large majority
of those who referred to him posed as neutral bystanders. Un-
doubtedly, this is because the action took place elsewhere.
Although Fortuyn sometimes granted interviews to newspapers
(including the infamous interview in de Volkskrant), television was
his main stage.
Fortuyn’s ideas appealed especially to segments of the popula-
tion with relatively low levels of education, people who valued con-
formity and felt alienated from established political parties – a
group that had grown as the pillars (vehicles for inter-class inte-
gration par excellence) corroded. As long as politicians had not
exploited their sentiments, they had remained inactive and cyni-
cal. But once Fortuyn emerged on the scene, his appeal was in-
stant (Van Holsteyn & Irwin 2003; Sniderman & Hagendoorn
2007). Seventeen per cent of voters supported Fortuyn post mor-
tem. Their profile did not deviate from the average in economic
capital (as measured by income) but they generally had lower le-
vels of cultural capital (as measured by education) (NRC Handels-
blad 2002). Cynicism towards politics had grown in the preceding
years (e.g. Van Praag 2002), and Fortuyn had managed to capita-
lize on these feelings, as shown by the high turnout and support
among voters who had previously abstained.9 Statistical analyses
of voter motivation showed that fear of asylum seekers and cyni-
cism towards the government correlated (to roughly the same de-
gree) with the decision to vote for Fortuyn (Bélanger & Aarts
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2006; Van Holsteyn & Irwin 2003). While the LPF fell apart after
it entered government, Fortuyn clearly had an impact outlasting
the party that carried his name.
Fortuyn and the transformation of the integration debate
After Fortuyn was killed, his supporters heralded him as the in-
ventor and maestro of the “new politics” – transparent, passionate
and thorough as opposed to the soulless compromises of the “old
politics”. It is certainly true that politics has aroused more passion
since Fortuyn. He turned the election campaign into a spectacle,
his wits and energetic appearance reducing his opponents to piti-
ful grayish bureaucrats. Fortuyn redefined the logic of politics
through a style that could mobilize an electorate cynical of estab-
lished parties and anxious about social transformations, including
the growing presence of minorities and Muslims. But it was not
only his style that was new. While apprentice politicians normally
learn to adapt to the mores of the party, in Fortuyn’s case the party
was built around him. It could be argued that Fortuyn never had
time to develop his party. But it appears that he pioneered a parti-
cular form of political organization. Rather than a political bureau-
cracy – with regulations, manifestos, programs and the like – the
party functioned as a marketing bureau that organized events and
campaigns around its one and only brand. Rita Verdonk and Geert
Wilders, two culturalists who broke away from the right-wing Lib-
eral party VVD to establish their own parties, later radicalized this
model. Instead of a party where members can vote or convene,
they created restricted associations over which they exercise full
control. These “parties” are designed to minimize internal dis-
putes, maximize their resonance in the media and appeal to spon-
sors who seek to translate their economic power into political in-
fluence.
After Fortuyn, there has been a permanent presence of rene-
gade culturalists in core civil arenas challenging established politi-
cal parties and playing upon the opposition between parliamen-
tary elites (who pamper unworthy minorities) and political
renegades (who stand up for hard-working and law-abiding citi-
zens). They have challenged not only certain ideas about integra-
tion but also the modus operandi – they relish confrontations and
reject accommodation. For these self-styled renegade politicians,
stirring controversy is essential: they rely on the media to commu-
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nicate to their prospective supporters and to cast themselves as
challengers. Whereas under the purple government, politics had
been reduced to conflict prevention and the sorting of prefer-
ences, in the wake of 9/11, Pim Fortuyn injected passion and spec-
tacle into politics – now an arena where renegade politicians com-
pete for the lead role in civil drama.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali and enlightenment Culturalism
Ayaan Hirsi Ali made her first recorded public appearance during
a debate on the Enlightenment in the cultural center De Balie in
Amsterdam, one of the intellectual nerve centers of the Nether-
lands. Trouw editor Jaffe Vink narrated her electrifying presence:
... When a philosopher on the stage relativized the foundations of
the Enlightenment and went too far in her praise of multicultur-
alism, a woman stood up to retort. She spoke Dutch with a light
accent and she was black – and then it is dead quiet in a place like
this. The woman castigated the Dutch philosopher and said she
had no idea about Islam. ... [Hirsi Ali] made a plea for... addres-
sing rather than downplaying the severity of the contemporary
state of Islam. (Vink cited in Prins 2004: 143)
A few weeks later, Hirsi Ali published her first article on the opin-
ion pages of Letter & Geest, a supplement of the newspaper Trouw
and a prime milieu of the culturalist discourse. While the media’s
gatekeepers are generally very willing to provide a stage for promi-
nent figures (politicians, writers, etc.) who want to promote Cul-
turalism, the editors of Letter & Geest were searching for new per-
sonalities. The section had published translated articles from
American neoconservatives as well as long and controversial
pieces from Dutch culturalists. Letter & Geest was the first media
outlet to offer a stage to Hirsi Ali’s criticisms of Muslims. She
called upon her readers to give dissidents a stage so that they
could provide “a counterweight to the one-sided and mind-bog-
gling religious rhetoric that millions of Muslims hear on a daily
basis. Let the Voltaires of our time work on the enlightenment of
Islam...” (Hirsi Ali 2001). Immediately after the publication of her
article, Hirsi Ali received offers from publishers and invitations
for public lectures. As she gained in stature, tensions within the
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scientific bureau of the Labor party (a discursive milieu for Labor
supporters as well as Labor critics like Scheffer) grew stronger.
Her colleagues requested Hirsi Ali to tone down her criticisms of
Muslims and especially of Labor politicians (see Vink 2002). The
definitive break with the Labor party came when the right-wing
Liberals offered her a seat in parliament. Hirsi Ali shared For-
tuyn’s antipathy towards Islam as well as his drive to challenge
the culture of consensus, which she experienced firsthand in the
Labor party and in Dutch politics more generally. “I... realized that
Fortuyn had not only been correct about Islam but also with res-
pect to the condition of established politics. We are still going
round in the same little circles. Still. We avoid any risk, we do not
want to offend or upset anyone. Everything is in the service of
harmony” (Hirsi Ali 2003). Hirsi Ali sought to shock Muslims
out of their orthodoxy and Dutch politicians out of the slumber of
the polder model.
Box 5.4 Ayaan Hirsi Ali – a Somalian warrior in Dutch
polder politics
Ayaan Hirsi Ali (1969) was born in Somalia. Her father, Hirsi
Magan Isse, was educated as an anthropologist at Columbia
University and a prominent opponent of the socialist dictator-
ship of Siad Barre. Hirsi Ali’s mother was one of four wives.
Her mother and grandmother, who wanted to raise Hirsi Ali
according to their clan’s interpretation of Islam, had her cir-
cumcised when she was five. During Quran lessons, critical
questions were not allowed. Hirsi Ali’s teacher once hit her so
hard that she suffered a fractured skull (Van Tilborgh 2006:
23). Her father accepted the traditional upbringing and its hor-
rors but ensured that his daughter received a proper education
at the English-language Muslim Girls’ Secondary School.
Hirsi Ali was a staunch believer, sympathized with the Mus-
lim Brotherhood and participated in the book burnings of
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. She nevertheless longed for freedom
from misogynist doctrines. She had read about the position of
American and European women in the Valley Secretarial Col-
lege in Nairobi (Kenya), and this made her decide to escape
from an arranged marriage with a Canadian Somali. She bolted
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during a family visit in Düsseldorf and took the train to Am-
sterdam, where she requested political asylum. She learned
Dutch quickly and pursued a Master’s in political science and
political philosophy at Leiden University.
Her faith wavered when, in her side job as translator, she
came into contact with Somali women in asylum centers and
hostels for battered women. She saw husbands and male fam-
ily members using religion to legitimize physical and mental
abuse. When she joined a research project on migrant women
at the scientific institute of the Labor Party, Hirsi Ali inces-
santly addressed the hardships that Muslim women and chil-
dren suffer at the hands of their relatives. She was dismayed
that most people in the Labor Party did not share her diagnosis
and were unwilling to recognize the link between Islam and
the oppression of women. Her identification as a Muslim suf-
fered another blow after 9/11: she was horrified by the attacks
but felt that the Quran legitimized the violence. Reading the
Atheist Manifesto (Atheïstisch Manifest) of Leiden philosopher
Herman Philipse was an ultimate revelation, and in 2002 she
renounced her faith. Shortly afterwards she joined the right-
wing Liberals and entered parliament with 40,000 preferential
votes.
Hirsi Ali’s openness about genital mutilation and other
forms of abuse as well as her graceful appearance made her an
object of intense media attention. Her higher-class upbringing
as well as her devoted supporters (colloquially known as “the
friends of Ayaan”) gave her the power – the confidence, elo-
quence and determination – to translate her particular experi-
ences into a universal discourse of liberation from religious
oppression. Initially unaffected and later appalled by the cul-
ture of consensus and compromises, she argued for full discur-
sive conflict: “Dare to clash. It is inevitable. The Netherlands
needs to get rid of the fear to stigmatize.” The angry responses
of Muslims merely reinforced her sense of purpose: “every
group that goes through a transformation has to go through
such rage” (cited in Van Tilborgh 2006: 32-33). The same is
true, in extremis, of the countless death treats she received. The
assassination of Theo van Gogh and the letter to Hirsi Ali that
Mohammed Bouyeri stuck into his chest with a dagger – “oh
Hirsi Ali, I am certain that you will falter...” – was the final con-
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firmation that her calling was to provoke Islam to take “a short-
cut to enlightenment” (the name of her current movie project).
While Hirsi Ali was similar to Fortuyn in some ways, she was dif-
ferent in others. She had previously been a Muslim and argued
against Islamic doctrine in the name of women’s liberation. Due
to the abuse she had suffered and her attempts to confront Mus-
lims (Box 5.4), she was the feminine antithesis to pragmatist poli-
tical culture and its representatives. While many of her state-
ments, appearances and articles aroused interest, her most
notable project was the movie Submission made with Theo van
Gogh, a filmmaker and bête noir of Amsterdam’s intellectual elite.
Submission was an 11-minute visual pamphlet that sought to de-
monstrate that the Quran considers women fundamentally infer-
ior to men. The movie features four female actors whose faces are
covered with headscarves and whose naked bodies are visible
through transparent veils. The Arabic calligraphy of Quranic
verses are projected or painted on the women. The voice-over nar-
rates the horrors they have suffered at the hands of male relatives
and suggests that the men use Quranic verses to justify their
abuse. Six weeks after the broadcasting, the movie’s director was
shot and stabbed to death in Amsterdam. The Islamic extremist
who killed Van Gogh plunged a dagger into his chest with a note
containing threats of death to the West, the United States, the
Netherlands and Ayaan Hirsi Ali.
Resonance and consonance
Like Fortuyn, Hirsi Ali blasted onto the scene: after her debut in
mid-2001, the number of her appearances in the newspapers and
on television skyrocketed (Van Tilborgh 2006: 24). By 2003, she
had become the most central figure in the debate. Between her
first appearance and 2006, she received 59 positive (16.8 per
cent), 177 neutral (50.3 per cent) and 116 negative references (33
per cent), making her slightly more popular than average. Like
Bolkestein and Scheffer, Hirsi Ali was praised by opponents and
supporters alike for her courage and for breathing life into poli-
tics. Her combination of feminine beauty and hard-hitting dis-
course made her a culturalist figurehead. Whereas Fortuyn had
primarily appealed to the disenfranchised, Hirsi Ali had devotees
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among the cultural and political elite, including artists, writers,
philosophers, politicians and journalists. Especially philosophers
of law at Leiden University such as Paul Cliteur and Afshin Ellian
supported, both in the newspapers and personally, Hirsi Ali’s
quest for Islamic enlightenment. Her supporters made her into a
civil icon: the embodiment of democratic ideals such as freedom
of speech, defiance of unjust authority and heroism in the face of
death threats. Hirsi Ali’s performances and the assassination of
Theo van Gogh pulled writers and artists into the civil sphere.
While these groups were previously marginal in the debate, they
increasingly appeared on the opinion pages and often expressed
passionate support for Hirsi Ali. Due to these developments, the
share of articles supporting Culturalism surged to around 30 per
cent (see Table 3.1). To her numerous opponents, Hirsi Ali was a
mouthpiece for conservatives. Her critics pointed out that she had
no special training in Islam and accused her of unjustly projecting
her personal traumas rooted in tribal customs onto Muslims as a
group and Islam as a religion.
Hirsi Ali and the transformation of the integration debate
While Hirsi Ali was clearly the most prominent immigrant cultur-
alist, she was far from the only one. Other critics from countries
where Islam is the dominant religion included Afshin Ellian, a
legal scholar and refugee from Iran who routinely projected his
experiences of Khomeini’s regime upon Dutch politics and Dutch
Muslims; Nahed Selim, an Egyptian writer opposed to head-
scarves and other Islamic commandments for women; Hafid
Bouazza, a Moroccan writer and bon vivant critical of Islam; Ebru
Umar, a writer of Turkish descent and close friend of Theo van
Gogh who accused the mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, of failing
to protect basic civil liberties in the face of Islamic threats. The list
goes on. The prominence of Ayaan Hirsi Ali – and a large number
of lesser known figures – signaled a broader shift in civil politics
where immigrants critical of their own communities played a vital
role in increasing Culturalism’s legitimacy. While intellectuals,
writers and artists had previously not identified with culturalists
and tended to lean to the left, this time it was different: they were
apparently eager to make a woman’s campaign for Islamic en-
lightenment into a civil spectacle. In 2005, the variety and num-
ber of actors supporting Culturalism was larger than ever before.
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The power of Culturalism, 1991-2005
The chapter thus far has discussed the evolution of culturalist dis-
course and the ways in which different civil actors appealed to
specific class fractions. The question then arises: if the base of
Culturalism was so diverse, did these different actors and class
fractions really work together? Did the discursive divides between
the different currents of Culturalism disappear? Can we discern
the formation of a coherent discursive movement – an alliance of
actors with discursive leaders and dense networks? If so, how did
this coalition develop in relation to its antagonists between 1990
and 2006?
Proliferation and polarization
The Traag algorithm for community detection (see Chapter 4)
shows that there were not always clear patterns of conflict. Be-
tween 1994 and 1999, when the debate cooled, there was no
straightforward opposition between culturalists and their oppo-
nents. Between 9/11 and the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, the
debate was intense. But here, too, we cannot discern straightfor-
ward opposition. Graphs for these periods show a mishmash of
antagonisms and alliances that do not add up to discursive opposi-
tion at the level of clusters. In other periods, we see opposition
between a cluster predominantly composed of culturalists and a
cluster composed mostly of its critics. Similar oppositions re-
curred after the interventions of Frits Bolkestein (1990-1991),
Paul Scheffer (2000-2001) and Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2003-2005).10 In
each period there is a polarized figuration with two major camps
and relatively few bystanders.11 These continuities make it possi-
ble to investigate how the relationship between the culturalist
cluster and the antagonistic cluster (the antipode) evolved. Below
we examine these oppositions in three different periods, referring
to the network graphs that visualize the oppositions as well as the

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bolkestein was central to the debate in the 1990s. A very large
number of actors directed their attention to him, as represented
in Figure 5.1, with many lines converging on Bolkestein. He is by
far the most central figure, but he did not only receive support
from within ‘his’ cluster, which is why his score for discursive
leadership is not higher than three (Table 5.1). Bolkestein’s cluster
also contains some critics such as Wasif Shadid, an anthropology
professor at Leiden University who ended up in this cluster be-
cause he shares opponents with Bolkestein. We see that the Labor
Party is also in Bolkestein’s cluster; this is because some Labor
Party politicians (Thijs Wöltgens, Aad Kosto) went to great lengths
to distinguish the legitimate Bolkestein from the illegitimate Jan-
maat. The ironic consequence is that Janmaat ends up in the clus-
ter of actors who oppose the culturalist turn in government policy
(Figure 5.1). Despite these counterintuitive results (a point to
which we will return shortly), it is clear that Bolkestein’s cluster is
composed mostly of actors who either explicitly promote Cultural-
ism or defend the legitimacy of his discourse. The other cluster
mostly includes actors who resist the culturalist turn in govern-
ment policy and the integration debate. They either support the
ideal of collective emancipation as embodied in pillarized institu-
tions or strategies of economic (rather than cultural) integration as
promoted by the Scientific Council for Government Advice. The
figuration in this period is balanced in the sense that the clusters
have similar scores on indicators of articulation, consonance and
resonance power. However, the clusters do have different internal
figurations (Table 5.1). The culturalist cluster has a high variance
in the distribution of discursive leadership and relatively dense
networks – a first indication that culturalists tend to form different
sorts of networks than their opponents.
The Scheffer period
We see similar oppositions after Scheffer’s publication of his arti-
cle “The multicultural drama” in 2000. Scheffer is the central
node in a cluster of actors who support Culturalism (cluster 1, lo-
cated on the right in Figure 5.2). This cluster has an antagonistic
cluster consisting mostly of actors who resist the culturalist turn.
As in the Bolkestein period, some actors within Scheffer’s cluster
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Figure 5.1 Visualization of conflicts and alliances in the period
between Frits Bolkestein’s Luzern lecture on integration





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate culturalists. This
particularly applies to Paul Kalma, the director of the scientific in-
stitute of the Labor Party, who distinguishes between the type of
discourse promoted by the columnists of Elsevier (including Pim
Fortuyn) and the discourse of (his former colleague and fellow
party member) Scheffer. The result is that some of the most radi-
cal culturalists (like Fortuyn) end up outside Scheffer’s cluster and
in the cluster of Culturalism’s opponents. While these radical cul-
turalists received few references, the dissociating strategies of
actors like Kalma are interesting in that they mute conflict by blur-
ring the divide between what would otherwise be more homoge-
neous clusters. The same happened in the previous period when
actors like Shadid chose similar targets as Bolkestein, thus ending
up in the cluster in which Bolkestein was the discursive leader.
Although such findings initially seem counterintuitive, they reveal
a mechanism typical of what Collins refers to as a “tangle of con-
flicts” – one that produces unexpected alliances and (thus) attenu-
ates polarization (Collins 2007: 5). Actors who distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate culturalists otherwise do not
support culturalist views; they have few or negative ties with other
members in the cluster, thus making the networks of both clus-
ters less dense (if there are enough of these people, there would
no longer be antagonistic clusters). Another similarity with the
Bolkestein period is the pattern of a relatively tight-knit cluster
dominated by culturalists in opposition to a comparatively diffuse
cluster dominated by its critics (Table 5.1). The difference in the
variance of discursive leadership between the culturalist cluster
and its antipode is again high, indicating a high concentration of
discursive power in the culturalist cluster (Table 5.1). There are
also some notable differences between Scheffer and Bolkestein’s
culturalist clusters. Although in both periods their members, on
balance, received more criticism than praise, the difference with
the antipode is smaller for Scheffer’s cluster (Table 5.1). Most strik-
ingly, the resonance power of the culturalist cluster is much stron-
ger in 2000-2001 than it was in 1991-1994: many actors opposed
Scheffer and his allies, but these critics attracted little attention.
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Figure 5.2 Visualization of conflicts and alliances in the period
between the publication of Paul Scheffer's “The



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The period after Fortuyn’s assassination
In the period after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn – between
May 2002 and January 2006 – we again see opposition between a
cluster dominated by culturalists and a cluster dominated by the
critics of Culturalism. The central actors no longer distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate culturalists. The oppositions that
were partly muted before thus become more pronounced: the ten-
sion between culturalists and their opponents increases to levels
not seen before (Table 5.1). The number of actors in this period is
very large, as the density of Figure 5.3 shows. The figure shows a
relatively small yet cohesive culturalist cluster (on the right) facing
a large yet diffuse opposition (on the left). The culturalist cluster
has a number of leading figures but Ayaan Hirsi Ali stands out;
she’s the central node around which the others congregate. Within
the culturalist cluster there are comparatively many positive rela-
tions, as expressed in a relatively high score for density (Table 5.1).
The negative relations that separate the culturalist cluster from the
others are comparatively often directed to the culturalist clique;
the largest cluster in the figure (the anti-culturalist cluster on the
left) has some positive internal relations, but its members mostly
group together because they share a negative relation to the cultur-
alist cluster.
This time Ayaan Hirsi Ali stands out as the most prominent
discursive leader of the culturalist cluster; Afshin Ellian and Pim
Fortuyn also receive considerable support. The variance of discur-
sive leadership is comparatively high, indicating that discursive
power in the culturalist cluster is much more concentrated than
in the antipode. While individuals like Roger van Boxtel (the Min-
ister of Integration on behalf of the progressive Liberals) and Job
Cohen (mayor of Amsterdam for the Labor Party) receive support
from within their own cluster, they also attract criticism. They
therefore do not come to stand for the group in the same way
Hirsi Ali does. In short, we find the same pattern that was appar-
ent in the early 2000s (and partly in the early 1990s): compared to
its antidote, the culturalist cluster has members with much higher
resonance, much denser networks and stronger discursive lead-
ers.
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Figure 5.3 Visualization of conflicts and alliances in the period
between the assassination of Pim Fortuyn (May 2002)































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































“Culturalism” does not refer to exactly the same discourse in each
of these periods. There are, for instance, differences of degree and
kind between Scheffer’s discourse (focused on the underclass and
national culture) and that of Hirsi Ali (focused on Muslims and
Western culture). These differences in emphasis partly explain
variations in the patterns of conflict and cooperation over time.
Nevertheless, there is striking continuity over a time span of 15
years. In times of proliferation, culturalist clusters emerge with
relatively strong discursive leaders and dense networks: cultural-
ists seem to support discursive leaders and each other. Their op-
ponents, in contrast, do not defer to leaders and tend to focus on
criticizing culturalists rather than supporting their allies. If we ag-
gregate the data for all periods, we find a familiar pattern: a large
cluster of culturalists with relatively strong leaders and dense net-
works versus a very large cluster of their critics with sparse net-
works and weak leaders (Table 5.1).
The term “culturalists” of course refers not only to individuals
central in the debate but also to actors who invest them with pres-
tige and prominence. The fact that very different kinds of people
become discursive leaders of Culturalism suggests that they do
not lead a movement of their own making. Rather, they personify
the forces latently or manifestly present throughout the period un-
der investigation. Depending on their backgrounds and dis-
courses, central culturalists can tap diverse bases of support (e.g.
Fortuyn appealing to less educated segments of the population,
Scheffer appealing to elites). But these are small variations in light
of the remarkable continuities (e.g. Scheffer and Fortuyn solidly
in the same cluster). While the individuals and themes change
over time, the overall pattern remains remarkably stable: cultural-
ists initiate debates and define the parameters and themes of dis-
cussion. Compared to their opponents, the resonance of the cen-
tral culturalists is incredibly strong. Culturalists also tend to band
together more than their opponents when the debate heats up and
to rally around discursive leaders. The cluster containing most of
Culturalism’s critics is very large, but it is also fragmented: its net-
works are sparse, it lacks strong discursive leaders and its most
central actors have much lower resonance than the most central
culturalists. Actors in clusters other than the culturalist cluster are
defined by their opposition to culturalists; they do not comprise a
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discourse alliance in and of itself. They share opponents, not net-
works or leaders.
Culturalism: experiences of domination and
subordination
How do culturalists perceive their position in the integration de-
bate? What drives them to intervene in the way they do? And how
do they operate in the policy field? While culturalists may feel that
they have conquered terrain in recent years, they do not feel that
their discourse has become dominant, let alone hegemonic. When
they comment on the debate, culturalists often suggest that elites
censor information that could undermine faith in a multicultural
society. When I asked my respondents to identify these censors, I
did not receive satisfactory answers. One respondent, after deliver-
ing a tirade against multiculturalists, was piqued when I asked
him who he had in mind. “I do not give names,” he said, as if he
was talking about a secret resistance group rather than a dominant
ideology. At other times, respondents mentioned one or several
people, but they were typically marginal figures – individuals who
could hardly be held responsible for the discursive inhibitions cul-
turalists perceive so strongly. Moreover, those actors who had sup-
ported Culturalism since the 1980s and 1990s indicated that they
received frequent invitations to speak at debates, especially in left-
wing circles. However, opposition to Culturalism is not a figment
of the imagination. Culturalists did not face a passionate oppo-
nent but, in the words of one of my respondents, a diffuse mental-
ity difficult to pin down:
I had clear, substantive criticisms against multiculturalism. But
each time I presented them, my opponents said “Ah, well, if that
is what you mean by multiculturalism, then I am not a multicul-
turalist.”And so they escaped every attack.
Other respondents acknowledged that “nowadays” (around 2005)
few people championed multiculturalism. Nevertheless, they felt
the continued presence of a culture of dogmatic egalitarianism
that some referred to as “equality thinking” (gelijksheidsdenken), as-
sociated with the cultural heritage of Christianity, Socialism and
the trauma of the Second World War. Because minorities and the
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poor are regarded as pitiful creatures, a number of my culturalist
respondents argued, their beliefs and actions are exempt from cri-
tical scrutiny; the more reprehensible and unsuccessful minor-
ities are, the more Dutch elites feel a need to affirm their equality
(e.g., Vink 2001; see also Bolkestein 2009). While the resistance
that culturalists encounter does not take the form of a well-articu-
lated discourse, they can nevertheless sense that they are trans-
gressing social norms:
Just try it at a party. Just try to say something negative about
minorities. You will find that people feel uncomfortable, that
there is a taboo. More than that, you will feel uncomfortable. We
have been so much accustomed to censoring ourselves that it is
still very difficult to express ourselves. And when you then do ex-
press yourself, when you state it like it is and break through the
barrier, then you feel a sense of liberation. (approximation of in-
terview, talk not recorded)
The above quote shows that culturalists not only struggle with
their opponents but also with internalized norms. It also reveals
that it can be rewarding to violate these norms. In such instances,
culturalists experience what social movement scholars call “cogni-
tive liberation” (McAdam 1982: 34-35). This is not, as James Jasper
emphasizes, simply a process of framing reality in a different way
but of attaching different emotional values to ideas, notions and
symbols (Jasper 1997). Culturalists mark a discursive break when
they feel and say: “We no longer feel ashamed to speak this truth
to power”. Paradoxically, the feeling that one is challenging a sys-
tem of discursive oppression would not be so enthralling if the
domination was complete. It is precisely the inability of multicul-
turalists, anti-racists and the politically correct to enforce these
norms that makes it possible and even rewarding to break them.
“Breaking the taboo” is no longer an act of individual bravery but a
tested repertoire of a growing discursive movement (cf. Prins
2002, 2004).
The scorn of (internalized) others is not the only thing cultural-
ists have to fear. Especially central actors who speak out against
Islam risk more than hurting the sensibilities of Dutch civil elites.
Physical violence had never been entirely absent from integration
politics, but it had seemed far away. Khomeini’s fatwa was directed
against a British writer. There were frequent attacks against Jan-
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maat but the pain of this pariah did not hurt the civil community;
when Janmaat’s wife was left disabled after a petrol bomb attack
from the extreme left, the mainstream political parties and the
media were indifferent. This changed after the assassinations of
Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh. Though controversial, Fortuyn
was widely seen as part of the civil community; the shock of his
death reverberated throughout the civil sphere (Pantti & Wieten
2005). Fortuyn’s supporters argued that the “bullet came from the
left” and that the established parties had “demonized” their leader,
thereby fostering the political climate that killed him. The killing
of Van Gogh made him into a martyr for the freedom of expres-
sion and a culturalist hero. Culturalists had already cast them-
selves as protectors of the civil community from outside threats;
violence only confirmed their conviction that they embodied the
values that (radical) Muslims sought to destroy.
The assassinations had an ambivalent effect on the famous and
infamous critics of Islam and their circle of friends. On the one
hand, the chance of attack made some more careful in expressing
themselves. One of my respondents decided to keep a lower pro-
file because he felt participating in the debate had become unplea-
sant and perhaps dangerous. When I visited him at his workplace,
there was a security guard in the corridor to check visitors before
letting them in through a locked door. Another respondent was
extremely cautious before he agreed to an interview. When I vis-
ited him at his home, he spontaneously stated that the lack of a
name tag under his bell was “not because of the threats”. When I
asked him to sit closer (for the recording), he wondered out loud if
I was going to shoot him. When I asked about the threats, he an-
swered that he could not even tell me why he could not tell me.
On the other hand, the threats validate the idea that culturalists
represent a worthy cause in the face of risks. A more tangible con-
sequence of the threats and violence against central culturalists
was their supporters drawing together. After the assassination of
Theo van Gogh, the “Friends of Theo” – the artists and intellec-
tuals surrounding him – made many appearances on television,
directing their satire, criticism and parodies against Islam as well
as the left (Hajer & Uitermark 2008). When Ayaan Hirsi Ali went
into hiding, the “Friends of Ayaan” – as the media called them –
came together to console her. The public signs of support on the
opinion pages in part reflect the private friendships that grew
stronger in the face of danger. Threats and violence motivated cul-
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turalists to utter with greater conviction their discourse against
Islam and the complacent left.
These snippets of experience show that Culturalism is a pas-
sionate discourse that relies on emotional symbolism. Culturalists
trigger responses and responses are valued: this power to attract
attention and to stir debate – what I have referred to as resonance
power – defines their power in the media. Their power is much
more limited in policy circles. This is not only because many civil
servants have an affinity for the left (a general impression I share
but cannot prove) but also because they communicate in a vocabu-
lary different from the visionary exclamations of culturalists.
When culturalists manage to insert themselves on the agendas of
policymakers, bureaucratic and parliamentary procedures take the
sting out of their discourse. Paul Scheffer, for instance, expressed
disappointment after his article was discussed in parliament:
Fundamental questions about the legitimacy of government and
about living together in a country with so many differences have
been evaded.… Citizens are more and more concerned about the
public cause, but this is not reflected in parliamentary delibera-
tions. The debate about the multicultural drama, for example,
shrunk after two days into talk about implementation problems
with citizenship courses. (Scheffer 2002)
Scheffer himself also took the sting out of his discourse when he
functioned in the state bureaucracy. When he was hired, along
with two others, to select candidates for the diversity council in
Amsterdam (see Chapter 9), the fear of society disintegrating
didn’t seem to be foremost on his mind:
We looked for strong individual persons. We also wanted to have
a significant share of women and ethnic minorities – it was as
politically correct as it could possibly be. So I think they were very
happy about what I did. But I have to say, I value each of the suc-
cessful candidates very highly, even though most will probably
not share my viewpoints. But I have looked at their biographies
and qualities rather than their viewpoints. There are just some prob-
lems that everybody has to recognize, so we do not have to agree that
there is a multicultural drama. [my emphasis]
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Within policy processes, different administrators, departments,
quasi-governmental organizations, experts and civil society asso-
ciations have to coordinate their efforts. The focus is on problems
that “everyone” recognizes, and these problems are usually de-
scribed in the sort of bureaucratic jargon that does not offend any
of the partners involved. The emotive words that enabled cultural-
ists to take center stage in the debate on minority integration
worked against them in policy circles. The pragmatic approach to
integration that I introduced in the previous chapter and explore
in more detail in the next seemed almost immune to culturalist
criticism.
Conclusion: The expansion and transformation of
Culturalism
The corrosion of established political institutions has created a
pool of disenfranchised citizens apathetic or antagonistic towards
parliamentary politics. They often feel that cultural and political
elites fail to properly reward conformity or punish transgression.
Although they may still favor the redistributive policies of the left,
growing numbers of people with low cultural capital and distrust
towards elites have put their faith in right-wing populists who
promise to let the state weigh down upon those who abuse or
even threaten the system (Houtman 2003; Achterberg & Hout-
man 2006). Culturalism thus aims to conserve cultural values
and enforce cultural norms. But it would be misleading to charac-
terize it as a conservative force for at least two reasons.
First, conservatism is associated – in everyday speech as well as
in the academic literature – with traditional family values, reli-
gious convictions and respect for authority (e.g. Hunter 1991;
Martin 1996). But we saw in the previous chapter that Dutch cul-
turalist celebrities took issue with conservative values and
espoused those progressive values initially promoted by the new
social movements of the 1960s and 1970s (see Duyvendak et al.
2009; Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007). The inequality of cul-
tures should be acknowledged, they argued, to protect the equality
of men and women, homosexuals and heterosexuals. Second, civil
elites articulated a culturalist discourse as part of a more general
challenge to accommodation, dialogue and moderation. Cultural-
ism, in the specific figuration in which it was mobilized, func-
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tioned more as a revolutionary than a conservative discourse. As a
contending elite, culturalists sought to change the rules of the
game in order to devalue the dispositions of established elites.
Through their bold discourses and sensational performances, cul-
turalists sought to mobilize readers, viewers and voters against the
experts, bureaucrats and commissions that dominated established
parties and integration policy. The conflict was not simply be-
tween natives and immigrants but between different ways of talk-
ing, acting and performing.
This chapter analyzed the evolution of Culturalism in the 1990s
and 2000s against the backdrop of the development of the Dutch
civil sphere. Looking at the class and strategic dimensions of dis-
cursive power, I observed how culturalists, especially after the as-
sassination of Pim Fortuyn, became more diverse in their class
composition, dramatized their discourse and clustered around
leaders. While it is true that disenfranchised natives formed a
core constituency of culturalists, the discourse was also mobilized
by intellectuals, academics and politicians who sought to chal-
lenge the pragmatist political culture and to redefine power rela-
tions in the civil sphere.
My analysis of Culturalism’s development has elucidated how
and why the discourse became more powerful. The analysis also
suggested that Culturalism did not become hegemonic and that its
relative growth in articulation, consonance and resonance power
was limited. The growing power of Culturalism does not preclude
the possibility of other integration discourses also increasing in
power. As with all civil conflicts, conflicts over integration are not
zero-sum games. The growing power of Culturalism evokes oppo-
sition and triggers transformation. The next chapter examines in
more detail how Culturalism’s rise has affected its opponents and




6 Contesting Culturalism: Anti-
racism, Pragmatism and Civil
Islam
The previous chapter noted that culturalists were prominent in
successive episodes of integration politics. But it also became clear
that the power of Culturalism was ambiguous and contested. In
this chapter we investigate actors who promoted alternatives to
Culturalism, focusing in particular on three discourses: Anti-
racism, Pragmatism and Civil Islam. Supporters of these dis-
courses criticized Culturalism for polarizing society and stigma-
tizing minorities, but did so for very different reasons. As the op-
ponents of Culturalism do not form a coherent group (Chapter 5),
this chapter first dissects the integration debate through a corre-
spondence analysis of the different discourses and their promo-
ters. The subsequent sections explore the milieus where these dis-
courses were cultivated, identify their bases of support and
analyze their relationships to Culturalism.
Alternatives to Culturalism
To explain the presence and power of the many critics of Cultural-
ism, I use the properties database introduced in Chapter 3.
Through a correspondence analysis of the authors and the dis-
courses they promote, we can examine the discourses’ distinct
bases of support. Figure 6.1 presents the results of this multiple
correspondence analysis.1 As we would expect, Culturalism finds
support among right-wing politicians. We also see that contribu-
tors to the newspaper Trouw are prominent supporters of Cultur-
alism, due to the efforts of the editors of the Letter & Geest section.
The “small minority” group is close to Culturalism; it includes
non-Western immigrants but not those from the four largest
groups living in the Netherlands (Moroccans, Turkish, Surinam-
ese and Antilleans). This group includes people like Ayaan Hirsi
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Figure 6.1 Multiple correspondence analysis of newspaper articles:
discourse promoted, affiliation and ethnic background
of the (first) author (n = 588) (Joint plot of category
points, variable principal normalization)
Ali and Afshin Ellian who criticize the minority groups living in
the Netherlands for failing to meet the standards of the Enlight-
enment. They urge the Dutch to become more militant and pas-
sionate about defending liberal democracy against the alleged
threat posed by radical Islam. The figure shows that the large
minority groups, in contrast, support Anti-racism and Civil Islam.
The results, in short, confirm and refine the analysis of Cultural-
ism in the previous chapter.
What about the other discourses?2 With the aid of correspon-
dence analysis and Table 6.1, the subsequent sections discuss first
Anti-racism, then Pragmatism and finally Civil Islam.
Anti-racism: A marginal discourse
Introduction
New social movements proliferated in the Netherlands in the
1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Although the movement for immigrant
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Table 6.1 Relative and absolute support for five integration dis-
courses in five different periods (unknown/other [n = 118]
not shown) (reproduction of Table 3.1)
Culturalism Pragmatism Civil Islam Anti-racism Diversity Total
N % N % N % N % N % N
1990 to 1994 17 14.8 73 63.5 11 9.6 10 8.7 4 3.5 115
1995 to 1999 11 17.5 27 42.9 9 14.3 6 9.5 10 15.9 63
2000 to 9/11 15 23.1 41 63.1 4 6.2 2 3.1 3 4.6 65
9/11 to 6 May 2002 16 34.0 17 36.2 9 19.1 1 2.1 4 8.5 47
(Fortuyn murder)
6 May 2002 to
1 Jan 2006
95 29.6 157 75.1 42 20.1 16 7.7 11 5.3 321
Total 154 25.2 315 51.6 75 12.3 35 5.7 32 5.2 611
rights and against racism was never as strong (or as well docu-
mented) as some other movements, it was an integral part of a
wider network struggling for social justice and equal rights (see
for example Van der Valk 1996). The association NBK (Nederland
Bekent Kleur, Holland Admits Color) organized mass demonstra-
tions of around 100,000 people in the early 1990s, including
many prominent politicians, intellectuals and celebrities. Meas-
ures against discrimination and racism were part and parcel of
government policies: the 1983 revision of the constitution institu-
tionalized the prohibition of discrimination in Article 1, while sub-
sidies were made available for centers monitoring and acting
against racism and discrimination.3 In sum, Anti-racism was sup-
ported by social movements and state institutions in the 1980s.
But was it also a powerful discourse among civil elites in the
1990s and 2000s?
There is considerable dispute among scholars over the power of
Anti-racism. Many suggest there is a taboo on critical remarks
about immigrants and minority cultures. Ian Buruma, for in-
stance, writes that both Frits Bolkestein and Paul Scheffer were
“denounced as racists” when they warned against the deleterious
consequences of mass migration (Buruma 2006: 53). Ruud Koop-
mans similarly suggests that there has been “a sense of postcolo-
nial guilt and [an] ever-present fear among authorities of being
accused of racism” (Koopmans et al. 2005: 15). Other commenta-
tors suggest that Anti-racism has been weak in the Netherlands
compared to countries like the United States or the United King-
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dom. Philomena Essed observes that Dutch scholars have been
reluctant to use the word “racism”, instead opting for concepts
and measures suggesting that minorities suffer from a deficit (Es-
sed 1987; Essed & Nimako 2006), while Teun van Dijk argues that
elites blame racism on marginal groups (such as Janmaat’s party),
thereby reproducing rather than confronting systemic racism
(Van Dijk 1992, 1993, 2003). Ellie Vasta argues that “structural
marginalization and racist discourses have reinforced the exclu-
sion of ethnic minorities”, but “the Dutch” fail to recognize this
since “they are not as accommodating as they, and others, think
they are” (Vasta 2007: 735). To assess the power of Anti-racism
and to analyze its civil vocabulary, I first assess its articulation
power and identify its bases of support. I then sample some frag-
ments to illustrate variants of Anti-racism before turning to the
experiences of anti-racists in the debate and in the policy field.
Articulation power and support base
Only a relatively small portion of the articles were coded as anti-
racist. This was not due to overly restrictive operationalization. As
Appendix 1 explains, all articles that exclusively or for the most
part address the dangers of discrimination, prejudice, racism or
stigmatization were coded as anti-racist. The use of the word “ra-
cism” was not a criterion for inclusion. Even with this broad defi-
nition of Anti-racism, the share of articles does not exceed 10 per
cent in any of the periods. The high point for Anti-racism was in
the 1990s, with a modest resurgence after 9/11 (Table 6.1). The
correspondence analysis shows that Anti-racism finds support
especially among civil society associations and immigrant profes-
sionals but not among politicians, academics or journalists (the
three largest groups that respectively account for 24, 22 and 27
per cent of the articles in the database).
Discursive milieus and civil vocabularies
The articles coded as “anti-racist” cover a wide range of positions
from radical to moderate. Radical here means that authors use
heavy symbolism to make their point. One such article, authored
by the Jewish writer Anne-Ruth Wertheim, draws upon the most
charged metaphors of the civil sphere when warning that the fear
of immigrants could result in massive racist violence: “If Jewish
124
history teaches us anything, it is that pestering and humiliations
can lead to mass murder. We have to be alert to forms of racism
that can be a precursor to large-scale eruptions of violence”
(Wertheim 2004). The article is exceptional in that it uses the
term “racism” and portrays the Netherlands as a country about to
fall victim to the darkest of forces. Other actors aim to treat racism
and discrimination as soberly as possible. The director of the anti-
discrimination agency Meldpunt Discriminatie Amsterdam,
pleased that the issues of discrimination and racism are not as
charged as they were in the 1980s, expressly limits herself to tech-
nical and juridical procedures (Silversmith cited in Blokker 2000).
Most of the anti-racist articles fall in between these extremes and
address the pernicious consequences of increasingly hostile inte-
gration discourses and policies. For instance, Kees Groenendijk, a
professor of law at the Vrije Universiteit, argues that measures to
reduce immigration and discipline immigrants have made immi-
grants into second-class citizens: “the results are disastrous for the
position of immigrants and the relationship between immigrants
and the majority of the population. Most measures lead to exclu-
sion rather than integration” (Groenendijk 2004).
The only actor with an anti-racist discourse who received sus-
tained media attention was Abu Jahjah, the leader of the Belgian-
based Arabic European League. This was partly because Jahjah is
so different from immigrants who staff subsidized and institu-
tionalized minority organizations: he is radical. His politics is a
fusion of Arab nationalism and the civil rights discourse of Mal-
colm X (see for example Jahjah 2003). Jahjah had firsthand experi-
ence of Israel’s war against Lebanon, and his condemnation of
Israel could count on support among some immigrant groups.
He also took a strong stance against Culturalism. Rather than ar-
guing for integration or dialogue, he claimed that the only way
forward was to struggle for full civil rights:
Natives enjoy their civil rights 100 per cent. Immigrants get 70
per cent. I also have a right to 100. I am not going to humbly wait
till I get those rights and then be grateful. Because I will not get
them. So I take them. (cited in De Gruyter & Olgun 2002)
Jahjah explicitly rejects the notion of integration because, in his
view, it implies assimilation. He argues for multiculturalism be-
cause he feels that full recognition of the identity and culture of
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minorities is the only way not to exclude minority groups. But the
most distinctive feature of his interventions is his constant stress
on discrimination as an infringement of civil rights. The differ-
ence between the 70 and 100 per cent is due to employers, banks,
landlords and the police, all of whom, according to Jahjah, rou-
tinely discriminate against immigrants regardless of their citizen-
ship status, in violation of anti-discrimination legislation (ibid).
Jahjah’s solution is to mobilize so that the abstract rights en-
shrined in the constitution materialize in practice.
Resonance and consonance power
Contributions addressing the consequences of ethnic or racial
domination appeared only incidentally and were written by actors
on the margins of the civil sphere. The only person with an anti-
racist discourse who achieved a relatively high level of centrality
was Abu Jahjah. In contrast to others whose articles were coded as
anti-racist, Jahjah had considerable resonance power; his Page
Rank score is much lower than Hirsi Ali or Fortuyn, though he
still ranks third in the period between the Fortuyn and Van Gogh
assassinations with 3.9 per cent of the period’s resonance power.
However, he did not garner much support and had unusually low
consonance: 39 negative references versus 4 positive ones. Jahjah
thus seems to be the exception that confirms the rule: Anti-racism
is a marginal discourse that encounters massive opposition when
it moves closer to the core of the civil sphere.
One way to cross-validate these results is to see what the actors
in the debate say about racism – and not just authors of articles
coded as anti-racist. If we search the database for the words “ra-
cist”, “racists” or “racism” and make a rough distinction between
fragments criticizing racism and those criticizing anti-racism, we
find that the latter are more numerous: racism is identified as a
problem 35 times and anti-racism 61 times. If we examine these
fragments in their contexts, we find that racism is normally not
associated with Dutch society or with Dutch politicians. Some
actors talk about the need to remain vigilant of the dangers of
racism, while others speak of racism in other countries such as
Belgium, France, Germany, the United States or the United King-
dom.
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Subjective experiences: Feelings of discursive subordination
How do anti-racists perceive their position in the integration de-
bate? What drives them to intervene in the way they do? And how
do they operate in the policy field? Anti-racists, in providing a ra-
dical critique of Culturalism, act with the same fervor as cultural-
ists. Like culturalists, they seek to radically transform power rela-
tions, albeit in the opposite direction. While the substantive
content of Anti-racism is a mirror image of Culturalism, its struc-
tural location is very different: anti-racists are in marginal posi-
tions, their power has been decreasing, and they seek to defend
the interests of groups – immigrants, minorities, Muslims –
whose members have increasingly been portrayed as unworthy or
incapable of incorporation into the Dutch civil community.
Whereas culturalists like Afshin Ellian and Paul Scheffer (see pre-
vious chapter) have recently been afforded professorships at
Dutch universities, some of the most central anti-racists in acade-
mia – Philomena Essed, Chris Mullard, Teun van Dijk, Miriyam
Aouragh – have moved abroad. In interviews and articles, they ex-
press great frustration over the academic and political climate they
left behind. Where culturalists feel that the debate is now (more)
“balanced”, anti-racists feel that it is, in the words of one of my
respondents, “not even a debate. A debate implies that there are
different parties. What you have now is not a debate but the same
old rubbish… of the same old people. Once in a while there is
some opposition, but it is an illusion to think that this is a public
debate.”
Anti-racists feel stigmatized. “The real taboo is racism” is a re-
current phrase in their discourse. When they use the r-word, they
are often castigated as censors who seek to suppress criticism of
religions or cultures. Stigmatization sometimes borders on, or be-
comes, intimidation. Some of my respondents were ridiculed in
such settings as the popular right-wing website – or shock blog –
Geenstijl. Several respondents had received threats by email or
telephone. One of my student assistants managed to arrange an
interview with the chairperson of the Arabic European League
(AEL), a man of Moroccan descent who worked as an account
manager at a large company. He agreed to the interview on the
condition that his last name be kept secret; he did not want to risk
a smear campaign that would hurt his career. One AEL activist
stated that she did not know whom to trust anymore after finding
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out others in the movement had been informants or undercover
agents of the Dutch intelligence agency.
Anti-racists experience exclusion, not just symbolically but prac-
tically. In contrast to the culturalists discussed in the previous
chapter, anti-racists have great difficulty accessing the opinion
pages or other central settings of the civil sphere. They therefore
have to organize outside of it. The anti-racist movement tries to
frame the grievances of both immigrants and natives who are con-
cerned about the movement I label culturalist but that anti-racists
refer to as xenophobic or racist. To tap into these feelings of frus-
tration, and to counter complacency, the anti-racist movement
tries to create discursive milieus where the balance of power is
radically different from the central settings of the civil sphere.
They invite speakers who articulate the same basic message –
Islamophobia and the right-wing revolt endanger minorities and
society at large – in different ways. One central figure of the Inter-
national Socialists, a Trotskyist association that supported several
campaigns against racism, stated that debates, events and demon-
strations should give people the skills and confidence to take un-
popular positions. The goal is to “give back pride to people. To
offer a stage where they can express their grievances and where
they hear arguments that they can use.… That is what people
want. People don’t need another debate of left versus right, of
Muslims versus VVD (right-wing Liberals).”
The sudden growth of the AEL and considerable turnout at
some anti-racist events (several hundred at a debate, several thou-
sand at a demonstration) fuelled the belief among some anti-racist
organizers that there was widespread support for a collective re-
sponse to the onslaught of Culturalism. But there were also con-
siderable obstacles. In the policy field and in civil society, anti-ra-
cist associations have to compete – for members, influence and
activists – with actors that have much greater access to state re-
sources. They therefore tend to shy away from radical critique.
While anti-racist associations may receive funds from (subdivi-
sions of) charities or donations, they do not have structural access




The above findings contradict claims that accusations of racism
are frequent. They furthermore corroborate claims that elite
denials of Dutch racism are commonplace.4 There were strong
discursive restrictions on anti-racist discourse, while personal ac-
cusations of racism were altogether absent. The subjective experi-
ences of anti-racists and the structural position of Jahjah (central
because of intense criticism) indicate that Anti-racism is very
weak. These results are in line with the findings of the previous
chapter: culturalists are not hindered by taboos or powerful an-
tagonists, but their critics are. Actors who attempted to blame
Dutch natives rather than immigrants were marginal figures who
received very little space and had virtually no consonance. While
there were signs that anti-racist discourse was growing stronger in
response to the rising power of Culturalism, the increase in ar-
ticulation power was limited, and Jahjah was central to the debate
only during a very brief period. In short, Anti-racism was subordi-
nate to Culturalism. The other discourses had more ambiguous
relations to Culturalism.
Pragmatism: A resilient discourse
Introduction
After the emergence of Pim Fortuyn, commentators in and of the
Netherlands observed a dramatic shift away from multicultural-
ism towards policies aimed at assimilation. But the Netherlands
had never actually pursued multiculturalism.5 Intellectuals who
explained and espoused its principles were notably absent, as
were any attendant policies. The word “multiculturalism” in fact
appears in the database for the first time in 1995 and was used
almost exclusively by its opponents. The only exception was Abou
Jahjah. It could be argued that this absence was merely semantic,
that the word was not used but that the ideas and notions were
there. But this would miss the crucial point that the protection
and preservation of minority cultures – a central component of
any coherent multiculturalist discourse – was never a goal of pol-
icy. As Chapter 4 showed, the goal of the minorities policy, and of
the integration policy following it, was to prevent the process of
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minority formation, routinely conceptualized as the formation of
an ethnic underclass (cf. Van Amersfoort 1974; Penninx 1988b;
Scholten 2007).
It is essential to understand this prehistory of integration poli-
tics to appreciate what exactly culturalists challenged. They did not
introduce the idea that migration causes problems, that migration
had to be curtailed, that immigrants had to become autonomous
citizens, that unemployed and unskilled labor immigrants had to
become productive workers, or that some cultural practices (such
as forced marriages or domestic abuse) had to be ended. All of
these ideas were well established by the late 1980s and the early
1990s (see also Tijdelijke Commissie Onderzoek Integratiebeleid
2004: 436-445). The designers and defenders of the minorities
and integration policies sought to put these ideas into practice
through a combination of “poldering” and paternalism. Because
they want to solve integration problems as practically and effi-
ciently as possible, I refer to these actors as pragmatists. To assess
the strength of Pragmatism and to analyze its civil vocabulary, I
first look at its articulation power and support base: how many
articles were coded as “pragmatist” and who produced them? I
then quote fragments to illustrate the different variants of Prag-
matism before turning to the experiences of pragmatists with the
media and policy field.
Articulation power and base of support
Most of the critics of Culturalism were classified as “pragmatists”.
While their share of articles decreased over time, Pragmatism re-
mained the most articulated discourse throughout the period of
investigation. Although support for Pragmatism was highest be-
fore 9/11, there has been no sharp downward trend in its relative
power since then (Table 6.1). Pragmatism has been resilient. Giv-
en its strong presence on the opinion pages, it is hardly surprising
that it drew support from many different sectors. The correspon-
dence analysis shows that three sectors distinctively support Prag-
matism: left-wing politicians, academic sociologists and the edi-
tors and journalists of NRC Handelsblad. These actors all belong
to or identify with the governmental elites responsible for integra-
tion policy. Below, we examine actors from these three sectors and
the type of discourse they promoted.
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Discursive milieus and civil vocabularies
Since their inception, the institutions of the minorities policy have
maintained close relations with left-leaning parties, particularly
the Labor Party. Labor traditionally receives a large proportion of
immigrant votes and recruits politicians and administrators
through the institutions of the minorities/integration policy (ex-
pertise centers, consultative bodies and civil society associations).
Prominent immigrant politicians have also arisen through this
party (see Chapter 10). Other left-leaning parties likewise have
ties to this field. Together the left-leaning parties account for 61
articles, or just over 20 per cent of the total coded as pragmatist.
Though pragmatists from these parties share some fundamen-
tal notions, there are important variations. Within the Labor Party,
there is a continuum between politicians who emphasize the ob-
ligations of Dutch society and those who emphasize the obliga-
tions of immigrants. Examples of the former include Ed van Thijn
(Minister of Interior Affairs in the 1980s and mayor of Amster-
dam in the late 1980s and early 1990s), Hedy d’Ancona (Minister
of Welfare in the early 1990s) and Job Cohen (State Secretary of
Justice in the 1990s, mayor of Amsterdam between 2001 and
2010, Labor Party leader from 2010 to 2012; see Box 6.1). These
individuals, while acknowledging that mass migration causes
problems, argue that elites have the responsibility, in Cohen’s
words, to “keep things together”. Ed van Thijn argued, contra cul-
turalists, that in times of transformation, “governmental elites...
have to be aware of their educational mission and to prepare the
way for a society that combines socio-political integration with cul-
tural diversity” (Van Thijn 1997). On the other end of the conti-
nuum are pragmatists who emphasize the obligations of immi-
grants, including Aad Kosto (State Secretary of Immigration and
Minister of Interior Affairs in the early 1990s), Wouter Bos (Labor
Party leader between 2002 and 2010) and Ahmed Aboutaleb (al-
derman of diversity in Amsterdam in the early 2000s and mayor
of Rotterdam since 2008). Governmental elites, they argue, have
underestimated the problems arising from migration; there is a
need, in the words of Wouter Bos, to attend to the “problems that
a diversity of cultures can create”, particularly the threats posed by
“political Islam” (cited in Wansink & Du Pre 2004). But regard-
less of the variation in emphasis, these politicians felt that a mix-
ture of “soft” and “hard” measures were necessary to induce im-
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migrants to integrate, thereby safeguarding the unity of the nation
as a civil community.
Box 6.1 Job Cohen – a passion for moderation
With his gentle, suave smile, calm voice and serious expres-
sion, Job Cohen (1947) perfectly reflects the image of the
polder model where leaders are responsible and skillful execu-
tioners rather than mobilizers of the masses. Cohen has been
an administrator since his time at high school in Haarlem. He
served as a class representative and had a position on the board
of the school orchestra (Kleijwegt & Van der Vlugt 2008). At
Groningen University he was among the first students to par-
ticipate in the democratized governing bodies. An academic ca-
reer as a legal scholar took him first to Leiden University for
his dissertation, but he focused on academic governance and
eventually became rector magnificus (the Dutch equivalent of
vice chancellor) of Maastricht University. For the Labor Party
he took up high-profile positions in the government (as State
Secretary in 1993-1994) and the Senate (1995-1998). His most
notable achievement is a new immigration law that made the
migration regime of the Netherlands into one of the most strict
and restrictive in Europe (Entzinger 2002). But for Cohen,
stopping the influx of migrants was not something to boast
about, just something that had to be done with prudence and
commitment. As the mayor of Amsterdam, Cohen introduced
or defended many repressive measures – preventive searches,
camera surveillance, raids – but always presented them as part
of a more comprehensive approach to “keep things together”.
He frequently declared his willingness to work together with
migrants and their associations, believing that accommodation
and incorporation would reduce resentment and lead to the de-
velopment of a liberal Islam (see Chapter 10). What defines
Cohen’s position is his passionate support for moderation and
consensual politics. The move away from the center of politics
is of great concern to him: “It is bad for the balance in society”
(Kleijwegt & Van der Vlugt 2008). And balance is something
Cohen cherishes. The preservation of social cohesion and so-
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cial peace is the cornerstone of his approach and central to his
understanding of integration politics.
Sociologists, though not the only academics promoting Pragma-
tism, were the most present. With 38 articles, sociologists pub-
lished almost twice as many articles as their colleagues from other
major disciplines (philosophy, anthropology, political science and
history have around 20 articles each). Twenty-three of these arti-
cles were coded as pragmatist (60.5 per cent). Even more than left-
wing politicians, pragmatist sociologists emphasize that heated
emotions have no place in integration polities. One sociologist,
for instance, stated that there is a need for a “distanced analysis of
the goals and effects of policies” (Burgers 1996); another that in-
tegration policies require patience and care rather than the “verbal
violence” of party programs (Entzinger 2002). In the articles and
in interviews, these pragmatist sociologists present themselves as
intellectual technocrats serving society through relevant insights
and reliable findings. The heavy presence of sociologists among
academics in the integration debate and their support for Pragma-
tism is due to their traditional role in monitoring multicultural
society and conducting research for integration policy (Essed &
Nimako 2006; Schinkel 2007). Though they did not wish to be
identified with any particular ideological or political position,
pragmatist sociologists were very criticial of culturalists, arguing
that many other factors besides immigrants’ cultural backgrounds
explain their disadvantaged position.
Alongside sociologists and left-wing politicians, the editors and
journalists writing for NRC Handelsblad constitute a third category
of actors who form a bastion of support for Pragmatism. Of the
90 articles they produced, 74 per cent were coded as pragmatist.
Their support of the discourse, however, fluctuated over time:
when Scheffer (himself a regular contributer to NRC) published
“The multicultural drama”, support for Pragmatism was compara-
tively weak. But in the early 1990s and especially after 9/11, it was
very strong. The contributors to NRC mostly supported Pragma-
tism as part of a more general aversion towards populism (which
characterized much but not all culturalist discourse). Regular con-
tributors like Elsbeth Etty (15 pragmatist articles) and Sjoerd de
Jong (11 pragmatist articles) were fascinated by the growing popu-
larity of populist politicians and tried to place the phenomenon in
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a wider historical and sociological context. Of course their ana-
lyses contained a – partly explicit, partly implicit – valuation of
civil ideas, notions and symbols. Etty’s analysis of growing nation-
alist sentiment was typical of this denunciatory explanation:
The longing for the strengthening of national identity arises from
the fear for the loss of the particularity of Dutch cultural expres-
sions in an era of internationalization and European integration.
But even if the fear of an erosion of national culture would be
warranted, an argument for a “Dutch we-feeling” in relation to
culture amounts to little more than regional folklore. (Etty 2001)
Many such passages can be found: the presentation of culturalists
is first criticized (anxiety over Moroccan delinquents or Islamic
extremists is in fact a sublimated fear of globalization), and then
their agenda is declared irrelevant. Rather than engaging directly
with culturalist discourse or its implications for degraded groups
(as anti-racists do), such reflections serve to create distance be-
tween the analyst and the analyzed, with the former putting the
sentiments of the latter into perspective. Other pragmatists writ-
ing for the NRC identified with disgruntled natives and felt that
elites should incorporate rather than denounce culturalists.6
Whereas previously it was only immigrants who had to be accom-
modated, now resentful natives had to be taken seriously as well,
so that they will not grow (even more) resentful towards political
and other elites.
Resonance and consonance
Despite their ambitions of civil unification and social harmony,
pragmatists with reasonably central positions are focal points of
discursive conflict. They are criticized at least as often as central
culturalists. Between 2000 and 9/11, the Minister of Integration,
Roger Van Boxtel, was a central figure and attracted much more
criticism (14 times) than praise (twice). After 9/11, Job Cohen be-
came a central figure, and he, too, was much more often criticized
(51 times) than praised (8 times). Most other pragmatists, with the
possible exception of some policy sociologists, did not achieve
centrality. Especially Han Entzinger – a professor of sociology, for-
mer civil servant and one of the designers of the integration policy
– had a small but sustained presence on the opinion pages. Com-
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pared to most others, he received many neutral references (39)
and had a relatively favorable ratio of criticism and praise (9:5).
Subjective experiences: The calm confidence of pragmatists
How do pragmatists perceive their position in the integration de-
bate? What drives them to intervene in the way they do? And how
do they operate in the policy field? Most of the articles on the opin-
ion pages were produced by persons whose prestige derives in
large part from their position within the state: politicians who
seek to govern, academics who do research for the government,
and experts who gather information and produce advice. They are
part of a policy field in which integration is researched, discussed
and managed; each day there are dozens of expert meetings, con-
ferences and lectures revolving around the question of how diver-
sity should be governed. While there are disagreements, the
shared desire to devise practical strategies binds these actors to-
gether. For them, integration is a matter of technique, not ideol-
ogy.
Many pragmatists complain that integration politics has gotten
out of hand. They occasionally participate in the media debate but
feel uncomfortable with mediatized politics. This passage from an
interview with a pragmatist social scientist is typical:
You do research and this gives you a certain claim to, well, to a
part of the truth. And this is what you should contribute. After
all, it’s the taxpayer’s money, and so you have the task to contrib-
ute. But it has to be a debate that does not speak without nuance
about, well, jeez, about Muslims, as is happening at the moment.
No, you should show nuances. It is all more complicated… Yes,
there are scumbags. There are fundamentalists too. But there are
also fundamentalists that are different.
Another academic complained that he had to communicate his
findings in sound bites. He occasionally had his articles published
in newspapers but felt that he could not get the message across in
the space allotted to him. These experiences are typical of re-
searchers in the policy field. They experience a loss of discursive
power when they move into the media and are especially frus-
trated by accusations that their work is multiculturalist ideology
dressed up as science (e.g. Ellian 2005; Scheffer 2001; Sommer
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2002). When I asked a researcher how he felt about the accusa-
tion that he promotes multiculturalism, he grabbed a pile of his
publications and threw it before me. He exclaimed that he “never
said anything like that” and invited me to check. Such feelings of
frustration are indicative of discursive subordination. The disper-
sion of integration politics into the media results in the loss of
status based on bureaucratic routines and scientific authority (see
also Hajer 2009). A professor who feels that his work is highly
valued in classrooms and expert meetings can be reduced to a
mere ideologue in another setting.
However, most of the time, pragmatist researchers are calm and
confident in their positions. They operate in a policy field that is
much less dynamic than the debate on integration in the media
and parliament. Policy objectives and media issues may change
quickly, but power relations in the policy field are robust. One re-
searcher at the University of Amsterdam’s Institute for Ethnic and
Migration Studies (IMES) – a bulwark of Pragmatism – told me
that the ministries did not call as much after the right-wing cabi-
net of 2002 had been installed but that he did not really mind.
After all, he said, the government has no other place to turn to if
it wants to devise a strategy against radicalization among Mus-
lims. The IMES indeed received the first large grant for studying
radicalization (see Buijs et al. 2006). Since then, the IMES has
developed a very strong position in the expanding field of radicali-
zation studies. Centers like Forum, the Amsterdam Center for
Foreigners and the Moroccan Platform Netherlands (Samenwer-
kingsverband Marokkanen Nederland) have jumped on the train
and developed courses and programs against radicalization. Peo-
ple working in these institutions feel that the fear of radical Mus-
lims is exaggerated but are nonetheless happy to offer their ser-
vices. Many of the programs previously aimed at promoting
dialogue or emancipation have been adjusted to fit the new policy
objectives.
Examples of this sort of adjustment abound (see also Hay 1995).
One senior civil servant who had worked closely with left-leaning
administrators for years was surprised by my question of whether
his work had changed after the siege of Fortuyn’s party. “Of course
not! Everybody is for social cohesion,” he said. And he was right.
The right-leaning government of Rotterdam had expanded most
of the community work programs introduced under previous gov-
ernments, changing the emphasis from social contact to social
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control (Uitermark & Duyvendak 2008). Something similar is
true at the national level. The right-wing Liberal Rita Verdonk
used her power as a minister to promote a culturalist discourse,
but her so-called “&-program” was remarkably similar to the left-
leaning government of Amsterdam’s policies to fund initiatives
transcending ethnic divisions (discussed in Chapter 9). The insti-
tute Forum coordinated the program and supported associations
and initiatives to break down the barriers that Verdonk – nick-
named “iron Rita” (ijzeren Rita) – had erected. Far from demotivat-
ing pragmatists, culturalists seem to have breathed life into a pol-
icy field whose legitimacy is based on the idea that integration is
neither unproblematic nor impossible. As long as integration is a
topic of controversy, the policy field can count on investments.
Conclusion
Rather than siding with natives with revanchist sentiments or im-
migrants with fears of xenophobia, pragmatists reasoned on be-
half of the state in order to help it maintain the civil unity required
for the legitimate exercise of power. It is for this reason that prag-
matists do not simply have an antagonistic relationship with cul-
turalists. The ascendancy of Culturalism is taken as a sign that
there are integration problems that need to be solved and conflicts
that need to be resolved.
The widespread feeling that past integration policies have failed
has undermined the legitimacy of left-wing administrators and
policy sociologists, but it has also – paradoxically – created new
divisions and tensions that pragmatists can now promise to over-
come. Something similar is true for the pragmatist intellectuals
writing for NRC and other periodicals. Although they are subordi-
nate to culturalists in the sense that they have lower consonance
power and much lower resonance power, the parallel increase of
culturalist and pragmatist articles indicates that the rise of Cultur-
alism has encouraged pragmatists’ entry into civil arenas. Pragma-
tists thrive on the feeling that there is a process of polarization
between immigrants and natives that requires the kind of inter-
pretation, reflection and management that they can provide.
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Civil Islam: An emerging discourse
Introduction
The fatwa against Rushdie and Bolkestein’s claim to civilizational
superiority placed Islam on the agenda of Dutch integration poli-
tics in the early 1990s.7 The images of burning books and Bolkes-
tein’s statements dramatically raised the question of whether
Islamic beliefs and civil engagement can coexist. Culturalists have
since argued that this is impossible or improbable, implying that
identifying with Islam precludes or constrains membership in the
Dutch civil community. Especially after the assassination of Pim
Fortuyn, the integration debate no longer focused on “foreigners”
or “minorities” but on “Muslims” (see Figure 3.1). Fortuyn termed
Islam a “retarded culture” and specifically stated that Muslim im-
migration should stop.8 Ayaan Hirsi Ali likewise argued that con-
frontational politics was necessary: the strategy to compromise
and accommodate would only allow orthodox Muslims to cultivate
and disseminate their anti-democratic, misogynist and homopho-
bic ideas (e.g. Hirsi Ali 2004).
These notions reverberated throughout the civil sphere but did
not go uncontested. As the debate evolved, a discourse crystallized
that I refer to as Civil Islam. The core premise of this discourse is
that Islam allows or even demands full participation in society and
commitment to the values and norms enshrined in the Dutch
constitution (for a more elaborate definition, see Appendix 1).
This process of discourse development takes place in everyday life
(Buitelaar 2006; Entzinger & Dourleijn 2008; Van Tilborgh
2006) but also in discursive milieus composed of associations,
meetings, books, websites and friendship networks (Buijs 2009;
Maussen 2009; Roy 2004). Chapters 10 and 12 identify some of
the discursive milieus located within the associational networks of
the Netherlands’ two largest cities (Amsterdam and Rotterdam)
and show how the proponents of Civil Islam argued that religion
is not the same as ethnic tradition and can be used to critically
interrogate and reform traditional practices. While these ideas
and notions had been cultivated for many years and in many parts
of the world, after 9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh
they also found their way into the opinion pages of Dutch broad-
sheet newspapers. To assess the strength of Civil Islam in this set-
ting and to analyze its civil vocabulary, I first examine the number
138
of articles coded as “Civil Islam” and the actors who produced
them. I then provide fragments to illustrate that Civil Islam does
not just negate Culturalism but crucially depends upon and inter-
acts with it. I then investigate what accounts for the consolidation
of Civil Islam and why some actors promoting this discourse have
relatively high popularity.
Articulation power and base of support
Civil Islam found support especially among anthropologists and
representatives of civil society associations (Figure 6.1). The insti-
tutional location of the discourse seems similar to Anti-racism,
but the dynamic is different. Whereas Anti-racism remained stag-
nant over our period of investigation, the articulation power of
Civil Islam was on the rise: from 11 per cent of the articles in the
period 1990-1999 to 14 per cent in the period after 9/11 (Table
6.1). These general figures conceal two developments. One is that
the Christian Democrats did not sustain their initial support (and
partly turned to Culturalism). The other is that increasing num-
bers of immigrants appeared on the opinion pages after 9/11 to
promote Civil Islam. After 9/11, the discourse accounts for almost
28 per cent of the articles by non-Western immigrants (n = 39)
and 36 per cent of the articles by authors from the four largest
minority groups (n = 22).
Although there are sociologists and philosophers who promote
Civil Islam, the correspondence analysis suggests that anthropolo-
gists are the most prominent academic supporters of this dis-
course (Figure 6.1). Anthropologists such as Thijl Sunier, Wasif
Shadid and Peter van der Veer argued that immigrants’ religious
beliefs and practices were changing to meet the demands of their
lives in the Netherlands (Shadid 2002; Sunier 1997; Van der Veer
2001). They emphasized that because there are numerous inter-
pretations of Islam (see also Van den Brink 2004), it is problem-
atic to speak of “the Muslim community” or to view Islam as a
monolith. There were also many actors who argued as Muslims
that their (or the true) interpretation of Islam implies good citizen-
ship. I do not have precise figures on the religious beliefs of
authors on the opinion pages, but my estimate is that slightly
more than half of the articles categorized as Civil Islam were writ-
ten by Muslims. These intellectuals and representatives argued
and indeed exemplified the idea that Muslims should participate
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in the debate on their religion. One prominent proponent of this
discourse, Tariq Ramadan, was at the time a professor at Freiburg
University. Ramadan had become an influential commentator in
the international media, and Dutch newspapers published his
pieces in translation. Right after 9/11, Trouw published “An open
letter from a Western Muslim”:
The starting point has to be an unconditional denunciation of the
attacks... The horrible events in the United States force us to en-
gage in wholesome self-criticism and to stop allocating blame to
“the others”... Only a minority of Muslims exhibit Muslim citizen-
ship. The large majority of Muslims are in the social and cultural
margin, and as soon as something happens – first the Rushdie
affair, now the attacks – we see the fractures, the distrust and the
mental ghetto. Wisdom... demands that we are present, that we
express ourselves, that we explain the Muslim religion with its
spirituality, its principles and its demands for justice and peace.
(Ramadan 2001)
Ramadan explicitly called upon Muslims to speak out and to view
and present themselves as members of the civil community. In his
writings, including those articles in the database, Ramadan ar-
gued that Islam requires respect for the constitution and active
engagement in political, cultural and social life (cf. Ramadan
2004). He moreover expressed optimism over the growing civil
engagement among Muslims:
Progress is necessarily slow but it is real: among the second and
third generations there are more and more Muslim women and
Muslim men who stand up for both their Muslim convictions and
their Western culture. With respect for the constitution, they de-
fend citizenship and an open identity, and they promote an Amer-
ican or a European Islamic culture. (Ramadan 2001)
For Ramadan, commitment to Islam entails civil engagement:
Muslims have to participate in society and contribute to it. They
also have to struggle against injustice, including injustices perpe-
trated by dictatorships under an Islamic flag: “our ethics of citi-
zenship require us to interpellate our governments, to call upon
them to break their ties to dictatorships and to promote pluralism
and democratic rights in all countries” (Ramadan 2001). Ramadan
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did not have a strong presence on the opinion pages (2 articles),
but his views are emblematic of a growing number of Muslims
who seek to reconcile religious and civil engagement. Among the
other proponents of Civil Islam, we find some actors emphasizing
the need to protest against the injustices of Dutch society and
some mainly critical of their own communities. The former were
mostly affiliated to immigrant or religious associations, the latter
to government institutions or political parties.
An example of an actor who is especially critical of Dutch so-
ciety is Mohammed Cheppih, a Muslim preacher who briefly
served as the leader of the Dutch branch of the Arab European
League. Cheppih, who plays a pivotal role in local networks of
Islamic youths, feels that “The Dutch only want to hear that Islam
is retarded and evil. Anybody who says that gets plenty of space.
Anybody who goes against it is a fundamentalist and extremist.
That is what they think of me” (Cheppih cited in Olgun 2003).9
The journalist and presenter Samira Abbos is a more moderate
critic who appeared on the opinion pages when her book “The
Muslim does not exist” (Abbos 2005) was published. In it, she
presented an overview of Dutch Muslims’ interpretations of Is-
lam, ranging from the liberal to the orthodox. She said she desper-
ately tries to build bridges between Muslims and natives but re-
ceives no help from the latter. Paul Scheffer, for instance, refused
to write the preface for her book because he felt Abbos should
have been more critical of Islam (Abbos cited in Knols 2005).
Examples of actors especially critical of their own communities
include Ahmed Aboutaleb (Box 6.2) and Haci Karacaer, both pro-
minent members of the Labor Party.10 They had more articulation
power than the other actors promoting Civil Islam, producing se-
ven and six articles, respectively, of which three and six, respec-
tively, were coded as Civil Islam. As the director of Forum, Abou-
taleb criticized his fellow believers for failing to understand their
religion: “Muslims in the Netherlands should think better” and
acknowledge that “Islam is a flexible religion” that allows and re-
quires its adherents to adjust to circumstances (Aboutaleb 2002).
In the aftermath of the Theo van Gogh assassination, he intensi-
fied and dramatized this discourse. He told an audience at a mos-
que that “the Muslim community would be wise to not have its
religion hijacked by extremists”. In a remark that could have
come straight out of one of Scheffer’s articles, he called upon the
Moroccan community to engage in restorative work: “I want to say
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that the Moroccan community is burdened with the extraordina-
rily heavy task of cooperating to restore peace and quiet and work-
ing on the production of ‘counter poison’ against intolerance”
(Aboutaleb cited in Hajer & Uitermark 2008: 11).
Box 6.2 Ahmed Aboutaleb – building bridges between
pragmatists and culturalists
Ahmed Aboutaleb (1961) was born in the village of Beni Sidel
on the northern coast of Morocco. He migrated to the Nether-
lands when he was fourteen. After getting a degree at a poly-
technic, he started a career in journalism, working especially
for minority media that were, at the time, heavily subsidized
by the government. He moved on to become a public relations
worker for Hedy d’Ancona when she was Minister of Welfare.
As someone who had intimate knowledge of migrant commu-
nities but was not immersed in an association or institution
promoting a particular (minority) interest, he was perfectly
placed to lead Forum. He was hired as the director in 1996
when Forum was created out of several interest groups. Unlike
its predecessors which were expected to organize and rep-
resent groups, the new institute was to perform as an “exper-
tise center for multicultural development.” Aboutaleb believed
that such a transformation – from interest representation to
expertise – was necessary, and tried to reform or cut off subsi-
dized migrant associations. Under his leadership, the institute
opened up channels to Culturalism. In 1998, it requested Jos
de Beus, a professor of political science at the University of
Amsterdam and prominent member (and critic) of the Labor
Party, to write an essay on the “cult of avoidance” (De Beus
1998). In 2000, the director of the Social and Cultural Plan-
ning Agency, Paul Schnabel, was requested to deliver the insti-
tute’s annual lecture. His argument that assimilation should be
encouraged had strong resonance in the period when the de-
bate revolved around Paul Scheffer’s “multicultural drama”
(see Chapter 5). Some time after publishing “The multicultural
drama”, Scheffer joined the Forum board.
These examples show the forces under which Aboutaleb de-
veloped his civil habitus. The institute and Aboutaleb moved
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away from representing particular minority interests and in-
creasingly passed on the expectations of civil elites to minority
communities. Aboutaleb embodied the idea that migrants have
to integrate, uttering it time and time again in columns, lec-
tures, interviews, expert meetings and countless other occa-
sions. In 2003, Aboutaleb joined the Municipality of Amster-
dam as a top-level civil servant. He worked as an advisor to
diversity alderman Rob Oudkerk and succeeded him when
Oudkerk had to resign after a scandal. Aboutaleb’s disposition
to critically address minorities was valued especially in the
aftermath of the Theo van Gogh assassination. Aboutaleb was
constantly in the media with a dual message: Muslims and
Moroccans had to behave as responsible citizens, and right-
wing politicians should not treat all Muslims as radicals, a
stance that earned Aboutaleb praise from both pragmatists and
culturalists.
Haci Karacaer was a member of the Labor Party and at the time
aspired to be an alderman. He was also the director of Milli Gorus,
a transnational Turkish Islamic association that, like the Turkish
AK Party, has its origins in Erbakan’s National Salvation Party in
Turkey. Karacaer observed that the traditional Turkish nationalist
discourse of Erbakan no longer spoke to the younger generation:
Young people say: what does that do for me... in the Netherlands?
So we decided to become part of the mainstream in the Nether-
lands... We could have continued to stay at the edge and to dangle
in the margin of society but we do not want to do that anymore.
We want to participate. Our guiding notions now are: integration,
participation, emancipation and performance. (cited in Janssen
2003)
For Karacaer this meant that he responded as much as he could to
the requests of political parties, government agencies, newspa-
pers, television channels and cultural centers to participate in de-
bates or to provide commentary. Milli Gorus is a conservative as-
sociation, but Haci Karacaer promoted a discourse emphasizing
the moral obligation of Muslims to honor and protect liberal de-
mocracy. Although he occasionally criticized Dutch politicians, he
achieved his central position thanks to his fierce criticisms of
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Muslims and particularly his own constituents who have to inte-
grate:
I organized language courses for my constituents, for the older
immigrants [oudkomers]. There is place for sixty people, but so far
only twenty or thirty people registered. That was a disappoint-
ment. So I told the director of the social services: come to the
mosque and say, “guys, if you do not take the course, you do not
have to try to get money next month.”... We do not want more
people [getting benefits from] social service; we want to develop
an Islamic middle class.
Karacaer was criticized from within his own organization, espe-
cially for his participation in activities promoting rights for homo-
sexuals (interview Karacaer). His remark that “Islam is not
retarded, but some Muslims are” angered the conservative seg-
ments of his organization, well aware that Karacaer was referring
to them (interview Milli Gorus).11 But as Karacaer lost support
among some of his constituents, he strengthened his association’s
position in local governance networks (Uitermark & Gielen 2010).
Resonance and consonance
Although many actors promoting Civil Islam criticized Dutch or
Western society, the most prominent and influential proponents
of this discourse almost exclusively allocated blame to immi-
grants. Karacaer and Aboutaleb were central in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11 and remained prominent afterwards. They were
not only central; they were popular. In contrast to all other central
actors, Karacaer received more praise (12 times) than criticism (9
times). Aboutaleb received slightly more negative than positive re-
ferences (27 versus 22), but this was only because one actor
trashed him (the culturalist Trouw columnist Sylvain Ephimenco).
These scores are exceptional in that they are much more positive
than those of central culturalists and incomparably more positive
than those of central pragmatists and anti-racists. The praise was
due to various reasons,12 but the most important one was that they
were Muslims sternly addressing their own community. Pragma-
tists embraced them as “bridge builders”; culturalists considered
them as positive exceptions. Aboutaleb and Karacaer did indeed
build bridges, but not necessarily between immigrants and na-
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tives – they bridged the divide between pragmatists and cultural-
ists.
Subjective experiences: A passion for norms
How do actors promoting Civil Islam perceive their position in
the integration debate? What drives them to intervene in the way
they do? And how do they operate in the policy field? Although
Ahmed Aboutaleb, Haci Karacaer and other leading Muslims are
often portrayed as idiosyncratic individuals, we need to analyze
their success in relation to more general transformations of the
integration policy field and the civil sphere. While in corporatist
institutions, minority leaders are expected to represent their com-
munities, the mediatization of integration politics requires that
they authentically address the interests and concerns of core
groups. “Authentically” is crucial here; immigrant politicians are
commonly perceived as acrobats who have to maintain a delicate
balance between their communities and society at large (Cadat &
Fennema 1996). But in a highly emotive and mediatized civil
sphere, strategic considerations are at best ignored and at worst
rejected as expressions of hypocrisy. In order to credibly play the
role of a civil leader, it is essential to passionately lament ideas or
actions repelled by core groups, such as intolerance towards
homosexuals or apologetic remarks about crime or radicalism.
And this is what Aboutaleb and Karacaer did: they castigated Mor-
occans and Turks for being backward, passive and oversensitive.
They referred to Islamic principles to argue against insolence and
intolerance and to argue for education, political participation and
decency.13
It is no coincidence that Aboutaleb and Karacaer (and several
other local leaders that we encounter in Part III) were members
of the Labor party. The Labor party was always slightly to the right
of the Socialist left in that it sought to uplift and educate (rather
than mobilize and represent) the masses. Aboutaleb and Karacaer
embodied the promise of this civilizing mission as they had
wrestled themselves from humble backgrounds and risen to pres-
tigious positions. As a cleaner in Schiphol, Karacaer knew he
wanted to move up:
I am a social person, so I drink a cup of tea with the Dutch fore-
men. The Turks there felt that I was flirting with those Dutch
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guys. But I have always been a rebel, arrogant. So one day I go to
the foremen and ask: what do I have to do to get at your side of
the table? “You cannot,” they said. And then I said: “Just wait.”
Later I met a Dutch professor when I was organizing a confer-
ence and he said: “It’s ridiculous that you do cleaning work.”
That was the turning point to quit what I was doing and to re-
educate myself to work in ICT. (quoted in Ham & Uitermark
2007: 84)14
Aboutaleb speaks in the same angry manner of people from his
own community who try to keep him back: “The Moroccan com-
munity can be like a box full of crabs; when one tries to get out,
the others pull it back” (quoted in Ham & Uitermark 2007: 91).
Both leaders blame members of their ethnic community for not
seizing opportunities. Aboutaleb states that “when you talk to
Moroccans, you have to address the issue of the victim role (slach-
tofferrol)” (ibid. 81). The “victim role” refers to the mentality of
blaming others, and especially discrimination. Immigrants may
indeed encounter discrimination, but Karacaer feels that it is “an
illusion” to think that “16 million Dutch people will change be-
cause of some pitiful Moroccans and Turks” (quoted in Ham &
Uitermark 2007: 85). Because they are immigrants and have
lower-class backgrounds – unlike most Labor party notables and
members – they can more persuasively claim that immigrants in
the Netherlands can succeed if they want to. Interestingly, both
Aboutaleb and Karacaer do not take strong positions against the
culturalist right. They may criticize Pim Fortuyn or Geert Wilders,
but they do not get angry with their supporters. Whereas frustrat-
ed immigrants can count on fierce criticism when they “play the
victim role”, Karacaer and Aboutaleb do not lecture natives about
victimhood when they complain about immigrants.
Their relaxed attitude towards Islamophobic natives and their
relativizing stance towards discrimination and racism are often
met with criticism from their own ethnic and religious commu-
nities – a diffuse and fragmented opposition of orthodox (salafi)
Muslims, left-wing immigrants, internet warriors, street delin-
quents and elderly conservatives. Such criticisms, however, do not
weaken Karacaer or Aboutaleb’s zeal; they only reinforce their con-
viction that there is a need to stand up to the uncivil parts of their
communities. As long as they receive credit from some immi-
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grants and much recognition from core groups, they can speak
with a confidence and passion rarely found among pragmatists.
Conclusion
Only Muslims who were critical of their own (ethnic and reli-
gious) community had ample space to promote their discourses.
It is remarkable that two Muslims – Karacaer and Aboutaleb –
were the exceptions to the rule that central actors receive more
criticism than praise. Promoters of Civil Islam who were less cri-
tical of minorities did not receive anywhere near as many refer-
ences as Aboutaleb and Karacaer. But the fact that the promoters
of Civil Islam increasingly found their way onto the opinion pages
indicates that this discourse had a productive relationship with
Culturalism. While the supporters of Civil Islam countered the
culturalist charge that Islam is inherently uncivil and accused cul-
turalists of stigmatizing Muslims, their discourse shares with Cul-
turalism the idea that immigrants exhibit a disturbing lack of will
to integrate and participate in society. Actors promoting Civil Is-
lam voiced strong criticisms of immigrants commiting crimes,
underperforming in school, disrespecting women, neglecting
their children and committing other civil vices. In contrast to
pragmatists and anti-racists, they often did not hesitate to blame
traditional Turkish, Berber or Moroccan culture. And in contrast
to Culturalism, Civil Islam suggests that the solution to (what it
frames as) scandalous and massive transgressions is to adhere to
the Holy Scriptures and the teachings of the prophet Muhammed.
Civil Islam in a sense transcended the division between pragma-
tists and culturalists.
The emergence of these groups and discourses seems to be the
outcome of a specific mechanism that could be referred to as the
“compulsion of the civil sphere”: pollution creates a demand for
reparation, and it is those subjects whose identities have been
tainted who are best positioned to do the repair. Those Muslims
who express themselves on the opinion pages generally declare
their commitment to the constitution and the values enshrined in
it, such as non-discrimination and freedom of expression. They
thereby cleanse the stigma attached to Muslims through state-
ments and performances negating the culturalist premise that Is-
lam and integration are a contradiction in terms. The compulsion
of the civil sphere is contradictory in its origins – there is a de-
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mand for dignified representatives from stigmatized groups – and
ambivalent in its effects: while Muslims are degraded, it is pre-
cisely this devaluation that prompts some actors to intervene in
core civil arenas.
Conclusion
What can we conclude from this and the previous chapter about
discursive power relations between culturalists and their antago-
nists? There is no doubt that Culturalism has gained power. The
breakthrough came with Bolkestein’s intervention in the 1990s.
The resurgence and expansion of Culturalism occurred in the
new millennium. Paul Scheffer first made Culturalism acceptable
to the progressive middle classes. The electoral success of Pim
Fortuyn subsequently demonstrated that blunt criticisms of Islam
in combination with sensational performances could entice and
mobilize previously disenfranchised segments of the population.
The turbulent life history of Ayaan Hirsi Ali and her unsettling
appearance finally gave Culturalism an icon that cultural elites,
too, could support or even adore.
Whereas support for Culturalism was initially restricted to the
right-wing Liberals of the VVD, its base of support diversified and
expanded after 2000. Culturalists could now mobilize sentiments
and enfranchise groups through civil channels that were pre-
viously closed or non-existent. One expression of culturalists’
growing discursive power was their ability to neutralize oppo-
nents: since accusations of racism and discrimination were de-
clared taboo in the early 1990s, culturalists have rarely been asso-
ciated with the dark side of the civil sphere. While the three
alternative integration discourses considered in this chapter pro-
vide both radical and moderate critique, their promoters are
forced to respond to culturalists and therefore do not have agen-
da-setting power. Let me consider these three discourses and their
relations to Culturalism in turn.
Anti-racists offered a radical alternative to Culturalism. Their
discourse portrays racism and discrimination as clear and present
dangers to the civil community and its values. Anti-racists suggest
that a crucial precondition for a well-functioning civil sphere is
undermined when immigrants and Muslims are portrayed or
treated as second-class citizens. Like their culturalist adversaries,
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anti-racists have a controversial and outspoken discourse. But un-
like their adversaries, anti-racists are on the margins of the civil
sphere. Anti-racism found support among civil society associa-
tions representing lower-class and stigmatized groups and aca-
demics on the margins of the university system; it did not enjoy
support from journalists or political parties (the two groups most
present on the opinion pages). The only time an anti-racist
achieved centrality in the debate was when Abou Jahjah was work-
ing at the Dutch branch of his Arabic European League. But he
encountered fierce opposition, and in the end his efforts were un-
successful.
Pragmatists also offered an alternative to Culturalism and had
many opportunities to articulate their discourse. Pragmatism
found support among actors in policy circles, left-leaning political
parties and the most intellectual quality newspaper (NRC Handels-
blad). Pragmatism remained resilient in the face of the growing
power of Culturalism and its challenge to established interests.
This would have been inconsistent were there a zero-sum relation-
ship between the two discourses. But Culturalism and Pragma-
tism are in a symbiotic relationship: culturalists break open the
debate by violating the civil norms of pragmatists, giving them
ample opportunity to rebut. Rather than pushing Pragmatism out
of the civil sphere, Culturalism pulled it in. We also saw that many
ideas and notions that pragmatists previously never had to defend
became highly contentious. For instance, the idea that confronta-
tion and polarization are bad was no longer self-evident; some of
the most central pragmatists (such as Job Cohen) provoked strong
opposition when they argued for accommodation and dialogue.
But when we observe that pragmatists were unsuccessful in op-
posing Culturalism, we should keep in mind that this was never
their main goal. The problem that occupied pragmatists was im-
migrants not integrating, not the emergence of Culturalism. Cul-
turalism and Pragmatism share two fundamental notions: first,
migration undermines civil unity; second, immigrants’ lack of ci-
vil engagement is a problem requiring state and political atten-
tion. Although the discourses have different ideas on how civil in-
tegration should be achieved, they are not diametrically opposed:
culturalists stand up for reason, pragmatists argue for reasonable-
ness; culturalists want to confront problems, pragmatists want to
handle problems; culturalists say that policies have failed, pragma-
tists that they have not fully succeeded, etc. There was, in Bour-
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dieu’s terms, complicity between the antagonists where different
parties compete but also cooperate (Bourdieu 1984a: 113-114).
They mark their positions through their opposition and owe a
part of their discursive power to the fact that they constantly pro-
voke and invoke one another.
Civil Islam, too, has a tense yet symbiotic relationship with Cul-
turalism. It differs from Culturalism in that it ascribes civil value
to a religion that culturalists frame as a threat or problem. Small
but growing numbers of Muslims found their way into one of the
core arenas of the civil sphere – the opinion pages – and demon-
strated, in words and performances, that there is no contradiction
between civil and religious engagement. But Civil Islam did not
just negate Culturalism; the discourses share an agenda of norm
enforcement. Promoters of Civil Islam claimed that it is indeed
the moral responsibility of Muslims to act as assertive citizens
(the critical variant) or to obey the social and legal rules set by
both the nation and the religion (the liberal variant). Even though
it was obvious that many engaged Muslims and Islamic associa-
tions were deeply hurt by the suspicions and accusations of cultur-
alists, many share the idea that Muslims should leave behind their
traditional culture and insert themselves into the Dutch civil com-
munity. As we will see in Part III, this means that culturalist and
pragmatist governments increasingly consider them as vital part-
ners in generating civil engagement, preventing radicalization
and promoting civil integration.
The general effect of the various developments analyzed in this
and the previous chapter – the ascendancy of Culturalism, the
marginalization of Anti-racism, the resilience of Pragmatism and
the emergence of Civil Islam – is that the signifier “integration” is
filled with ambitions and emotions. Although they have different
understandings of what “integration” entails, they strongly believe
that this is what we need to achieve. As Culturalism consolidated,
integration came to mean more than just economic, social or even
cultural integration. It is now crucially about civil integration:
there is a strong demand for immigrants and especially Muslims
to extend and demonstrate their loyalty. For culturalists, this
means that Muslims have to renounce or criticize their religion
and communities; for pragmatists, it means they have to engage
in dialogue and show commitment to the government’s integra-
tion agenda. In this sense, discursive conflict is a tool for integra-
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tion: it brings together (in a struggle) actors who pursue a com-
mon yet intrinsically volatile objective – civil integration.
These findings suggest that there was no simple shift in the
debate on integration. While positions and oppositions in the de-
bate transformed and the debate’s intensity fluctuated, there was
no overall development that can be characterized as, say, a transi-
tion from “multiculturalism” to “assimilationism”. Such a charac-
terization would reduce to a single movement what was in fact a
complex reshuffling of relations among actors as well as dis-
courses. The divisions and exclusions are complex and contested
because different discourses suggest different civil hierarchies
and courses of action. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is now
more pressure on immigrants – especially Muslims – to integrate
into Dutch society. What culturalists sought to achieve through
strict enforcement, pragmatists sought to achieve through “pol-
dering” and paternalism: the civilizing of minority groups.
How have these discursive processes and policies affected the
proximate referents of integration discourse? Are minorities mar-
ginalized because they fail to meet the norms that civil elites im-
pose on them? Or do such demands generate countervailing
power? Since cities are prime sites where civil integration is nego-
tiated, Part III examines how the governance of diversity has
transformed in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The two largest cities
of the Netherlands are where most immigrants live; they also
function as real-time laboratories for Pragmatism (Amsterdam),
Culturalism (Rotterdam) and Civil Islam (both cities). How do the
different discourses play out in these two cities? This is the ques-





7 Introduction to Part III: Civil
power and governance
figurations
Big cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam are focal points of inte-
gration politics. The government and media constantly focus their
attention on these places, as they are perceived to be the front line
of multicultural society. This is where disintegration is supposed
to be occurring, where civil norms are violated. News media over
the years have produced a steady stream of vivid accounts of Mor-
occan teenagers harassing elderly natives, parents forsaking their
responsibility in raising children, Muslim men who do not want
their wives to participate in society and so on. But villains and
victims are not the only characters in these stories. There is also
intense interest in the heroes and heroines who resist degenera-
tion and strive to restore or recreate civil unity. Civil society asso-
ciations, active residents, and spirited and committed administra-
tors receive favorable coverage.
The subsequent chapters investigate how civil power is distrib-
uted in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. How and why have power re-
lations transformed within local governance networks since 1980?
I focus specifically on the position of Moroccan, Turkish and
Islamic associations within local governance figurations. The rea-
son for this is that the beliefs and practices of these (overlapping)
population groups are most directly at issue in integration politics.
Minority associations are often portrayed as threats to the civil
community because they allegedly foster uncivil discourses and
practices. But minority associations are also called upon to “take
responsibility” and to mobilize and educate their constituents so
that integration problems can be solved. How does this ambiva-
lence play out in interactions between the government and minor-
ity associations? Which associations become powerful actors in
governance networks and which associations are marginalized?
What are the differences over time and between cities in the bal-
ance of power between different civil actors?
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At first sight, it seems that minority associations were sup-
ported in Amsterdam and marginalized in Rotterdam. Amster-
dam has become known as a city that, in spite of severe incidents,
puts its faith in dialogue, cooperation and tolerance. Amsterdam’s
mayors have a long history of promoting pragmatic solutions to
integration problems, and since his installment in 2001, Job Co-
hen has been a figurehead of Pragmatism. Rotterdam, in contrast,
has been the city where Culturalism manifested itself most force-
fully. Pim Fortuyn, one of the champions of this discourse and a
resident of Rotterdam, won a staggering 35 per cent of the votes in
the municipal elections of 2002. After Fortuyn was killed, his
party, Leefbaar Rotterdam, opted for a confrontational approach.
Rather than working with minority associations, as Cohen pro-
posed, Leefbaar Rotterdam considered minority associations as
part of the problem that had to be solved.
These political discourses are obviously important. They are
widely disseminated through the media and define oppositions in
public debate. But when focusing on the relationships between
different actors, we should not assume that political discourses
automatically determine power relations. The power and effects
of discourses can only be assessed by analyzing how they were
mobilized in interactions between local governments, civil society
associations and other civil actors. I refer to the set of relation-
ships between the government and civil society associations as a
governance figuration and investigate how positions and opposi-
tions crystallized and transformed within these figurations.
The four subsequent chapters show that we can identify three
consecutive governance figurations in Amsterdam and just one in
Rotterdam, and that each of these governance figurations has its
own rules of the game – that is, specific mechanisms for reward-
ing and recognizing some civil actors while marginalizing others.
Part III’s concluding chapter provides a more systematic compar-
ison of the structure of governance figurations and the power of
minority associations. The remainder of this chapter elaborates on
the questions and presents the methods, techniques and data
used to answer them. I first indicate how power relations in gov-
ernance relations can be investigated and then formulate a hypo-
thesis about the power of minority associations in Amsterdam
and Rotterdam.
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Mapping positions, oppositions and power in
governance relations
Before the inception of the minorities policy, government and civil
society associations’ responses to the influx of immigrants were
incidental and ad hoc (see Chapter 4). While there were many as-
sociations, support groups and government agencies somehow
concerned with the position of immigrants, they were not part of
a unified policy field. Following the introduction of the minorities
policy, the national government encouraged local governments to
set up consultative structures for minorities. Yasemin Soysal char-
acterizes the governance of diversity in Netherlands in the 1980s
and early 1990s as follows:
Elaborate state structures or state-sponsored institutions develop
to provide social services. Since the state is responsible for the
collective good, governments in corporatist polities generate clear
top-down policies for the incorporation of immigrants, with an
emphasis on standardized protection and services. Corporatist
polities have formal avenues by which new populations can gain
access to decision-making mechanisms and pursue their inter-
ests. (1994: 38)
Both Amsterdam and Rotterdam developed corporatist institu-
tions in the 1980s, but the type of corporatism was different. Am-
sterdam opted for a specific variant of corporatism that I refer to
as ethnic corporatism because its key institutions were consultative
councils organized along ethnic lines. Such councils were not es-
tablished in Rotterdam. The Rotterdam government instead fi-
nanced non-profit corporations to support minority associations. I
refer to these corporations as civil corporations and to Rotterdam’s
governance figuration as civil corporatism. The differences be-
tween the cities’ governance figurations were initially more a mat-
ter of form than of substance. But they nevertheless had a long-
lasting impact by locking both cities into specific trajectories (cf.
Pierson 1994, 2000).
Positions and oppositions
I mainly used interviews to map positions and oppositions in gov-
ernance figurations. Interviews provide rich data on actors’ dispo-
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sitions and schemes of perception, how they view the world and
how they try to change it. I conducted interviews with around 30
participants in integration politics in both cities. In addition, I
drew on around 50 interviews conducted by thesis students or stu-
dent assistants who carried out research under my supervision.1
Virtually all respondents cited in Part III represented or worked
for associations or organizations. The interviews reconstructed
the evolution of respondents’ schemes of perception through
questions about the settings in which they cultivated their views
and the experiences or events that shaped their life course.
Interviews not only provide rich information on actors’ percep-
tions but also give insight into their alliances and antagonisms
with other civil actors, such as civil society associations, political
parties and government agencies. I asked my respondents to
speak about their everyday interactions as well as large-scale
events such as conferences and protests. The answers provided
detailed information on their activities and on the networks that
practically and financially enable them, as well as how actors per-
ceive the figurations in which they are embedded. Apart from in-
terviews, positions and oppositions can also be gleaned from local
media, from publications (pamphlets, mission statements, subsi-
dy requests), from secondary literature and from observed interac-
tions during informal discussions or public debates.
Power relations: Resources and recognition
As in Part II, I understand power as an outgrowth of the positions
of actors within figurations (cf. Emirbayer 1997). Apart from rela-
tions between civil society associations, I am also interested in the
position of minority associations within larger governance figura-
tions. Power in governance is very directly about access to state
resources, and this is why I extensively document the interface
between the elected government, the state bureaucracy and civil
society (cf. Putnam 1976). By analyzing the distribution of recogni-
tion and resources, it is possible to identify and reconstruct power
relations within governance figurations.
Recognition refers to the extent to which actors are regarded by
others in their networks as legitimate and honorable representa-
tives of a particular or general interest. Interviews provide rich
data on how different actors in a governance figuration value each
other and why. Sometimes these valuations materialize into insti-
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tutional structures. Advisory councils, for instance, represent a
prime example of the institutionalization of recognition: those
who are on the council have the legitimacy – in the eyes of the
state – to represent a particular interest. Next to the state, the
media is also a source of recognition. In reports on integration
issues or incidents, the media portray some individuals as heroes
of civil repair while castigating others as threats to the civil com-
munity. I incidentally refer to coverage in the local media, but
since integration politics in both cities is so enmeshed in national
integration politics, I can draw extensively upon the analysis in
Part II.
There is also a material component to civil politics in multicul-
tural cities: the production, dissemination and institutionalization
of discourses require resources, including accommodation, equip-
ment and labor power. Governance figurations are not only sym-
bolic economies, they are also material economies. The state has
enormous resources at its disposal, making it a crucial terrain and
stake in the struggle for civil power. The analysis focuses espe-
cially on those resources appropriated directly for civil projects
such as funds spent on campaigns to promote civil unity or to in-
crease civil engagement. With the help of student assistants, I col-
lected data on subsidy relationships between governments and ci-
vil society associations in both cities as well as in a number of
neighborhood districts. This information was processed in a data-
base containing a total of 397 subsidy allocations. The database
includes information on the subsidy (the amount, the purpose,
the fund from which it was paid, the target groups, the date) and
the association (name, ethnicity). At an average of 14,800 euros,
the subsidies are tiny in light of total municipal budgets. Nonethe-
less, they are important for two reasons. First, civil actors usually
have very limited budgets, which is certainly true for associations
catering to lower-class minorities. Second, subsidy relationships
indicate the state’s acceptance of a civil actor. If civil actors man-
age to claim subsidies from a particular fund, it is very likely that
they can also tap other resources.2 An association that receives
money to organize a debate on, say, the position of immigrant wo-
men can usually also claim resources from other sources (from
the Department of Education, for instance).3
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Contradictions and transformations
What determines the balance of power between actors in a govern-
ance figuration? How do power relations transform? Chapter 2
identified three possible causes of transformation. First, the rela-
tions between different fields can be reconfigured, resulting in
new rules of the game. For instance, the introduction of New Pub-
lic Management techniques (see Osborne & Gaebler 1992) and
the growing importance of image management call corporatist ar-
rangements into question. Actors who have the specific capital re-
quired to adapt to these changing circumstances can move to the
center and marginalize actors whose prestige depends on their
position within corporatist institutions. A second possible cause
of transformation is a changing basis of support. Civil society as-
sociations cater to specific groups and depend on them for inputs
in the form of voluntary work, financial contributions or atten-
dance. When a group contracts (as happened when “guest work-
ers” lost their jobs en masse), associations either have to redefine
their constituencies or lose ground. Actors within governance net-
works reconsidering their alliances is a third possible cause of
transformation. For instance, oppositions inherited from immi-
grants’ countries of origin can be overcome if antagonists find
common ground, as happened when Amsterdam’s progressive
Moroccan associations decided to cooperate with conservative as-
sociations.
However, the aim of Part III is not only to explain change but
also to account for continuity. Chapter 11 shows that Rotterdam’s
governance figuration – despite persistent tensions between liber-
als and conservatives and occasional conflicts between the govern-
ment and minority associations – has remained remarkably stable
over a period of at least 20 years. Since none of the actors gained a
decisive advantage over the others, they were unable to shape the
figuration according to their own ideas and interests. I argue that
there was no such balance of power in Amsterdam due to the di-
rect support of its government for one or the other civil elite.
Rather than distributing resources and recognition evenly be-
tween secular and religious associations, between progressive and
conservative associations, or between mono-ethnic and multi-eth-
nic associations, the Amsterdam government intervened directly
to impose its discourse upon civil society. This, then, is the major
difference between Rotterdam and Amsterdam: while the Rotter-
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dam government’s shifts in discourse were more radical, such
shifts were more consequential in Amsterdam.
A comparative study of the power of minority
associations
The different chapters in Part III explain why Rotterdam’s govern-
ance figuration remained resilient while that of Amsterdam was
dynamic. In addition, I make and test the argument that the struc-
ture of governance figurations influences the civil power of minor-
ity associations. This argument echoes the findings of a body of
literature that emphasizes the role of institutions or political op-
portunities in shaping and channeling contention (Kriesi et al.
1995; Ferree et al. 2002). In the field of integration politics, Ire-
land’s pioneering study suggested that institutions determine how
immigrants will mobilize (Ireland 1994; see also Ireland 2006).
For the Netherlands, Soysal (1994), Rath et al. (2001) and Koop-
mans et al. (2005) have shown that particular political opportunity
structures create distinct patterns of mobilization. The most rele-
vant study for our case is Laure Michon and Jean Tillie’s compar-
ison of Amsterdam and Rotterdam (Michon & Tillie 2003). Antici-
pating and inspiring some of the arguments made here, the
authors suggest that the political participation of minorities in
Rotterdam is higher because its government more generously
sponsors minority associations. The causal chain is as follows:
generous subsidies facilitate minority associations to promote ci-
vil engagement, which expresses itself in higher levels of electoral
participation. I corroborate and extend this argument. As I am not
only interested in electoral participation but in various aspects of
civil power, I formulate a deliberately broad hypothesis: minority
associations have more power in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam. Why
I expect stronger minority associations in Rotterdam is developed
in more detail in the various case studies and in the comparative
chapter; here I restrict the discussion to the measurement of four
indicators of civil power:
1. Constructive relations. In some civil societies, associations are
segregated along ethnic, ideological or class lines and suffer
from destructive inter-associational relations. Such a segre-
gated civil society, where associations work against rather than
with each other, drains the energy of civil actors and reduces
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their capacity to foster ties among different groups (Fiorina
1999). The case studies show that such destructive relations
are more prevalent among Moroccan and Islamic associations
than among Turkish associations. Despite their formidable
ideological conflicts, the Turkish associations manage to arrive
at relatively high levels of cooperation and coordination in
both cities (for Amsterdam, see Fennema & Tillie 1999; Ver-
meulen 2006). The litmus test for governance figurations is
therefore the level of cooperation among Moroccan and Islam-
ic associations. In both cities, Moroccan and Islamic associa-
tions have tried to create an associational network to address
the problems that plague their communities, but with differ-
ent levels of success. The comparative chapter assesses
whether minority associations have engaged in constructive
cooperation or inter-organizational rivalry.
2. Resources. Civil society associations compete and cooperate
with welfare organizations, consultants and political parties.
While the case studies provide detailed information on indi-
vidual civil society associations’ relations with the state, fortu-
nately data exist that enable a more systematic, comparative
analysis. Both governments sought to increase their support
of civil initiatives in the wake of Theo van Gogh’s assassina-
tion to prevent polarization between Muslims and natives.
Both created a subsidy fund to do so. The Municipality of Am-
sterdam launched the so-called Reporting Point for Good
Ideas (Meldpunt Goede Ideeën, MGI); the Rotterdam govern-
ment’s equivalent was With Rotterdam (Rotterdam Mee, RM).
Their goals were virtually identical: promoting participation,
norms and values, and interaction between different groups.
The coincidence of both governments creating similar subsidy
funds allows a quasi-experimental test of civil power: in which
city did minority associations gain more resources?
3. Constituencies. Strong civil societies organize broad constituen-
cies. While the chapters on Amsterdam and Rotterdam ad-
dress different types of associations, they do not offer a sys-
tematic account of their collective capacity to reach and
organize constituents. For this we would need data on the
memberships of all associations, which are not available. We
do, however, have data on immigrants’ participation in civil
society associations. Jean Tillie presented the findings of a
1999 Municipal Survey in Amsterdam that includes 210 Mor-
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occan and 109 Turkish respondents (Tillie 2004). Marieke van
Londen and her colleagues presented results of the 2000 Rot-
terdam Minorities Survey, which includes random samples of
640 Turkish and 544 Moroccan respondents (Van Londen et
al. 2007).4
4. Political Influence. Strong civil societies foster political interest
among constituents. They provide information and mobilize
people to make use of their political rights (Putnam 1993).
The case studies provide detailed accounts of how associations
do (or do not) perform these functions, while the comparative
chapter systematically analyzes electoral participation. To ex-
amine immigrants’ electoral participation, I make use of exit
poll data since 1994. The Institute of Migration and Ethnic
Studies and various partners carried out these surveys in vari-
ous cities, while Dekker & Fattah (2006) summarize the re-
sults for both Rotterdam and Amsterdam.
Class, culture and the power of civil society
We will see that Rotterdam scores better on all indicators, which
prima facie corroborates the hypothesis that Rotterdam has stron-
ger minority associations than Amsterdam. But apart from the
structure of governance figurations, there are other factors that
may account for the power of civil society associations. Here I con-
sider these factors and explain how they can be taken into account
or bracketed.
Class.Many studies – including this one – point to the relevance
of class factors for explaining participation in civil society associa-
tions or elections. Higher educational levels, for instance, corre-
late positively with electoral participation (e.g. Van Egmond et al.
1998). Different levels of civil engagement could therefore result
from differences in the class composition of immigrant commu-
nities. If immigrants have a higher class position in Rotterdam
than in Amsterdam, it might very well be that class – and not the
structure of governance figurations – explains the difference. But
the class position of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants is remark-
ably similar in both cities, as Tables 7.1 to 7.4 show. Data on in-
come, employment and education indicate that Amsterdam’s im-
migrants have higher scores on some variables (especially
employment levels). To the extent that class matters, we would ex-
pect (slightly) higher levels of civil engagement in Amsterdam.
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But as we find the opposite, we must conclude that higher class
position has no positive impact, or that its impact is mitigated by
other, more important factors such as the structure of governance
figurations.
Table 7.1 Ethnic composition of Amsterdam and Rotterdam in
2005
Amsterdam Rotterdam
N % N %
Native Dutch 377,278 50.8 324,038 54.3
Turks 38,209 5.1 45,254 7.6
Moroccans 64,794 8.7 36,292 6.1
Surinamese 70,993 9.6 52,762 8.8
Antillians 12,021 1.6 20,330 3.4
Industrialized 72,464 9.8 33,242 5.6
Other foreign 107,192 14.4 84,679 14.2
Total 742,951 100 596,597 100
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics
Table 7.2 Highest completed education of labor force in Rotter-
dam and Amsterdam in 2003 (*1,000)
Amsterdam Rotterdam
N % N %
Elementary school 148 27.6 180 44.2
High school 164 30.6 137 33.7
Higher education 224 41.8 90 22.1
Total 536 100 407 100
Source: adapted from Uitermark 2006: 37
Table 7.3 Cito scores5 in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 2002
Rotterdam Amsterdam
Girls Boys Boys and girls
Native Dutch 534 534 538
Turks 528 529 529
Moroccans 528 528 530
Surinamese 529 529 531
Antillians 526 526 529
Source: COS/Scala 2004; O&S 2004: 214
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Table 7.4 Unemployment rates as a percentage of the labor force
in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 1991 and 1998
Turkish Moroccan Surinamese Antillean Native Dutch
Amsterdam 1991 30 30 25 40 12
1998 17 21 9 9 5
Rotterdam 1991 37 43 35 39 9
1998 23 27 11 20 5
Source: Burgers & Musterd 2002: 411
Civil culture. Numerous studies draw attention to the relevance of
specifically national or ethnic factors in explaining variations in
civil engagement. Traditionally, this line of research has focused
on differences between countries (Almond & Verba 1963; Ferree
et al. 2002). More recently, a number of authors have suggested
that socio-cultural factors can account for variation between differ-
ent ethnic groups within a single city or country (Fennema & Til-
lie 1999; Fennema et al. 2001; Vermeulen 2005; Nell 2008). For-
tunately, it is possible to control for this variable, since the data
used in this study differentiate between different ethnic groups,
in casu Moroccans and Turks. We find strong differences between
the two ethnic groups and the two cities.
Cultural interaction. Analysts of culture such as Ian Buruma and
Ron Eyerman graphically narrate the clash between orthodoxy and
hedonism, a clash that seems especially explosive in Amsterdam
(Buruma 2006; Eyerman 2008). Rotterdam, in contrast, has the
image of a sober, modern and hard-working city, which may ap-
peal to immigrants (Duyvendak 2002). While an explanation
based on city culture cannot be rejected out of hand, it did not
find support in my interviews or in other data. Available data does
not allow for a systematic comparison of minorities’ identification
with the cities in which they reside, though available research sug-
gests that immigrants in Amsterdam are as likely to identify with
their city as immigrants in Rotterdam (Van der Welle & Mama-
douh 2008: 85; Phalet et al. 2000). My provisional conclusion is
that the difference is not one of mental identification but rather
one of the mechanisms enabling residents to act upon their com-
mitments, which brings us back to governance figurations.
Natives. Another possible explanation for variations in civil en-
gagement focuses on the attitude of natives in general and politi-
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cians in particular. Criticisms or slurs may deter immigrants from
participating in civil life, increase polarization between population
groups, and push immigrants towards more extremist and funda-
mentalist viewpoints. If confrontational discourse indeed fuels
disengagement, this should be more evident in Rotterdam than in
Amsterdam. But as we find the opposite, we need to explain why
minority associations are more powerful in Rotterdam in spite of
the discourse of its administrators. This is not to say that this fac-
tor is somehow unimportant but rather to suggest that other fac-
tors have greater impact. It may, for instance, be the case that con-
frontational discourse pulls minorities into civil politics to rebut
criticism. But then we would need to explain which institutions or
relations enable such counter-offensives – which once again
brings us back to the structure of governance figurations.
Conclusion
In his analysis of immigrants’ political claims, Ruud Koopmans
has shown that “the magnitude of cross-national differences is
much more important than that of local variation within each of
the countries” (Koopmans 2004b: 449). This is correct, but the
case studies here show that there are also important variations
over time and between cities that a political sociology of integra-
tion has to account for. In this chapter I have indicated how posi-
tions and oppositions can be identified, and how we can map
power relations and explain their transformations. While re-
sources and recognition may be concentrated in individual actors,
I have argued that their power relations can only be understood if
we position these actors in a governance figuration that consists of
asymmetrical interdependencies between actors rooted in differ-
ent settings and unequally invested with civil power. Focusing on
the governance figurations that structure relations between people
and their polities allows us to uncover the mechanisms that pro-
duce inequalities (and to reflect and act upon them, although this
is not my goal here).
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8 The minorities policy and the
dominance of the radical left:
Ethnic corporatism in
Amsterdam in the 1980s
I felt as though I was conducting some sort of archeological study
of civil society when I arrived at the neighborhood center in Am-
sterdam Oud-West. I was to visit an interviewee from Kommittee
Marokkaanse Arbeiders Nederland (the Committee of Moroccan
Workers in the Netherlands). KMAN was established in a squat in
1975. A few years later it opened its headquarters just outside the
historic center of Amsterdam. With the support of subsidies and
many Moroccan and native volunteers, the association organized
frenetically and created an extensive infrastructure of neighbor-
hood subcommittees, working groups and consulting hours. Al-
most nothing of this was left when I conducted my interview in
2006. Its only regular meetings took place in this neighborhood
center which provided KMAN space alongside many other small
associations from the neighborhood. KMAN notices were on the
front door. I also found a brochure of the City Moroccan Council
(Stedelijke Marokkaanse Raad, SMR) listing a nine-digit phone
number, which means it must have been printed before 1995
(when phone numbers were extended by a single digit).
After searching through the deserted corridors of the neighbor-
hood center, I found myself in a room with elderly Moroccan men
drinking tea, playing games and conversing in Arabic or Berber (I
cannot tell the difference). When I entered, they stopped their
conversations and looked at me with surprise, as if they thought I
had entered by mistake. After discovering that I had made an ap-
pointment with a member of the association, one of the men of-
fered me a seat at his table. He was about 45 years old and slightly
younger than most of the other men. He certainly was more com-
municative. In broken Dutch and English he explained that he
had lived in France before and so did not have many memories of
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KMAN. But he was nevertheless nostalgic about those days of pro-
tests, campaigns and events, and told me of their plans to rejuve-
nate the association.
After some time, a tall man with short gray hair entered the
room. I recognized him from a protest against the police killing
of a Moroccan man in Amsterdam West that KMAN had orga-
nized with other minority and anti-racist associations. KMAN had
organized countless demonstrations. That one was the last. The
tall man was one of the stewards who had volunteered to guide
the protest. I remembered him because his impressive bearing
had hardly helped as he tried to calm down some of the Moroccan
youths in the protest. He and his fellow activists could not prevent
several dozen youths from smashing shop and car windows,
which turned the event into a “rampage” according to the main-
stream media. While these memories flashed through my mind
he gave me a warm handshake and we exchanged some polite
greetings. I think he did not feel comfortable enough about his
Dutch to enter into a more substantive conversation, but he ges-
tured to me to come to an office in the back.
There I met my respondent, Driss Bouzit, a journalist who had
been documenting KMAN from the beginning. He had made a
career in the 1980s reporting on “minority affairs”, which became
a journalistic niche after the “minorities policy” was established.
At the time it was self-evident that reporters from minority groups
should report on minority affairs, but in the course of the 1990s
the institutions of the minority policy had eroded. Bouzit con-
firmed what many other people had told me: the government had
at some point decided to “pull the plug”. Like the civil servants
and administrators I talked to, Bouzit said that the KMAN leader-
ship was also to blame for this; they had been unwilling and un-
able to reform the association to meet contemporary demands.
The association had once been a major player in civil society, but
its most resourceful and energetic activists had left and taken up
positions in political parties, consultancy bureaus or welfare orga-
nizations, leaving behind the men in this room.
The interview was concluded when a meeting on disability al-
lowances started. Enterprises had laid off guest workers in the
late 1970s and early 1980s under the pretext that they were “dis-
abled”. This meant that the government rather than the enter-
prises were financially responsible. Now, a quarter-century later,
the government intended to test whether the recipients were in-
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deed “100% disabled”. The activists of yesteryear had gathered to
review the consequences of these reforms for their livelihoods.
* * *
Associations like KMAN had once received recognition and re-
sources from the government but were marginalized over the
course of the 1990s. The associations that were once organizing
national demonstrations and serving large and diverse constituen-
cies were now struggling for space in neighborhood centers or
had disappeared altogether. Their former radicalism and vibrancy
still incidentally reverberated in interviews but most of the time
they just expressed deep frustration about the government, the
media and politicians. They had been relegated from the very cen-
ter of the field to the outer periphery; what remained was the feel-
ing that they had been disenfranchised and humiliated. Before we
can explain how the radical associations lost their power and pres-
tige, we need to examine how they got it in the first place. The next
section analyzes the formation of “ethnic corporatism”, a govern-
ance figuration in which left-wing associations like KMAN had a
central position. Subsequent sections identify the contradictions
of this governance figuration and explain how these contradic-
tions undermined the position of left-wing associations.
The formation of ethnic corporatism
Amsterdam’s policies towards immigrants and minority associa-
tions took shape in a period of unprecedented social turmoil. Un-
employment was skyrocketing, the middle classes were moving
out of the city, the housing market had collapsed, drug scenes
were growing, and crime was on the rise. The city was in crisis,
but politics was more alive than ever before. Amsterdam in the
late 1970s and early 1980s was the stage for some of the most
explosive social conflicts of the post-war period. The squatting
movement established countless autonomous social centers
throughout the city. The student movement revolted in and out-
side the university. Anarchist and far-left political parties chal-
lenged the dominance of the Labor Party.
The government took recourse to draconian repression when
the stakes were high – it sent tanks onto the street to break the
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squatters’ resistance (see Anderiesen 1981). But it also showed an
impressive capacity to pacify social conflict. The combination of
pressure from grassroots movements and support from the cen-
tral state induced the local government to heed many of the de-
mands of the protest groups and to fund and incorporate them.
Social movements found inroads into the state and were offered
resources and recognition to establish institutions to protect the
rights of tenants, workers, welfare recipients, women, and so on.
The funds provided by the central state as part of the minorities
policy allowed the municipality to use this same strategy to incor-
porate minority associations into the state bureaucracy.
There were, however, deep schisms within immigrant commu-
nities. The most vocal minority associations at the time were es-
tablished by left-wing dissidents and militants who had often fled
repression in their country of origin. In the Netherlands they en-
gaged in political struggles for social and legal rights but also con-
fronted co-ethnics who subscribed to conservative or fascist be-
liefs. Fierce battles were fought among and within minority
associations. Within the Moroccan community there were contin-
uous fights – sometimes physical – between dissidents who had
fled from the dictatorial Moroccan regime and loyalists who sup-
ported the Moroccan King, Hassan VI. Within the Turkish com-
munity there were occasionally violent clashes between Commu-
nists, Socialists and Kurds on the one hand and fascists on the
other.
Each of these blocs had their own associations. Moroccan dissi-
dents and radicals were united in KMAN,1 which often engaged in
confrontations with the so-called Amicales, a network of associa-
tions sponsored by the Moroccan dictatorial state. Divisions
among Turkish associations also reflected divisions in the sending
country. The Communists of HTIB,2 the Socialists of DIDF3 and
the Kurdish separatists of FKN4 were in conflict with supporters
of the Turkish fascist party MHP,5 the so-called Grey Wolves.
These conflicts between loyalists and radicals coincided and inter-
sected with struggles between (secular) progressives and (reli-
gious) conservatives. As loyalists often organized through mosque
associations, this only reinforced the hostility of left-wing associa-
tions towards religious groupings and authorities, although most
religious associations – then as now – preferred to stay out of pol-
itics altogether.
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These schisms within immigrant communities created prob-
lems for the government: how could it incorporate communities
that were internally divided? The initial answer was to ignore the
differences and to provide the same services to all associations
through the Welfare Foundation for Foreigners. However, left-
wing associations and their native sympathizers protested vehe-
mently against the support extended to conservative associations.
Activist researchers uncovered the ties between the Amicales and
the Moroccan government and disclosed the fascist ideology of the
Grey Wolves. The left-wing associations moreover expressed frus-
tration over the paternalism of the welfare organizations. They felt
it was outrageous that native civil servants with limited knowledge
of minority communities were designing and offering services to
immigrants. One senior civil servant describes the field in this
period as a “political minefield”. She had worked in Rotterdam
until 1981 and noticed a stark difference with Amsterdam:
There was a typical difference between Amsterdam and Rotter-
dam. In Amsterdam there were all sorts of ideological discussions
going on in immigrant communities, especially among the for-
eign workers and their associations. The Ministry of Welfare had
made a subsidy arrangement for categorical welfare provision
through the Welfare Foundation for Foreigners and the Surina-
mese Welfare Foundation. There were no subsidies for immi-
grant associations, though they could declare some costs with the
Welfare Foundations. But the immigrant associations wanted to
have a say in how the funds were distributed, and they wanted
their own budgets. At the time they had the support of action
groups, squatters, students and many other political groups active
in Amsterdam.
As I indicated in Chapter 4, many of the native Dutch profes-
sionals and volunteers involved in minority affairs in the 1970s
and 1980s identified with the struggles of (left-wing) minority as-
sociations. Community workers and left-wing politicians agreed
that paternalism had to be avoided and were steadfastly opposed
to fascist or reactionary associations. The Welfare Foundation was
abolished and the responsibility for the distribution of subsidies
transferred to the municipality.6 This meant that – in contrast to
Rotterdam – the Amsterdam government has since engaged di-
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rectly with minority associations, without the mediation of organi-
zations like the Welfare Foundation for Foreigners.
When the minorities policy was introduced in 1983, the central
position of minority associations was formalized and institutional-
ized in advisory councils for different minority groups. The coun-
cils were made up of the representatives of individual minority
associations, including political associations, mosques, cultural
centers and sport clubs. The respective councils received adminis-
trative as well as financial support. Turks and Moroccans were in-
itially together in one council, but each community got its own
council in 1989. Three other councils represented other ethnic
minorities: one for Surinamese and Ghanaians, one for Southern
Europeans and one for refugees and Chinese. The awkward com-
bination of different groups has to do with the requirement that
councils represent at least 16,000 people. If a minority group did
not reach this threshold, it had to form a council with other
groups.
This way of institutionalizing civil society associations exempli-
fies the technocratic nature of the minorities policy and illustrates
the argument in Chapter 4 that the government wanted, above all
else, to organize and categorize these new populations in such a
way that they would be governable. There was no multiculturalist
impetus but the official policy goals nevertheless reflected the am-
bitions of progressive movements. The memorandum on the
minorities policy in 1989 – the first time the government articu-
lated a coherent framework for the growing range of policy meas-
ures related to minorities – mentioned two overall goals: “to take
away the disadvantages (achterstanden) of immigrants and to
stimulate their social mobility by expanding access to scarce socie-
tal resources and services and by creating the conditions for
emancipatory activity” (Gemeente Amsterdam 1989: 16). The first
goal fits with pragmatist integration discourse, as it emphasizes
the importance of preventing the formation of an underclass. The
second goal fits with anti-racist discourse, as it explicitly states that
the government needs to “combat racism and discrimination in
order to break down inequalities in power relations” (ibid.).
Even though the memorandum explicitly stated that the preser-
vation of cultural identity was not an official goal, the document
recognized the importance of minority associations.7 Associations
were supposed to organize groups that were beyond the reach of
the state and to represent the interests of ethnic communities to
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the government. They were provided with subsidies to build an
organizational infrastructure and to organize activities to involve
groups that would otherwise remain disengaged. The ethnic com-
munity and its associations were to serve as a springboard first to
the welfare state and then to the labor market (Duyvendak & Rijks-
chroeff 2004).
The governance figuration that emerged in Amsterdam in the
early 1980s can be characterized as ethnic corporatism. It was ethnic
because the councils were organized along ethnic lines and be-
cause associations were expected to mobilize on the basis of ethni-
city rather than, for instance, religion, class or race. The figuration
was corporatist because civil society fused with the state. Several
individual associations received subsidies from the municipality
while the respective councils received administrative as well as fi-
nancial support. The secretaries of the councils had contracts as
civil servants and were stationed at city hall. In short, a fully
fledged minorities policy was in place providing positions and re-
sources to minority associations and their representatives. Which
actors reaped the rewards and recognition available within this
figuration?
Power relations under ethnic corporatism
Ethnic corporatism in principle provides a model for the inclusion
of each and every immigrant. Every immigrant belongs to an eth-
nic group which is represented by the ethnic council; every immi-
grant can make use of social provisions provided to his or her eth-
nic group. In practice, however, ethnic corporatism in Amsterdam
was much more open to some associations, communities and dis-
courses than to others. Here I examine power differentials in two
central domains of ethnic corporatism: the advisory councils
(where recognition for representing immigrant communities is at
stake) and subsidy relationships (where resources are at stake).
The advisory councils
The councils were not assemblies where each association or parti-
cipant had one vote. The councils had many members but only a
few associations, and individuals made the decisions and articu-
lated the official viewpoints. The passivity of many associations
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was due to their disinterest in civil politics: their members were
concerned with overcoming specific obstacles (like permit proce-
dures, fire safety regulations, etc.) but had no ambition to influ-
ence government policy or to engage in public debate. Another
reason was that participation in governance networks and receiv-
ing subsidies could lead to scrutiny regarding both ideas and fi-
nances. This was especially the case for conservative associations
under the watchful eyes of left-wing associations and their wide
network of sympathizers, who insisted that the government
should only support progressive associations.
In practice, the left-wing associations could set the councils’
agendas and claim they represented the rest of the community. In
many cases they actually did so; conservative and apathetic asso-
ciations could be hostile to left-wing groups but nevertheless agree
with – and passively support – measures that improved the posi-
tion of their ethnic group, such as access to social housing, health
care and education, and measures combating discrimination and
poverty. The left-wing associations, seeing themselves as van-
guards, performed this role with passion. Intellectual dissidents
and militant workers from KMAN came to dominate the Moroc-
can council, and the Communists of HTIB called the shots within
the Turkish council.
Subsidy relationships
Under ethnic corporatism, subsidy relationships and political rep-
resentation went hand in hand: associations with a central place in
advisory councils also received substantial structural subsidies. Ta-
ble 8.1 breaks down the recipients of subsidy into different cate-
gories.8 The most striking finding is that left-wing associations
received well over 70 per cent of the subsidies before 1995. Only
after 1995 – when corporatism was corroding (see below) – did
their share of subsidies decline. The table also shows that wo-
men’s associations accounted for a substantial share of the subsi-
dies. They were, without exception, closely tied to the general – i.e.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The left-wing associations flourished within this governance fig-
uration: they offered counseling, provided Dutch, Turkish and
Arabic language courses, organized information meetings, hosted
large cultural events, published magazines, made radio broadcasts
and frenetically mobilized for demonstrations and campaigns
(Van der Valk 1996). But the resources they received were out of
proportion to the number of immigrants they reached. Dozens of
other associations did not receive subsidies and held marginal
positions – or lacked positions altogether – within the advisory
councils. As can be seen in Table 8.1, the dominance of the left-
wing associations was stronger among Moroccans than Turks. Be-
cause they had more political interest and bureaucratic compe-
tence than the Moroccan associations, even some radically conser-
vative Turkish associations received funding in this period. These
were, however, the exceptions. The overall results are the opposite
of what the critics of multiculturalism (Barry 2001; Baumann
1996, 1999; Benhabib 2002; Cornell & Murphy 2002; Okin
1999) lead us to expect: left-wing associations managed to move
right into the center of power, while conservative associations
were relegated to the background or excluded altogether.
The contradictions and erosion of ethnic corporatism
Ethnic corporatism was a stable governance figuration in the
1980s. But it contained contradictions that grew over the 1990s
and ultimately led to its collapse around the turn of the century.
Three developments aggravated the internal contradictions of cor-
poratism: the contraction of the support base of left-wing associa-
tions, the introduction of market incentives in governance rela-
tionships, and the inability of ethnic representatives to
discursively and institutionally manage defiant and disconnected
youth.
Shifting power relations in the Turkish and Moroccan councils
When it implemented the minorities policy and established the
institutions of ethnic corporatism, the government of Amsterdam
was uninterested in the tensions within and between immigrant
groups. It lumped together Chinese immigrants with Somali refu-
gees, ultranationalist Grey Wolves with Kurdish separatists, and
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Moroccan dissidents with loyalists. As long as the councils for-
mally represented 16,000 residents, the government did not care
whether the different associations shared cultural attributes or po-
litical orientations. The result of this technocratic ignorance was
that associations indifferent or hostile to one another were forced
to cooperate. However, cooperation between opponents lasted
only as long as it provided direct and tangible benefits to those
involved. Both councils crumbled under their internal contradic-
tions during the 1990s.
The Turkish council was undermined by tensions between con-
servative and radical associations. While the left-wing associations
tried to dominate the council, they had lost many of their constitu-
ents and had not succeeded in involving the second generation of
immigrants, for whom the struggle for the rights of “guest work-
ers” smelled of yesteryear. The guest workers had previously suf-
fered hardship in their workplaces, but at least they could mobilize
through this identity (as workers) and as part of larger coalitions.
When they lost their jobs en masse, there was no longer a shared
identity through which the left-wing associations could mobilize.
The conservative associations, in contrast, mobilized on the basis
of Islamic identity – which had become more rather than less sali-
ent. At one point Haci Karacaer, director of the conservative mos-
que federation Milli Gorus, became the chairperson of the council.
Karacaer enthusiastically advocated the dissolution of the council,
which he regarded as an anachronistic institution dominated by
even more anachronistic associations and individuals.
The Moroccan council was likewise fraught with contradictions,
but the main conflict here was between the older and the younger
generation. This was especially problematic in light of the rising
anxiety over growing criminality among second-generation Mor-
occans. Since the late 1980s there has been a steady flow of
government, academic and media reports on the over-representa-
tion of Moroccan youths in crime statistics. The government initi-
ally involved Moroccan associations in efforts to prevent disen-
gagement, but it became increasingly apparent that there was a
generational schism. The Argan youth center established with the
support of left-wing associations initially formed part of the net-
work around SMR and KMAN, but over the course of the 1990s it
cut most of its ties to the older generation.
In short, a major contradiction within ethnic corporatism re-
sulted from the forced cooperation of associations with very differ-
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ent interests, discourses and constituents. It was only possible to
suppress these differences when one group of actors so domi-
nated resources and recognition that it could claim to speak for
the entire ethnic community. While the guest worker associations
initially had this power, as they lost momentum it became increas-
ingly clear that some actors – the younger generation in the case
of Moroccans, conservatives in the case of Turks – had no interest
in upholding a governance figuration that was controlled by their
opponents.
Flexible subsidies and the erosion of corporatist privileges
A second contradiction within Amsterdam’s form of ethnic cor-
poratism was that civil society associations depended for both re-
sources and recognition on the government they agitated against.
The model in which civil society associations rely on state funding
but nevertheless enjoy a measure of autonomy came under pres-
sure in many countries and in many policy domains in the 1990s
(Duyvendak 1999; Mayer 1999). Administrators, politicians and
civil servants were increasingly influenced by the idea of a zake-
lijke overheid – the idea that the government should be run like a
private company, simulating the market to ensure efficiency and
compliance. If governments grant subsidies to civil society asso-
ciations, they should stipulate how these funds are to be spent
and monitor recipients’ performance; if an association does not
reach stipulated targets, the funds should be transferred to an-
other, more efficient association (Jordan & Jordan 2000; Osborne
& Gaebler 1992). Within this neoliberal framework, there was no
place for structural subsidies, which were one of the most impor-
tant sources of income for guest worker associations.9 Structural
subsidies were abolished in 1997 and replaced with project and
periodic subsidies.10 Amounts previously earmarked for structur-
al subsidies were now channeled through the so-called SIP Fund
(named after the Subsidieverordening Integratie en Participatie or
Subsidy Regulation for Integration and Participation), for which
civil society associations had to tender bids. A further reform in
2004 opened the bidding to all associations, not just immigrant
associations. These changes in the rules of the game marked a
move away from ethnic corporatism and undermined the power
of the left-wing associations.
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Table 8.2 shows that a small group of associations still domi-
nated the scene in 1995 but that this had changed completely by
2005. Between 2000 and 2005, the trend was towards smaller
subsidies to more and younger associations – indicative of the ero-
sion of privileged positions in this particular policy domain and
the crumbling of corporatist arrangements.
Table 8.2 Subsidy requests to Amsterdam’s Department of Socie-
tal Development (DMO) in 1995, 2000 and 2005
Year 1995* 2000 2005**
General
Budget for subsidies € 793,888 € 812,330 € 738,022
Number of subsidized organiza-
tions
22 42 62
Average requested subsidy €29,853 €27,653 €25,050
Average amount granted € 24,276 €23,592 €14,889
Percentage of requested amount
awarded
86 78 63
Average year of foundation (age) 1978 (17) 1986 (14) 1993 (12)
Turkish and Moroccan associations
Number of subsidized Turkish as-
sociations
5 8 4
Number of subsidized Moroccan
associations
4 5 1
Per capita subsidy Turkish com-
munity
€ 5.40 € 7.40 € 4.10
Per capita subsidy Moroccan com-
munity
€ 1.90 € 2.20 € 0.60
Types of subsidized activities Mostly socio-cultural
activities. Few activ-












* Data missing for seven organizations. For these organizations, the amount is estimated on the basis of sources
for 1996.
** Not all subsidy requests had been fully processed at the time of research. We have full data for 40 out of 62
organizations. Missing organizations are included in the budget and in the number of subsidized organizations
but not in other figures.
Source: archives of the Department for Societal Development, Municipality of Amsterdam. Partly based
on Uitermark & Van Steenbergen (2006)
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The major losers were – as we would expect by now – the left-wing
associations and especially Moroccan guest worker associations.
Whereas in 1995 they were still secure in their funding, this was
no longer the case after 1997. The shift towards project subsidies
was disadvantageous for radical associations, as they lacked the
disposition (the will as well as the capacity) to produce proper
working plans and to organize the types of activities the govern-
ment wished to promote. Nevertheless, the number of funded as-
sociations and the amount of subsidy per capita increased be-
tween 1995 and 2000; the Department for Societal Development
at this point was still trying to induce the guest worker associa-
tions to operate within the changing policy framework. While it
had begun funding new associations (hence the rise in numbers),
it had not yet given up on the old ones. But by 2005, there was
very little left of the former elite.
Minority associations not only lost their structural subsidies,
the institutional network in which they were embedded was also
swept away. Turkish and Moroccan youth centers lost their fund-
ing while the Bureau for Strategic Minorities Policy at City Hall
was closed down (Zwaap 2002: n.p.). Such measures weakened
the linkages between associations, professionals, civil servants
and constituents. The data on structural subsidies merely provide
a snapshot of the broader erosion of corporatist institutions and
the tearing apart of networks within and between associations. Ba-
har Asiye’s case is illustrative (Box 8.1): associations catering to
lower-class groups not only suffered the discontinuation of struc-
tural subsidies but also reorganizations in the welfare sector,
forced relocations and imposed cooperation. The infrastructure
that had sustained secular and left-wing minority associations gra-
dually corroded, and with it the power of the associations to orga-
nize and represent constituents waned.
Box 8.1 Asiye’s course
Bahar Asiye used to teach illiterate women from Turkey to read
and write their native language. Initially, she worked as a pro-
fessional in the service of the government, but as a result of the
gradual abolition of the minorities policy, her position was dis-
continued. After becoming unemployed, she had more time to
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devote to ATKB, of which she had been a member for fifteen
years. As a volunteer she taught grammar and syntax to illiter-
ate women, but the courses also had an important social func-
tion. The women came with cookies long before the lesson
started to talk about their week – for many of them, their only
break from household or menial work. It was also the only
place where they could find information in their native lan-
guage on topics such as schools for their children, help with
legal problems, or advice in case of difficulties in or with the
family.
The courses had to be discontinued when the government
canceled the association’s structural subsidy and forced ATKB
to relocate from Amsterdam East to Amsterdam West. As part
of a policy to improve efficiency, ATKB was to be accommo-
dated in a space together with other women’s associations: the
Moroccan MVVN and a Hindustani women’s association.
ATKB and the other associations protested with letters and on
the street against their forced relocation but to no avail. The
new building was on the other side of the city and was inacces-
sible on weekends. Many women did not feel comfortable with
the move: they did not know Amsterdam West, were expected
to register with a doorman, and the location on the tenth floor
of an office building was not quite as homely (gezellig) as the
previous location. Asiye tried to find an alternative place in a
neighborhood center in East, but no space was available. Dur-
ing the last session of the course, many women cried.
Asiye remains active within ATKB but now spends a lot of
time meeting the subsidy demands of the government, which
is what needs to be done if the association wants to keep its
place in West. The municipality heavily subsidizes projects
against domestic violence, but it is difficult for her to feel that
she is really working for women who suffer. The municipality,
which demands that different women’s associations work to-
gether, poses numerous procedural demands. While they lead
to all sorts of problems, the women’s associations could agree
on organizing one large event in one of Amsterdam’s premier
cultural centers, De Balie. The location is prestigious – much
too prestigious for the women who are most likely to be victi-
mized.
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Stigmatization in civil arenas
The institutions of ethnic corporatism – the advisory councils, the
structural subsidies, the support of professionals – functioned not
only as a social infrastructure but as a base from which civil proj-
ects were developed. These projects were reasonably successful in
that they allowed minority associations to present themselves as
and alongside central civil actors. But over time, another central
contradiction of ethnic corporatism surfaced: ethnic leaders were
expected to represent stigmatized and deprived communities in a
dignified and professional manner. This meant that the stigmati-
zation of minority communities constantly threatened to taint the
image of their leaders, which indeed happened in the 1990s.
In the early 1990s, KMAN and other associations had effec-
tively campaigned for more resources to support social programs
and community initiatives. But as negative media coverage inten-
sified, the government became less forthcoming. The representa-
tives of the Moroccan community came to be seen as part of the
problem, with the media and government officials increasingly
annoyed with the tendency of Moroccan associations to claim they
could not tackle problems without significant government sup-
port.
The left-wing immigrant associations’ drop in civil power was
even more evident in the organization of protests against Israeli
violence in Palestine. KMAN, SMR and many other Moroccan as-
sociations supported Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupa-
tion. This was one of the few issues around which they – together
with other left-wing and Islamic associations – could mobilize a
relatively large crowd of immigrants and natives. But the protests
against Israeli violence resulted in media coverage that identified
the protesters as a threat to the civil community. The most ex-
treme example was a protest in support of the Palestinian intifada
in 2002, when a number of banners compared Israel with Nazi
Germany, equating the swastika with the Star of David. Youths
also attacked a gay night club – the It – with stones. They assaulted
people whom they believed were Jews and threw stones at the
Krasnapolsky Hotel (Krebbers & Tas 2002). The stewards of the
organization had tried to persuade protesters to remove the anti-
Semitic banners and to prevent a confrontation with the police.
They failed; the demonstration ended with a charge of riot police
across Dam Square. The protest was not presented as a civil in-
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dictment of an oppressive occupier but as a direct assault on the
Dutch civil community and a reincarnation of the darkest forces
in Dutch civil history.
This is just the most extreme example of a protest meant to
draw attention to injustice that resulted in the stigmatization of
the protesters in the media. Other examples included protests fol-
lowing confrontations between youths and police (in 1998 and
2003) and further protests against Israel (in 2000 and 2004). In
each of these cases, the demonstration’s organizers lost control
over groups of second-generation immigrant youths and therefore
over the media’s representation of the protest. This inability to
control angry and frustrated youths was also observed among Mo-
luccans (Chapter 4). But unlike the Moluccans, the violent protes-
ters perverted the most sacred symbols of the Dutch civil sphere
(the memory of the Second World War and the Holocaust) and
violated its most cherished norms (the taboo on anti-Semitism).
Conclusion
In the conclusion to The Civilizing Process, Elias tells the story of
the Duc de Montmorency who could not accept that King Riche-
lieu had monopolized the right to rule. He fought the King as feu-
dal lords had fought each other in olden times, not caring too
much for the importance of gunpowder in modern battle. Duc de
Montmorency thus attacked a battalion of musketeers and artillery
in full knightly outfit. His attack was heroic but fatal only to him
and his men (Elias 1994b: 404-405).
The old activists of the guest worker associations sometimes re-
minded me of the Duc de Montmorency. Their dispositions were
so engrained that there was no other way to fight the battle than to
mobilize like-minded people and voice demands. Neither the new
techniques of public management nor the insights of public rela-
tions were of much interest to them. But righteous anger and
stubborn insistence on social justice had become archaic by the
year 2000. The balance of power between the left-wing minority
associations and the government had shifted decisively: the for-
mer had lost much of their base, and the rules of the game had
changed. The government no longer accommodated its counter-
forces and had reduced civil society associations to state subsidi-
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aries.11 These shifts marginalized secular and left-wing associa-
tions.
For critics of ethnic corporatism, this process was entirely nat-
ural: “the weak must falter,” some said in interviews. But such
judgments naturalize what is in fact the result of a reconfiguration
of power relations. It was self-evident before that “the weak”
should be mobilized, supported and included. But as discursive
power relations shifted, the government increasingly embraced a
specific form of liberalism dictating that only the most virtuous
citizens deserved support. Over the course of the 1990s, Amster-
dam moved towards what we might term “civil liberalism”. The
next chapter identifies the genesis, power relations and contradic-
tions of this governance figuration.
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9 Diversity management and the
gentrification of civil society:
Civil liberalism in Amsterdam
in the 1990s
A new discourse on ethnic diversity and its governance was in the
making while the institutions of ethnic corporatism were corrod-
ing. This discourse revolved around the notion of “diversity” and
was premised on the idea that a diverse population presents op-
portunities, not only problems. This chapter locates the origins of
this discourse and examines how it was institutionalized within
government policy. The popularity of the Diversity Discourse
needs to be understood in the context of the broader shift away
from ethnic corporatism towards civil liberalism. This chapter
identifies the main features of civil liberalism and examines the
power relations inherent in it. Although the Diversity Discourse
promised to value all citizens and to recognize their complex iden-
tities, in practice the government selectively incorporated partners
who could help to produce positive images of diversity and multi-
cultural society. However, growing anxieties over integration ag-
gravated the contradictions of civil liberalism and forced the
government to reconsider the ideas, notions and symbols of the
Diversity Discourse.
The formation of civil liberalism
Amsterdam in the 1990s was the mirror image of Amsterdam in
the 1980s. Unemployment was declining rapidly, the middle
classes were buying their way into gentrifying inner-city neighbor-
hoods, and social programs and repressive measures were ridding
the streets of drug users and the homeless. The squatting move-
ment had contracted, students were more interested in affirming
rather than challenging the status quo, and the presence of anar-
185
chist and far-left political parties within the city council had be-
come marginal. Amsterdam had become a much safer and a
much more boring place.
Like other cities, Amsterdam came to see itself as an actor in
the international marketplace (Hall & Hubbard 1998; Harvey
1989). Through city marketing campaigns and prestigious urban
development projects, the city advertised itself to international in-
vestors and tourists (see Hajer 1989; Oudenampsen 2007; Ter
Borg & Dijkink 1995). There was never an ideological break with
the idea that the government was responsibile for the welfare of
all its citizens, but administrators increasingly felt that this goal
could only be reached if it devoted more energy and resources to
attracting mobile capital. The population increasingly came to be
seen as a stock of human capital that the government needed to
valorize.
As Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore suggest, neoliberalization –
the process through which market mechanisms are brought to
bear upon society and the state – unfolds in two analytically dis-
tinct moments: one of destruction and one of creation (Peck &
Theodore 2002). We examined the moment of destruction in the
previous chapter, which showed that the complex of institutions
representing minority interests came to be seen as inefficient and
archaic. Although the backlash was not as brutal as it was else-
where (Leitner et al. 2007), the institutions that had been shaped
by the movements of the 1970s and 1980s were dissolved, merged
and transformed so that they could no longer do what they had
been established to do – that is, promote the collective emancipa-
tion of marginalized groups. These moments of destruction, how-
ever, were followed by moments of creation. The minorities policy
was not simply discontinued but transformed by a coalition that
fused neoliberal management discourses with post-colonial cri-
tiques of multiculturalism.
The genesis of civil liberalism
The erosion of the institutions of ethnic corporatism created win-
dows of opportunity for actors and discourses that had so far re-
mained on the margins of the policy field. As the left-wing asso-
ciations lost their privileged positions, alternative discourses could
move to the center. These alternative discourses were cultivated in
two vibrant discursive milieus. The first was located within the in-
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stitutions of high culture. Intellectuals with immigrant back-
grounds like Anil Ramdas and Stephen Sanders argued – in high-
brow magazines like De Groene, for the progressive broadcasting
corporation VPRO and on the stages of Amsterdam’s cultural cen-
ters – that the notion of collective emancipation was fundamen-
tally flawed. They argued that governments often reified and
essentialized the identities of ethnic communities. “Dutch multi-
culturalism is well intended, but it keeps immigrants in the strait-
jacket of their own group identity. Cultural institutions praise im-
migrants more because of their cultural background than because
of their talent” (Ramdas 1995). Drawing upon a rapidly expanding
international, post-multiculticulturalist literature (see Uitermark
et al. 2005), Ramdas and Sanders emphasized the dynamism and
multidimensionality of cultural identification: through critical re-
flection and creative reinterpretation, both immigrants and na-
tives could free themselves from the paternalistic and essentializ-
ing understandings in which they were caught. The portrayal of
immigrants as groups that were both needy and exotic implied,
for Sanders and Ramdas, a denial of their intellectual and artistic
capabilities.
A second discursive milieu was located in the state bureaucracy.
Professionals with immigrant backgrounds often experienced that
colleagues and superiors viewed them as ethnics rather than as
professionals (Essed 1991, 1997; Ghorasi 2006; Anderson 2004).
The association of ethnicity and deprivation built into the minor-
ities policy was an affront to a (very) small but (rapidly) growing
segment of immigrant professionals, who sought an alternative
policy discourse that would recognize their qualities as individuals
and professionals. In the policy field at large, the social scientist
Philomena Essed was among the most influential critics of the
minorities policy. She felt that policies should be directed at so-
ciety as a whole, not just at minorities. Diversity politics, in her
view, meant that the qualities and needs of all people are recog-
nized and acknowledged (Essed 1997: 8). Minorities should not
only be seen as target groups but as contributors: the elderly do
not just need care, they can also provide it; immigrants do not
only have to be acknowledged by party programs, they can also in-
form them, and so on. Diversity furthermore implies that govern-
ments and organizations have an eye for individuality and quality;
as container concepts are insufficient to capture the diversity of
experience, a more open and probing attitude is required. For Es-
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sed and many others who had developed their views on diversity
within anti-racist movements and drew inspiration from Ameri-
can business and academic literature,1 diversity policy was the
“next step” forward.
The discourses emerging from these two milieus, while very
different,2 worked together to undermine the legitimacy of the
minorities policy and to advance alternatives that better reflected
the positions of actors who were highly educated, had high in-
comes and prestigious jobs. These actors – while they may have
shared ethnic minority status with guest workers – did not need
the minorities policy or ethnic corporatism to defend their indi-
vidual interests. The minorities policy lumped them together with
people with much lower status. The critics thus had every interest
to challenge the rules of the game of ethnic corporatism: they
wanted to break out of the bounds of imposed ethnic solidarity so
that their value as individuals would be recognized.
Although the ideas of thinkers such as Essed, Sanders and
Ramdas were not formulated to support neoliberalism, they were
nevertheless easily adapted to fit with the neoliberal transforma-
tion of Amsterdam’s governance institutions. The Diversity Dis-
course made ideals affordable. Diversity no longer required con-
cessions in the form of specific institutions, quotas, affirmative
action or redistribution. It became a sign of prejudice rather than
solidarity to call attention to the structural exclusion of specific
groups, while the very idea of “groups” became suspect, as such
collective representations supposedly failed to recognize individ-
ual qualities. The role of government was now to facilitate individ-
ual contributions to society to the best of everyone’s abilities.
These new conceptions of diversity have discursive affinities to
neoliberalism in that they emphasize value, individuality and
management rather than rights, collectives and struggle. The
government of Amsterdam emerged as a leading client of the
growing number of consultancy firms that promoted this notion
of diversity and the practice of “diversity management”.
A definitive statement on diversity
Neoliberal reforms had been underway for some years when La-
bor Party leader and alderman of diversity, Jaap van der Aa, in-
itiated the reorganization of the institutions of ethnic corporatism.
Van der Aa published the first draft of a policy memorandum on
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diversity in 1998; in 1999 the council approved a definitive state-
ment, The Power of a Diverse City (De kracht van een diverse stad).
This document represents the consolidation of a “diversity policy”
(Gemeente Amsterdam 1999) that “does not only want to address
problems” but “aims to create opportunities” (ibid. 3). It argues
that “everybody” (original emphasis) can contribute to the city.
Everybody is entitled to participate, not as a member of a group
but as an individual with a multifaceted identity. Dichotomies are
rejected: “Amsterdammers [residents of Amsterdam] cannot be
captured in one group. They are part of many groups” (ibid. 8).
The minorities policy allegedly worked in the opposite direction
by imposing categories on people and by associating them with
negative stereotypes. The new aim was to break down the artificial
barriers between groups and to portray diversity in a positive
light.3
The perspective has thus been reversed. The glass is now half
full, not half empty. In the words of one senior civil servant: “you
use the positive power of the city and the diverse power of the city.
You see diversity as an asset for the city and not as an accumula-
tion of problems” (Joris Rijbroek cited in Van Steenbergen 2009:
27). To unleash the city’s latent powers, the Diversity Discourse
needs to be disseminated; employers and other private actors
need to be convinced that they stand to benefit from harnessing
diversity within their organizations. The resources of the diversity
policy were mainly invested in the municipality’s own bureau-
cracy (Gemeente Amsterdam 2000). In the first year, around 3
million guilders (1.4 million euros) were reserved for the Planning
and Control cycle to ensure that the municipality’s own working
environment was open to “diversity”. A further 1.2 million
guilders (0.5 million euros) were reserved for campaigns and
communicative infrastructures to promote the idea that diversity
is positive and to help governmental and non-governmental asso-
ciations manage and harness diversity. Here we witness the gov-
ernment’s first steps towards its new role, where the media is a
crucial policy domain, and communications is a central task. Di-
versity monitors, diversity gala nights, diversity websites, competi-
tions for diversity prizes, diversity billboard campaigns and diver-
sity television commercials – everything is mobilized to:
change attitudes, to create a fertile soil for the diversity policy and
to express the fact that the diversity policy is of the utmost impor-
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tance to the municipality. Attention will be mobilized through so-
called “highlights” in the diversity policy, or the moments that
products are delivered, and concrete results become visible. (Ge-
meente Amsterdam 2000: 4)
It appears that the positive representation of diversity is itself con-
sidered a “concrete result”: the “implementation plan” contains 20
measures that all have more to do with communication (and to a
lesser extent with management) than with implementation in the
conventional sense of the word. It is assumed that once compa-
nies, citizens and associations have been informed of the benefits
of diversity, they will invest to capitalize on its possibilities.
Taken together, these shifts are more than just incidental
changes. Between 1990 and 2000, the entire problem of ethnic
diversity was reconceived. As the previous chapter showed, the
government initially regarded the deprivation of minorities as the
central problem. The solution then was to administer welfare and
to open up decision-making channels to minority representatives.
In contrast, the Diversity Discourse that emerged in the 1990s
framed the emphasis on deprivation and collective representation
as part of the problem. Instead of associating particular groups
with problems, the government needed to actively encourage all
citizens to contribute to urban vitality and to reward civil initia-
tives that break down ethnic barriers. We can thus speak of civil
liberalism. It is liberal because the role of the government is not to
support weak actors or reduce inequalities (as under ethnic cor-
poratism) but to promote pride of place and to reward initiative. It
is civil because it explicitly strives for civil unity and calls upon
citizens to contribute to the city. How did the transformation
from ethnic corporatism to civil liberalism affect power relations
within governance figurations? Which actors bore the costs?
Which actors reaped the rewards?
Power relations under civil liberalism
The diversity policy initially recognized minority associations and
advisory councils as “partners”. But it was immediately clear that
these actors did not fit the image of diversity that the government
promoted. While the councils had functioned to represent their
communities and to connect their constituents to the state, the
190
Diversity Discourse devalued these roles. Immigrants were now
expected to contribute to society, not voice demands. The emer-
gence of the Diversity Discourse thus reinforced the ongoing
move away from minority representation.
Advisory institutions
After the collapse of corporatism, experts filled the void that
opened up. When the minority councils were abolished in 2003,
a new institution was created that only included experts: the advi-
sory council for diversity and integration (adviesraad voor diversiteit
en integratie; in short, diversity council). Tellingly, Paul Scheffer
and Anil Ramdas – both prominent critics of multiculturalism –
were hired alongside Samira Boucetta of the Moroccan women’s
association Oumnia to select candidates for this new council.
They agreed with each other and with civil servants that the new
council should have nothing to do with minority representation.
As one of them remarked in an interview:
The councils all had their puny particular interests: the Turks, the
Moroccans, … This advisory council is mixed and completely dif-
ferent. Most people agree that the councils did not work at all and
they know why. That is enough reason to now focus on concrete
policy issues.
Whereas minority associations were previously evaluated on their
ability to represent ethnic communities, candidates were now dis-
qualified if there was suspicion that they represented particular
(ethnic) interests. The new diversity council was made up of aca-
demics, consultants and other professionals. Since the govern-
ment – rather than constituents or civil society associations – se-
lected its members, it is not surprising that the council operates
within the parameters of the government’s discourse and is more
likely to suggest improvements than changes.
The “social cohesion think tanks” are the neighborhood equiva-
lents of the diversity council.4 The idea to use the networks of the
neighborhood’s higher-class groups was first advanced by a civil
servant in Amsterdam East. Members were only invited if they
had careers, contacts with policymakers and some affinity to inte-
gration issues. In practice, this meant that managers and consul-
tants staffed the think tanks. While they work as volunteers, the
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neighborhood council makes funds available to finance their in-
itiatives. The purported success of the think tank in Amsterdam
East encouraged other neighborhood councils to establish them,
and since 2007 the government of Amsterdam has been support-
ing the initiative. The think tanks differ from the advisory councils
and the minority associations in that they are not predisposed to-
wards criticism. To the best of my knowledge, up until 2009 none
of the think tanks ever criticized government policy. Many of the
participants, in fact, are policymakers, and since 2007 the think
tanks have included elected politicians from neighborhood coun-
cils. Box 9.1 gives the example of Zeeburg, though similar exam-
ples could be drawn from other neighbourhoods.
Box 9.1 Class conflict in Amsterdam’s civil society
The professionals who staff think tanks and the volunteers who
work for immigrant associations have opposing interests but
rarely come into conflict, as they live in different worlds. The
case of Zeeburg is illustrative. For civil society associations, the
most dramatic event of 2006 was the privatization of welfare
provisions. To cut spending, the council outsourced welfare
provisions to a consortium of organizations called Civic. Civic
immediately announced that it would close several neighbor-
hood centers where small associations and informal groups or-
ganized activities such as cooking clubs, dance lessons, tea
drinking sessions, information meetings and Dutch lessons.
Civic renamed the remaining neighborhood centers “produc-
tion houses” to remind their users that they had to generate
resources in order to continue using the space. Civic also ap-
pointed “civil society developers” to write subsidy requests to
increase what was now referred to as “output”.
Some civil society associations lost their accommodation. In
interviews and informal conversations, volunteers expressed
outrage and tremendous frustration. They had often worked
on a voluntary basis for decades and were now told that they
had to earn their space through project proposals and work
plans. These associations lost many of their constituents while
some ceased to exist. In the meantime, the neighborhood
council established a social cohesion think tank to function as
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a “broker of networks” to bring together “different forces that
will multiply and make efforts for our neighborhood” (Denk-
tank Sociale Cohesie Zeeburg 2009). The think tank focuses
on “success projects” such as a walking tour of the neighbor-
hood and a tree where people can hang cards with a “wish for
the neighborhood”.
The destruction of existing networks was never a concern. In
part this was because the think tank was told from the start that
it needed to focus on success projects. Most participants –
being consultants – deliver what is requested. Furthermore,
think tank members cannot be critical of policies because they
themselves are responsible for them. One of the members, in
fact, is the alderman who made the decision to privatize wel-
fare policies. The social cohesion think tank does not convene
in the “production centers” but in the fancy Studio K – a com-
plex of offices, movie theaters and a cafeteria established by the
(privatized) housing corporation Ymere to attract buyers of so-
cial housing units in an effort to spur gentrification (Ouden-
ampsen 2005). The think tank for social cohesion applauds the
efforts of the neighborhood council to make the neighborhood
more “mixed” through the displacement of poor households.
In the words of its chairman, Firoez Azarhoosh of Razar con-
sultancy, Zeeburg has “potential and also realizes it” (Denktank
Sociale Cohesie Zeeburg 2009).
Borrowing a term from urban studies (Lees et al. 2008; Smith
1996), we can say that Amsterdam has witnessed a gentrification
of representation: professionals with high levels of cultural capital,
strong networks and prestigious jobs have displaced representa-
tives of guest worker associations. The function of advisory insti-
tutions has also changed: while the old councils critically exam-
ined government policies and mobilized their constituents to
reinforce their demands, the new institutions focus on assisting
government initiatives and suggesting improvements to existing
policies. As the participants in these new advisory institutions
owe their positions (and often their income) to the government,
they are not disposed to criticism.
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Subsidy relationships
Changes in the rules of the game did not just undermine the posi-
tions of the established associations, they also created opportu-
nities for new actors. If we examine the subsidy fund through
which minority associations were traditionally financed (the SIP
Fund discussed in the previous chapter), we see that the benefici-
aries of the shift towards project subsidies were refugee associa-
tions and other associations catering to smaller groups of immi-
grants (see Table 8.1; Uitermark & Van Steenbergen 2006).
The major transformations, however, did not take place within
existing institutions but through the creation of new ones. Espe-
cially the assassination of Theo van Gogh occasioned an institu-
tional overhaul under the banner of the policy program “Wij Am-
sterdammers”. While the next chapter discusses these reforms in
detail, here I focus on one new fund for financing civil society
associations – the so-called Reporting Point for Good Ideas (MGI,
Meldpunt Goede Ideeën), established after the assassination of Theo
van Gogh to support initiatives for civil repair. MGI fits with civil
liberalism in that the government views itself as a facilitator of
initiatives that emerge spontaneously. MGI, according to the
government, “is based on the idea of empowerment: a govern-
ment cannot do everything itself and needs [to] stimulate citizens
to be creative and responsible” (Gemeente Amsterdam 2006: A1).
Unlike the SIP Fund inherited from the corporatist era, the MGI
is a pure expression of the government’s changed discourse. As
one senior civil servant explains:
Associations within SIP are most of the time not so relevant to the
municipality because they neither fit the image the municipality
wants to communicate nor meet the specific objectives of the pol-
icy. From the government’s perspective, the return on investment
(rendement) is low. That is why new subsidy ordinances (verorde-
ningen) are made and why new funds are found to support the
desired partners.
Table 9.1 shows which actors received funding through MGI.
More than half of the organizations are predominantly native
Dutch (14 out of 24).5 It is striking that most recipients are not
civil society associations or citizens, at least not in the conven-
tional sense. Seventeen of the 24 projects funded by MGI were
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carried out by commercial bureaus or by associations connected to
a commercial bureau. Actors in this category received 464,850 out
of 598,300 euros, or 77.7 per cent of the total.
Table 9.1 Subsidies awarded through the Municipality of Amsterdam’s “Reporting
Point for Good Ideas” (Meldpunt Goede Ideeën, MGI) in 2005





“Dander” and Anita van der Stap Multicultureel
Onderzoek & Projectmanagement
12,400 Dutch bureau school children
AAED Management and Mex-It 40,000 Varied bureau all Amsterdammers
Argan 20,000 Moroccan community
work
Muslim youth and elderly
Cultuurfabriek 30,000 Dutch bureau Immigrant/Muslim women
De Slinger 44,000 Dutch bureau all Amsterdammers
e74 Productions 10,000 Dutch bureau all Amsterdammers
Emcemo 15,000 Moroccan (ethnic)
association
Muslim community
Instituut Jeugd en Welzijn, VU 10,000 Varied bureau Muslim youth
Mex-It (ism Anne Frank Stichting) 50,000 Varied bureau Muslim youth
Montesori Scholen Gemeenschap and Bureau Rumour 30,000 Dutch bureau varied





Bureau Maatschappelijke Participatie and OMWaNA 40,000 Dutch bureau older immigrants
Stichting Amsterdam Ontmoet 35,000 Dutch bureau neighborhood residents
Stichting Audiovisuele Antropologie Nederland (SAVAN) 5,000 Dutch bureau Moroccan women
Stichting COC 15,700 Dutch community
work
Amsterdam homosexuals
Stichting Dialoog Visuele Communicatie 20,000 Varied other neighborhood residents
Stichting Inner Gold Academy 18,000 Dutch bureau Immigrant youth
Stichting Kleur in ’t Werk 14,450 Dutch bureau Moroccan women
Stichting Los Imagos (Feestcommissie) 10,000 Moroccan bureau Moroccan youth
Stichting Mijn Wereld is overal 39,000 Varied individual
citizens
Muslim youth
Stichting Samenbinding and Mex-It (Ramadan Festival) 50,000 Varied bureau all Amsterdammers
Stichting StadsSpelen 30,000 Dutch bureau all Amsterdammers
Frontmedia 36,000 Dutch bureau high school students
Stichting De Spreeksteen 18,750 Dutch unknown all Amsterdammers
Total 598,300
Source: archives of the Municipality of Amsterdam; author’s codes
Most of the projects, and especially the large ones, were proposed
by organizations that have turned civil engagement into a profes-
sion. In Table 9.1, one organization, Mex-It, appears no fewer than
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three times. This is no accident. Mex-It was established by the
founders of Towards A New Start (TANS), a national “network or-
ganization for highly-educated immigrants”,6 especially second-
generation Moroccans working or studying in sectors like bank-
ing, consultancy and information technology. TANS caters to a ra-
pidly growing group of students in higher vocational schools and
universities. While Moroccans are underrepresented in the educa-
tional system, the share of young adults entering higher education
increased by more than 250 per cent between 1997 and 2007
(O&S 2006: 61; O&S 2007: 6).7 This created fertile ground for
associations like TANS that organize master classes, leadership
summits, job markets and network events for ambitious students.
Just as the guest worker elite was inextricably linked to the
minorities policy, Mex-It and TANS are the prime representatives
and beneficiaries of the diversity policy: the municipality is an im-
portant client of Mex-It while both organizations aim to cast diver-
sity in a positive light. The associates of Mex-It and many of the
other companies funded through MGI are “civil consultants” –
committed individuals with visions of how to improve society and
a strongly developed business sense. They are ideal partners for
the government, as they cater to its specific needs (as expressed in
the conditions for attaining subsidies or contracts) and are conve-
nient to work with: easily reached by phone or email, capable of
financial administration and sensitive to the political climate. Be-
cause they operate as suppliers in a market, they provide exactly
what the municipality demands. The number of civil consultants
has exploded in recent years due to the incredible growth in the
market for state-funded projects to promote inter-ethnic contact,
to create civil unity, to research (the lack of) civil initiative, to im-
prove civil skills and to manage public relations. Civil consultants
are particularly well placed to profit from the shift away from the
mobilizing of communities towards image production evident
throughout society and especially in the field of integration poli-
tics (Uitermark & Duyvendak 2008a). The disposition of these
elites is shaped in booming economic sectors like public relations
and brand management; they converted capital from these fields
into civil power.
In sum, in the transition from ethnic corporatism to civil liber-
alism we see two related transformations in power relations. The
first is the gentrification of civil initiative: both within the advisory
councils and among the recipients of subsidies, actors with
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higher-class backgrounds are much more present than before.
Traditional civil society associations that bring people together in
pursuit of non-commercial objectives are virtually absent. The sec-
ond is that there is a stronger focus on images and management
at the expense of organization and mobilization. Organizations
like TANS and Mex-It profited from both transformations and
moved to the center of Amsterdam’s governance figuration.
Nevertheless, civil liberalism is not a stable governance figuration,
as it is plagued with contradictions that make it vulnerable to chal-
lenges.
The contradictions and erosion of civil liberalism
A fundamental contradiction of the Diversity Discourse is the hy-
pocrisy that diversity is valued while minorities are not. The con-
cern for minorities stems from the belief that they are problem-
atic: they do not mix enough, are not liberal enough, do not
understand Dutch norms and values, are too often involved in
crime, disproportionately drop out of school, are often unem-
ployed, and so on. While the Diversity Discourse can reframe
these problems as obstacles to be overcome and underused talents
to be valorized, it cannot capture them in appealing civil terms.
This is why the discourse became popular with managers and pol-
icymakers but did not disseminate in civil arenas. One expression
of this failure is the very weak presence of the Diversity Discourse
on the opinion pages (Table 3.1). While the discourse had consid-
erable presence when the debate was relatively calm and when
there was cross-party agreement on how integration should be
achieved, it virtually disappeared when the debate heated up.
This is especially apparent in debates on crime and Islam. Mor-
occan criminals and Islamic radicals have been so thoroughly stig-
matized in the media that the diversity policy’s emphasis on op-
portunities appears otherworldly. It is illustrative that the diversity
– literally – has no words for groups that other discourses refer to
as problem youths, street youths or Moroccan street terrorists.8 It
is ironic that while Scheffer was trying out his article on the “mul-
ticultural drama” on learned audiences, civil servants at city hall
were drafting The Power of a Diverse City. While the Diversity Dis-
course may have worked in government bureaucracies and com-
panies, it was without power in the discursive arenas where inte-
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gration politics increasingly played out, such as the media and
parliament.
In retrospect, it is easy to see that Scheffer’s article played upon
ideas and feelings that were latently present and that had long
been cultivated. Scheffer was right in suggesting that the delin-
quency of Moroccan young males had become proverbial. While
the diversity policy had formally ceased to distinguish between
ethnic communities, the media had not stopped reporting about
Moroccans robbing, abusing, insulting and annoying natives.
While the diversity policy stipulated that the government would
not single out ethnic groups, the media and anxious citizens
demanded that politicians address what had become widely recog-
nized as a Moroccan problem. Numerous politicians and adminis-
trators called upon Moroccans and Muslims to “take responsibil-
ity” for what were – in spite of the individualizing Diversity
Discourse – framed as the problems of specific ethnic or religious
groups.
Those groups, however, had been hollowed out organizationally.
Ethnic corporatism had been designed to deal with problems and
to organize communities, but civil liberalism was designed to ca-
ter to successful and cooperative individuals. The mechanisms for
the distribution of recognition and rewards under civil liberalism
favor actors who are willing and able to promote the government’s
discourse and exclude those who want to organize marginalized
groups or promote radical discourses (see also Essed 2008). Left-
wing minority associations and community workers fell by the
wayside and were replaced by advisors of various kinds (university
professors, management consultants, Labor party intellectuals).
But the latter did not have linkages to problem groups. The para-
dox is that the government wants to govern these problem groups
but does not want to cooperate with the civil actors that represent
and organize them. This paradox turned into an even more se-
rious problem for the Amsterdam government when 9/11 and
especially the assassination of Theo van Gogh threw fuel on the
fire of integration politics.
Conclusion
Far from realizing a utopia of multiplying civil initiatives, the in-
stitutions of civil liberalism concentrated power in the hands of a
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few privileged actors. Civil consultants were recognized and re-
warded as super citizens doing the government’s bidding –
namely, producing images and events that shed a positive light on
diversity. But civil consultants did not make policy; they were
merely its most valued mercenaries. It was, indeed, the govern-
ment that won the most power in the shift from ethnic corporat-
ism to civil liberalism. It gave itself the discretion to monitor the
activities of civil society associations and to discontinue subsidies
if they did not meet expectations. The government now dealt with
numeorus unconnected, small and uncritical associations instead
of a handful of connected, large and critical ones. Under ethnic
corporatism, institutional inertia and political contestation had cir-
cumscribed the power of the government to impose its vision; un-
der civil liberalism these constraints weakened. The balance of
power shifted in favor of the government and its elite partners.
This chapter showed that the government tried to use its central
position to promote what I have referred to as the Diversity Dis-
course. While its critics sometimes regarded the diversity policy as
a remnant of archaic multiculturalism, it in fact was a brand new
way of looking at the city: we no longer see groups, injustices, dis-
advantages or tensions but instead dynamic individuals, opportu-
nities and civil creativity. This discourse originated in the milieu
of managers, consultants and other professionals and found its
way straight into the self-conception and self-presentation of the
city. In the happy images of multicultural Amsterdam, there are
no signs of the social injustices that the minority associations
dominant under ethnic corporatism had so incessantly ad-
dressed.9 Associations that catered to deprived groups were
pushed out of what had now become a market. This also meant
that the government only maintained ties with elite actors. While
consultants and experts were seen as valuable citizens, they could
not create bridges to the problem youths that featured so promi-
nently in media reports and culturalist discourses. The govern-
ment thus increasingly felt pressured to transform its institutions
and reformulate its discourse to get a grip on these groups. The
next chapter examines how the government and its partners tried
to engineer these linkages and how they mobilized religion and
religious institutions in an effort to discipline unruly groups.
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10 Governing through Islam: Civil
differentialism in Amsterdam
after 9/11 and the assassination
of Theo van Gogh
As the integration debate heated up, political and policy attention
focused on immigrants and Muslims who were actually or poten-
tially criminal, radical, insulated or apathetic. All of these beha-
viors and attitudes were framed as expressions of a lack of civil
integration. Culturalists and pragmatists agreed on this point but
disagreed on how to solve the problem. Culturalists developed a
discourse demarcating the civil community along the lines of eth-
nic culture and emphasized the need for strict enforcement. Prag-
matists, too, felt that Muslims needed to integrate but considered
this a collective challenge, not an exclusive obligation for Mus-
lims. Amsterdam was the most important discursive milieu for
the development of Pragmatism. In the 2002 elections, Labor was
pushed out of office at the national level and in Rotterdam but
remained in power in Amsterdam, which thus functioned as a
showcase for Pragmatism.
The first section of this chapter examines how the Amsterdam
government developed its discourse and how it forged its strategy
for civil repair in the wake of 9/11 and the assassination of Theo
van Gogh. The second section shows that the government divided
the population into groups according to their putative civil virtue.
The result was the emergence of civil differentialism: a govern-
ance figuration that transcended many of the contradictions of
ethnic corporatism and civil liberalism but that also – as we shall
see in the third section – had contradictions of its own.
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The formation of civil differentialism
Part II showed that integration politics proliferated after 2000 and
exploded after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn. Actors that chal-
lenged the pragmatist approach towards integration were stronger
than ever before. They claimed that a series of incidents – with the
assassination of Van Gogh as apotheosis – demonstrated that the
Netherlands had been too soft on immigrants and that a more
demanding and repressive approach was needed. The heating up
of integration politics and the growing power of Culturalism
forced the Amsterdam government to abandon its optimistic Di-
versity Discourse. After the turn of the century, the government,
and especially the mayor, Job Cohen, developed a discourse that
revolved around the idea that all groups within society had an ob-
ligation to defend civil unity. According to this discourse, civil
unity is under severe threat. It is the task of administrators to
stand above and connect the different groups – an approach that
developed under the slogan “keeping things together” (de boel bij
elkaar houden).
Job Cohen declared directly upon his installment as mayor in
January 2001 that he wanted to “keep things together” in Amster-
dam. What defined Cohen’s position – and what made the appar-
ently mundane ambition to “keep things together” into a highly
controversial slogan – was his idea that Muslims are an integral
part of the civil community. On several high-profile occasions, he
argued for mutual understanding and expressed his concern over
the backlash against Muslims after 9/11. Whereas culturalists of-
ten portray Muslims or radical Muslims as intruders or violators,
Cohen argued that Islam and its institutions can in fact help to
integrate newcomers. Religious institutions are of special interest
to Cohen since he views them as the cement that can keep to-
gether a society threatened by disintegration:
We now deal with an inflow of people for whom religion often is
the most important guide in their lives. That raises the question
of acceptance by the secularized society that surrounds them and
their integration in this society. As far as this last issue is con-
cerned: religion is for them an easy and obvious entry when they
try to connect to the Netherlands. Where would they find that
connection if not initially with their compatriots? This is why the
integration of these immigrants in Dutch society may best be
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achieved via their religion. That is almost the only anchor they
have when they enter the Dutch society of the 21st century. (Co-
hen 2002: 14)
One important implication of Cohen’s position is that he values
associations and identities that were almost completely ignored
under ethnic corporatism and civil liberalism. Mosques and
Islamic associations played a role in neighborhood networks but
were virtually invisible to the city’s administration. Pragmatists in
general, and Cohen in particular, regarded Islamic associations
and Muslims as agents of civil repair. Such rituals of civil repair
entailed a reconfiguration of governance relations: they represent
a move away from individualized understandings of diversity and
towards a more group-oriented approach where actors willing to
act as Muslims come to play a vital role (even though others have
cast them in that role). How were these notions and ideas in-
scribed into policies and state institutions?
Institutionalizing civil differentiation
After the attacks of 9/11 and especially the assassination of Theo
van Gogh, the Diversity Discourse was abandoned in favor of a
discourse based on the idea that the commitment of moderate
Muslims is necessary to curb the threat posed by extremism. This
was the analysis that would inform subsequent institutional re-
forms and projects carried out under the banner of Wij Amster-
dammers (Us Amsterdammers, WA) – a policy program created
by top-level civil servants under the direct supervision of the alder-
men and the mayor. WA marked a definite break in that it did not
postulate that “diversity is positive”. It was instead based on the
premise that diversity can lead to explosive conflicts that need to
be suppressed before they materialize. Whereas before – under
the minorities policy – ethnic groups were the policy objects, now
the population was divided into different groups according to their
putative civil virtue. While the precise articulation of this principle
of differentiation varied between individual administrators and
policy documents, the continuum usually runs from those who
passionately defend liberal democracy to those who passionately
attack it. For example, the analysis of conflict potential made im-
mediately after the assassination of Van Gogh distinguished be-
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tween five groups of Muslims and five groups of non-Muslims.
Muslims were distinguished as follows:
1. Muslims who are completely integrated and experience no
tension whatsoever between Islam and modernism. They ac-
tively resist radical Islam;
2. Muslims who accept the rules of the game of liberal democ-
racy but who feel some tension between Islam and modern-
ism. They resist radical Islam;
3. Muslims who experience a strong tension between Islam and
modernism but who accept the Dutch constitutional order.
They are willing to provide information on Islamic extremism;
4. Muslims for whom political Islam provides a sense of identity
and meaning. They approve the assassination, passively reject
the Dutch constitutional order and passively support jihadis;
5. The jihadis who recruit and train, maintain breeding places,
spread hatred of the West and want to commit extremist acts.
This group consists of 150 people [an estimate by the Dutch
intelligence agency, JU] and strong networks around them.
The non-Muslim population, according to WA, consists of:
1. Those who accept Islam within the context of the Dutch liberal
state and actively strive for the recognition of Islam within the
Netherlands;
2. Those who accept Islam within the context of the Dutch liberal
state;
3. Those who have difficulty with Islam and exclude and stigma-
tize Muslims;
4. Those who want Islam to disappear from the Netherlands and
who exclude and stigmatize Muslims;
5. Those who (want to) undertake violent action against Mus-
lims.
(Gemeente Amsterdam 2004: 4-5)
These categorizations give an impression of the ways in which
administrators perceived the population of Amsterdam: there is a
rough division between Muslims and non-Muslims, and both
groups are internally differentiated according to their putative civil
virtue. These categorizations also suggest a line of action: the mu-
nicipality and its administrators should form coalitions with those
who embrace liberal democracy, wish to reduce polarization and
fight against extremism, and should isolate and prosecute those
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who seek to undermine liberal democracy. This approach, if suc-
cessful, would encourage people – so the government’s analysis
assumed – to climb up the civil hierarchy.1 Here I truncate the
five groups into three different groups of Muslims (liberal elites,
critical counter publics and defiant outsiders) and examine their
positions and power relations within the emergent governance
figuration.
Power relations under civil differentialism
Embracing the liberal elite
The growing importance of representations of Islam within inte-
gration politics triggered the emergence and consolidation of a
small group of Muslim leaders who were able to position them-
selves as a major force for civil repair. They included the figure-
heads promoting Civil Islam we encountered in Part II, such as
Ahmed Aboutaleb and Haci Karacaer. The Amsterdam govern-
ment supported the civilizing mission of these Muslim leaders in
various ways. Some of the attempts to support liberal Islam were
hardly controversial, while other attempts aroused strong opposi-
tion. Let me mention three large projects – one that materialized
and two that did not.
An example of a project that did not arouse much controversy
was the Ramadan festival. Mex-It conceived the festival after the
assassination of Theo van Gogh. According to the project descrip-
tion, it aims to correct “misunderstandings of Islam among non-
Muslims as well as Muslims” (project description, n.d.) and to
open up this Islamic holiday for the whole of Amsterdam. The
municipality contributed from several funds (including MGI), but
the firm was also very effective – much more effective than any
immigrant or Islamic association with an organized constituency
– in attracting funds from commercial sources, including banks,
consultancy agencies and privatized welfare agencies eager to im-
prove their positions in a market where more and more custo-
mers had Islamic backgrounds. The first edition of the Ramadan
festival in 2005 had a budget of around 300,000 euros, which
grew to half a million in 2006. In 2007, the festival was expanded
to 40 cities in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom.
Its 2007 edition in Amsterdam had dozens of sponsors and part-
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ners; well over fifty associations and organizations participated in
one way or another. Newspapers and television stations constantly
covered the activities. Although controversial issues were debated,
the focus was on mundane topics such as food, fashion and busi-
ness.
An example of a project that aroused much more controversy
was the plan to establish a debating center for Islamic culture,
Marhaba. The project was first conceived in an expert meeting or-
ganized by Job Cohen. The model for Marhaba was the Parisian
L’Institut du Monde Arabe. The municipality decided to give a “start
subsidy” of 26,000 euros for the center in January 2006. Haci
Karacaer was hired to initiate the project. The goal of the start sub-
sidy was to draw up plans in anticipation of further financing
from the national government. The working group consisted
mostly of individuals strongly in favor of encouraging Muslims to
become more self-critical and included Ahmed Marcouch, Haci
Karacaer and Mohammed Baba of Mex-It.2 Referring to Tariq Ra-
madan, the group argued that it is both a necessity and a moral
duty for “European Muslims ... to break out of the isolation that is
imposed upon them, to make connections with the ‘Western cul-
tural universe’ and to confront this with their own principles”
(Marhaba 2006: 7). To achieve this, the center sought to attract
diverse audiences, especially higher-educated youth with an inter-
est in religious issues and current affairs. On the basis of the
working plan, Marhaba received an additional 468,000 euros of
subsidy in 2006. According to the plans in 2006, Marhaba was to
receive a structural subsidy of 2 million euros and an incidental
subsidy of several millions for accommodation.3 But while Marha-
ba was in the process of development, criticism intensified. Na-
tional as well as local politicians argued that Marhaba breached
the separation between church and state. In the end, the opposi-
tion was so strong that the municipality abandoned the project.
A third and possibly the most controversial example was the
Wester Mosque in the Amsterdam neighborhood of De Baarsjes.
The media drama began in the early 1990s when the Turkish
mosque federation Milli Gorus and the neighborhood council of
De Baarsjes entered into a conflict over the construction of the
mosque. The neighborhood council and a group of local residents
protested against its size and the height of the minaret but Milli
Gorus insisted it had the right to build anyway. After some years
of stalemate, Milli Gorus pushed forward a leadership that pro-
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mised the mosque would become a vehicle for emancipation
rather than a cultural bastion. The new leadership – with Haci
Karacaer as the charismatic figurehead – manifested itself every-
where and spoke out against conservative and fundamentalist ten-
dencies. The mosque association participated in the commemora-
tions of the Second World War and unequivocally denounced the
attacks of 9/11. The apotheosis was perhaps Karacaer’s perfor-
mance at the gay monument where he declared he would struggle
for the rights of other minorities even if that would bring him into
conflict with his own community. Milli Gorus had been trans-
formed – in media representations – from a hyper-conservative
association into a liberal vanguard of Dutch Muslimhood. A hous-
ing corporation now agreed to a joint venture to construct homes
on a plot adjacent to the mosque; the neighborhood council
agreed to fully support the project. But all this changed in 2006.
According to media sources, “conservative hardliners” sponsored
by the German headquarters of Milli Gorus had engineered a
“coup” against the “liberals” sponsored by the Amsterdam muni-
cipality (e.g. Beusekamp 2006). The downfall of the liberal leaders
robbed pragmatists of what had been their most epic civil story.
Cohen’s government suffered a direct blow when it crystallized
that it had covertly given an indirect subsidy of 2 million euros for
the construction of the mosque complex. While the liberal leader-
ship had told the government that such a subsidy was necessary to
prevent a conservative takeover, in yet another media revelation it
became apparent that one of the leaders had agreed to hand over
ownership of the mosque to the federation’s headquarters as soon
as the construction was completed. The government and the hous-
ing corporation withdrew their support. The plot where the Wes-
ter Mosque was to be erected was still vacant in 2011.
These examples show that the government intervened directly
in civil society to strengthen the power of liberal Islam. The idea
of a level playing field in which associations have to compete for
resources (central to civil liberalism) was completely abandoned.
The amounts involved were enormous compared to the sums allo-
cated through competitive bidding. The government sought to
strengthen the position of Muslims who were critical of their own
(ethnic and religious) communities and who expressed support
for the Dutch civil community. So strong was this desire that the
government attempted to rewrite the rules of the game by giving
itself the discretion to subsidize religious discourse.4
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Accommodating critical Muslims
A large segment of the Muslim population shows strong civil en-
gagement but is much more critical of Dutch society than the lib-
eral Muslim elite. For the sake of convenience, I refer to this seg-
ment as “critical Muslims”, though it should be clear that this
category lumps together actors as diverse as illiterate first-genera-
tion mosque representatives who vaguely sense that politicians are
against Islam and second-generation intellectuals who eloquently
counter Islamophobia in newspapers and on television. Under ci-
vil differentialism, these critical Muslims did not receive nearly as
much recognition and resources as the liberal Muslim elite.
Nevertheless, there were attempts to incorporate them into gov-
ernance networks. Through the support of projects enticing Mus-
lims to enter into debate, governments hoped to reduce the power
of radical discourses.
What kinds of projects received support? One example is Mus-
lim Youth Amsterdam (Moslimjongeren Amsterdam, MJA), which
brought together youths from different ethnic backgrounds and
mosques. While the city government had previously shown scant
interest in mosques (see previous chapters), this changed after
9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh. The alderman for
diversity, Ahmed Aboutaleb, decided that an association was
needed after research found that mosques, and especially Moroc-
can mosques, developed few civil initiatives. Aboutaleb granted
the consultancy firms that had carried out the research the assign-
ment to form the association. Its mission was to improve Islam’s
image and to educate the next generation of mosque administra-
tors. The group included such diverse people as television presen-
ter and Mex-It freelancer Jihad Alariachi and a young volunteer
from the orthodox El Tawheed Mosque. MJA was just one of sev-
eral associations of young Muslims incorporated into governance
networks. Another example was JUMMAO, a group originally
brought together by Ahmed Marcouch to participate in a (govern-
ment-funded) weekend of training by an institute for applied re-
search at the Vrije Universiteit. Islam Aangenaam (Pleasant Islam)
was another association of this kind. There was also the National
Muslim Youth Organization (Landelijke Moslimjongerenorganisaties,
LMJO), a national collective of youth associations established by
people who had left the group that would eventually become JUM-
MAO. These were just several of the associations that actually ma-
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terialized which I encountered in my research. The number of in-
itiatives was probably much higher and the number of ideas for
associations and projects countless.
Cultural centers like Mozaïek and Argan functioned as the dis-
cursive milieu in which these initiatives emerged. Unlike the
prestigious cultural centers in the canal district (such as De Balie,
Rode Hoed and Felix Meritis), Mozaïek and Argan attracted large
numbers of people from groups that are notoriously difficult for
the media and administrators to reach, such as orthodox Muslims
and eloquent Moroccan youths. In effect, these discursive milieus
functioned as counter publics (Fraser 1991) where alternative inte-
gration discourses were generated and where civil talents were
cultivated (Box 10.1).
These associations, venues and events offered excellent entry
points for journalists in search of “Muslim youth”, political parties
in search of new talent and companies looking for new hires. The
most engaged Muslim and Moroccan youths and organic intellec-
tuals ended up in television shows or news reports as “Moroccan
youth” or “Muslim”. The fact that these settings were constantly in
the spotlight affected how they functioned. In one sense, the
media coverage was a crucial part of the attraction. Some people
were “discovered” there. One volunteer told me in an informal
conversation:
Abdel is now something like a media star. He is just sixteen years
old and the perfect Moroccan. Gentle and engaged. He has a
group around him who often come to these debates. They are
part of the next generation. They all look up to Mohamed and
Jamal and see how far you can get. (approximation; talk not re-
corded)
The presence of important politicians and television cameras cer-
tainly adds to the prominence of a debate. The preference for
high-profile debates, however, also limited their role as milieus
for civil inculcation. Although volunteers and professionals often
intended to engage in long-term efforts to build institutional net-
works, such ambitions were easily forgotten when the next specta-
cular event took place. Associations in this volatile environment
functioned less as civil incubators than as portals for civil talent.
Some of the younger Moroccan and Muslim talents I spoke to self-
consciously cultivated their skills and networks to be involved in
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party politics, to represent one or the other association or to work
in the integration field. They also experienced major frustrations
as they discovered that rejection of their own communities was a
prerequisite for success outside of this particular discursive
milieu. Especially Marcouch’s transformation (from a representa-
tive of a Moroccan mosque federation to a critic of his own com-
munity, see below) irritated many of his former followers.
Box 10.1 A debate on “Islam and the Media” in the
Argan youth center (2 December 2005)
The chair for tonight was Martijn de Greve, a professional tele-
vision host and conference chair. The panelists:
1. Mohamed Jabri, a columnist for the internet website El-Qa-
lem. The website had the slogan “to strive with the pen”
and gave space to polemical Muslim commentators (like
Jabri) and orthodox Muslims who discussed religious af-
fairs;
2. Frank Williams, director of the Dutch Muslim broadcasting
station (NMO);
3. Farhad Golyardi, editor of the monthly Eutopia that gives a
stage to progressive intellectuals to comment on multicul-
tural society and international relations;
4. Fouad Laroui, professor of literature at the Vrije Universi-
teit, a Muslim and a critic of fundamentalist Islam;
5. Justus Uitermark, PhD student at the Amsterdam School
for Social Research, who had just been in the news with a
joint research project that, according to journalists, showed
that the media had written with “nuance” and did not “in-
stigate” the public after the assassination of Theo van
Gogh.
Although I had discussed integration issues in public debates,
expert meetings and seminars, this was the very first time I
had to speak in front of a room that had a large share of vocal
minority youths. Throughout the debate, this created a sort of
pressure that I had never felt before. Certain mistakes that
would be overlooked or ignored by other audiences now drew
immediate attention. For instance, when I made a remark
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about an “imam”, I was corrected by Jabri to the amusement of
many in the audience; I should have said “an Islamic scholar”.
One example to illustrate the dynamics of power in this par-
ticular setting: at one point, a participant in the audience
laughed at the idea that Osama bin Laden was behind the at-
tacks of 9/11 – “the Jews” did that. In a righteous fury he added
that the Quran dictated that no harm shall be done to those
who are peaceful to Islam but that violence was a natural re-
sponse to the atrocities committed against Muslims. A loud ap-
plause followed. One native Dutch woman said she had be-
come afraid of such rhetoric and openly asked if she, as a
lesbian, had anything to fear. An older Muslim woman then
reprimanded her for doubting the good intentions of the man
who had accused the Jews and then raised her hands to the sky
and called out “Allah Akhbar” a few times. After these out-
bursts a young man called upon “his brother” to be calm and
explained in the most dignified manner what he considered
proper Islamic conduct.
When I was asked in a later part of the debate to comment
on the coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict, I remarked that
I had no expertise on that topic but that I was shocked by the
accusations against Jews and especially by the applause. Jabri
accused me of avoiding the topic. Again: applause. Then Frank
Williams put an arm around me and said that my feelings
should be respected. At the end of the debate, the lesbian went
over to the Jew-accuser and, after a short exchange of words,
they hugged each other. Once more: applause.
After the debate, several people came to me to explain that
the Jew-accuser had been too bold but that there really was evi-
dence suggesting that the official reading of 9/11 was wrong.
Other people told me that they appreciated my contribution,
but that I should not “get so emotional”. We see here a com-
plete inversion of the assumptions and sensitivities inherent
in mainstream discourse production. Normally, Muslims “get
emotional” and cannot take it when their root assumptions are
questioned. Now I experienced these expressions of frustration
bred by discursive subordination.
The organizers who had invited me to the debate often fea-
tured on television as “youth workers” or as “Moroccan youth”.
The local TV channel AT5 invited the Jew-accuser to speak on
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Islam in a discussion program. I also learned that the Labor
Party had scouted two of the female organizers as potential pol-
iticians. These are just a few illustrations of Argan’s brokerage
role; it had transformed from a center for marginalized youths
into a vibrant discursive milieu embedded in governance and
media networks. This is partly due to funding from the govern-
ment. Argan’s community work is structurally funded and for
this particular debate the center received a project subsidy
from MGI (see Chapter 9).
Disciplining defiant Muslims
Precisely because participation in government-supported associa-
tions and debates requires a measure of civil engagement, these
events did not attract the problem groups that fill the media and
policy documents: isolated women, dropouts, delinquent youths
and (potential) extremists. To get a grip on these groups, the Am-
sterdam government, as other governments, intensified its invest-
ments in repressive and disciplinary institutions: more discretion
and personnel for the police, more surveillance cameras, more
state funds and discretion for security personnel, stricter enforce-
ment of the legal requirement to attend school, and so on. But
there was also a civil dimension to this offensive. Social isolation,
poor school performance, criminality, etc. were redefined under
civil differentialism as resulting from a lack of civil engagement.
The solution was therefore to stimulate “participation”. To civilize
the most defiant groups, the government increasingly called upon
Islam, Islamic authorities and Islamic associations. This develop-
ment, which took place throughout Amsterdam, reached its ze-
nith in the neighborhood of Slotervaart, a post-war neighborhood
on the outskirts of Amsterdam that became a laboratory for new
governance institutions. This is where Van Gogh’s assassin lived.
Media scrutiny and political interest further intensified when
Ahmed Marcouch, another prominent proponent of Civil Islam,
became chair of the neighborhood council in 2006 – the first
Moroccan to achieve this position in the Netherlands.
In Slotervaart, religion is used to convince target groups that
they need to cooperate. The policy document where the council
lays out its strategy against radicalization states that:
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… the emphasis will be on the opportunities offered by religion
and culture in upbringing, strengthening one’s own identity and
developing a positive self-image. Next to that, there will be a
search for points of contact (aanknopingspunten) in religion and
culture for creating a bridge to Dutch society. Dichotomous
worldviews will be countered with religious prescriptions. This
offers the opportunity to convince parents that their wish to give
their children an Islamic identity does not entail a clash with
Dutch norms and values. (Stadsdeel Slotervaart 2007: 8-9)
In the understanding of Slotervaart, delinquents and radicals
should be confronted by authorities who demonstrate to these pu-
tative Muslims that their behavior is not in accordance with prop-
er Islamic conduct. These policies reconfigured the relationship of
the government to both parents and civil society associations.
One of the goals of the programs for parents was to bring their
religious conceptions in sync with what educational and other so-
cial environments require. In her evaluation of a course for Mor-
occan parents offered as part of the anti-radicalization policy,
Amy-Jane Gielen (2008) shows that religious precepts were used
to delegimitize cultural beliefs or practices that inhibit success in
Dutch society. In the course, for instance, a group of (less-edu-
cated) mothers discussed whether it is permissible to hit a child.
Some complained that child protection laws are too strict and that
Dutch society does not allow them to discipline their children.
Others suggested that Islam requires parents to adopt a gentle ap-
proach and expressly forbids hitting children. They felt that their
ethnic culture holds women back and that greater knowledge of
Islam would lead to a revaluation of the mother’s role. As one of
them put it: “I do not find traditions and being Moroccan very
important because I think we mostly have bad traditions. The fact
is that a girl is kept down while a boy is allowed to do anything he
likes. Islam is against this” (cited in Gielen 2008: 15). This quote
is no exception. The discourse that I refer to as Civil Islam is not
only popular among civil elites but can also count on strong sup-
port from lower-class Muslim women, even if they have hardly any
contact with the native Dutch (Van Tilborgh 2006).5
The growing importance and frequency of state interventions in
households formed to some extent an alternative to support for
civil society associations, which lost their status as intermediaries
between the state and residents. Especially secular neighborhood
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associations lost their subsidies and accommodations (see Box
7.1). But associations that catered to groups close to potential radi-
cals or delinquents retained or consolidated their roles as interme-
diaries. For instance, participants in courses for child-rearing were
now recruited through Islamic associations. The government or-
ganized debates within mosques and provided guidance to mos-
ques wishing to present themselves in the media. The govern-
ment also supported mosques to organize dialogues among their
constituents and with other religions in an effort to open up to the
younger generation and Dutch society.
Contradictions of civil differentialism
Compared to civil liberalism, civil differentialism has two major
strengths. First, by promising to discipline and punish those
groups that threaten or dishonor the civil community, it offered
an answer to the anxieties expressed most vocally (but not exclu-
sively) by culturalists. Second, civil differentialism incorporated –
through discourses of Civil Islam and disciplinary interventions –
groups that had been ignored under civil liberalism. But civil dif-
ferentialism also had its contradictions.
First, the relationship between the Labor Party and Muslims is
under the constant scrutiny of other political parties, the media
and even the party’s own supporters. Any sign that it will use its
power in government to support Islam can be seized upon, creat-
ing a constant threat of scandals. The subsidies for Marhaba and
the indirect subsidy to the Wester Mosque are good examples of
attempts to support liberal Islam that generated overwhelming op-
position. Many Muslims, too, distrust the government when it
comes to religion. Even some of my respondents involved in
state-sponsored initiatives having to do with Islam deeply resented
the attempts to reform religion. More orthodox Muslims actively
searched for interpretations of Islam that did not have the stamp
of state approval, as they deeply mistrusted the proverbial “subsidy
Muslims” (“with or without a beard”, as one of my orthodox re-
spondents said). The subsidizing of liberal Islam – even the im-
pression that the government wants Muslims to believe in liberal
Islam – can have results opposite from what the government in-
tended.
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Second, the government was so heavily involved in shaping civil
society that it annihilated its autonomy. On the one hand, some
civil initiatives or associations were funded and accommodated to
the extent that they were transformed into state subsidiaries. On
the other hand, groups and people regarded as possible threats
were subjected to intense disciplinary interventions. Either way,
the government tried to reward civil discourses and to inculcate
civil dispositions through direct intervention. Civil society associa-
tions following their own agendas were marginalized within gov-
ernance figurations. This was especially detrimental to groups
that neither qualified as super citizens nor as potential threats to
civil order. Neighborhood associations and associations pursuing
specific interests did not benefit from the surge of support for civil
initiatives at all.
Third, the differential incorporation of different types of actors
bred resentment among subordinated actors, thereby undermin-
ing the capacity of associations to cooperate. Those who managed
to live up to the expectations of core groups sooner or later hurt
the sensitivities of co-ethnics or fellow believers. This was not due
to any tactical incompetence on their part, but to another impera-
tive of the civil sphere: in order to find acceptance among core
groups, civil actors with minority backgrounds have to transform
their stigma into marks of distinction, and can only do so by dis-
sociating themselves from stigmatized groups. Aboutaleb’s speech
in the Al-Kabir Mosque (see Chapter 6) is one example of a perfor-
mance that simultaneously boosted his status among media audi-
ences and degraded his direct audience.
Conclusion
The intense and often negative focus on Islam may further mar-
ginalize Muslims and lead to social disintegration. This, at least, is
what many people fear. But this fear triggered counterforces: this
chapter showed that as integration politics heated up, more time,
energy and resources were devoted to the discursive and institu-
tional incorporation of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, who
were increasingly redefined as Muslims. The controversies over
Islam were thus divisive in some ways but crucial for bringing
together actors that were previously apart. The commitment to Ci-
vil Islam bound together a coalition stretching from progressive
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politicians like Cohen to orthodox Muslims opposing terrorism.
Islam thus fused into governance and was mobilized to extend
the influence of the government.
The government liaised at various levels with civil society, even
creating new civil society associations: it invested heavily in actors
promoting liberal Islam, sponsored actors providing critical or
orthodox alternatives to radical Islam, and created disciplinary in-
stitutions to civilize groups that supposedly lacked civil engage-
ment. Interestingly, at a time when Muslims were increasingly
framed as a problem group, the Amsterdam government and its
partners used Islam to undertake and legitimize civilizing offen-
sives. Islamic precepts were appropriated to counter uncivil beha-
viors and beliefs associated (rightly or wrongly) with ethnicity. In
short, we can observe how discourses of Civil Islam fused into,
and legitimized, institutions that differentiate between groups ac-
cording to their civil virtue. Resources and recognition were dis-
tributed along these same lines: liberal Muslims close to the Labor
party leadership received a great deal of support, critical Muslims
further removed from the core could count on attention and lim-
ited resources, defiant or marginalized Muslims were the targets
rather than the subjects of policies. Although the emerging gov-
ernance figuration was much better designed to deal with incivili-
ties than civil liberalism, it also suffered from internal contradic-
tions. At the heart of these contradictions was the annihilation of
civil society’s autonomy. The government intervened directly into
power relations in civil society and subjugated civil initiatives to its
own policy program, incorporating minority associations in a rela-
tion of subordination. The case of Rotterdam provides an interest-
ing counter-example.
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The recent history of integration politics in Rotterdam is at least as
turbulent as that of Amsterdam. In 2002, Pim Fortuyn achieved
his first great electoral victory in his hometown of Rotterdam. For-
tuyn was virulently opposed to what he saw as the Islamization of
the Netherlands (see Chapter 5). After his death, the council mem-
bers and aldermen of his party, Leefbaar Rotterdam, continued
Fortuyn’s promotion of a culturalist discourse. Leefbaar Rotter-
dam was extremely critical of minorities and Muslims but, con-
trary to what we might expect, minority and Islamic associations
flourished in this period. Why? The key to answering this ques-
tion is the specific governance figuration that emerged in Rotter-
dam in the 1980s, one that has since remained stable and which I
refer to as civil corporatism. The first section of this chapter exam-
ines civil corporatism’s genesis and evolution; the second shows
how civil corporatism produced a balance of power between differ-
ent types of actors. The third section then identifies three contra-
dictions that plague civil corporatism. The fourth section con-
cludes that Rotterdam’s governance figuration may well have
increased the power of minority associations.
The formation of civil corporatism
The progressive movements of the 1970s and 1980s had a strong
presence in Rotterdam but were not nearly as powerful as in Am-
sterdam. Those who were attracted to the feminist, gay, squatting
and othermovements gravitated to Amsterdamwith its educational
institutions, intellectual elites and cultural provisions. Rotterdam
was and remains more of a working class city. It proved a fertile
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environment for various extreme-right parties and – in contrast to
Amsterdam – there were a number of occasions where nativemobs
assaulted guest workers. The largest outbursts of violence against
immigrants in the Netherlands occurred in Rotterdam South in
1972. Pensions were set alight and guest workers assaulted. The
riots that ensued lasted for days, as native youths threw up barri-
cades and fought the police (Dekker & Senstius 2001).
Immigrants received help from community workers and sup-
port groups, though these were not as large or as politicized as in
Amsterdam. One consequence was that, in contrast to Amsterdam,
the Welfare Foundation for Foreign Workers in Rotterdam did not
collapse under the pressure of internal conflicts. Nevertheless,
some guest worker associations grew increasingly dissatisfied over
the course of the 1970s with the alleged paternalism of native pro-
fessionals and established, with the support of the government, the
Platform for Foreigners in Rijnmond (Platform Buitenlanders Rijn-
mond, PBR) in 1981. Political refugees who had escaped repression
in Greece, Spain, Morocco and Turkey were among the most active
members and turned PBR into a bulwark for left-wing minority
associations. The platform organized protests against budget cuts
for disability pensions, restrictions on immigration, discriminatory
housing policies and many other policies that infringed on the
rights of lower-income groups and workers. Like the left-wing asso-
ciations in Amsterdam, the associations united in PBR refused to
cooperate with conservative or Islamic associations.
PBR thus had a similar political profile to the advisory councils
in Amsterdam (it was dominated by political refugees and left-
wing associations) but – and this is crucially important for under-
standing the trajectory of Rotterdam’s governance figuration – it
was not recognized as the official representative of Rotterdam’s
minorities. The Rotterdam government recognized PBR as a legit-
imate partner but also argued that it only represented a sub-sec-
tion of the minority population. To reach the more conservative
Muslims immigrants, the Foundation Platform Islamic Associa-
tions Rijnmond (Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijn-
mond, SPIOR) was established in 1988 on the initiative of the city
council. The government and the mosque associations initially
came together to discuss practical issues and to streamline the
policy process for establishing mosques (Maussen 2006). The
government, however, encouraged all existing mosques to partici-
pate in the new organization, not just the associations that dealt
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with building applications or other policy technicalities. The more
entrepreneurial mosques were willing to help the government
reach this objective and actively tried to foster linkages to mosque
associations that had previously been isolated.
I refer to PBR and SPIOR as “civil corporations”: non-profit or-
ganizations that receive structural subsidies from the local govern-
ment to support, unite and mobilize a large number of civil so-
ciety associations. They do not provide direct material support but
assist associations in managing their organizations, establishing
linkages to other associations and dealing with the government.
They also help to attract funds from neighborhood governments,
the municipal government and charities. Member associations
elect the board members of the civil corporations, thereby exerting
control over their policies. The civil corporations, in short, are in
the bosom of the state but nevertheless independent of it.
Both PBR and SPIOR have expanded their constituencies over
the years. Although it still prides itself as a progressive and secular
organization, PBR has lost its radical edge and no longer has prin-
cipled objections to working with Islamic or other religious associa-
tions. While conservative associations still dominate SPIOR, the
civil corporation over the years has increasingly served associations
not directly connected to mosques. PBR had 38 member associa-
tions in 2006 and provided commissioned support to 42 non-
member associations (PBR 2007). It had a staff of 12 salaried (full-
time and part-time) workers and a board of nine elected volunteers.
SPIOR had 40 member associations – i.e. officially affiliated civil
society associations – in 2007 (SPIOR 2007). All member associa-
tions of SPIOR have a representative on the board that supervises
the organization and its staff of nine full-time professionals. Both
civil corporations serve as intermediaries between the government
and target groups. When a government department has a project
targeting groups represented by PBR or SPIOR, it can reach them
through these civil corporations; PBR and SPIOR bring policy to
their constituents, as it were. The civil corporations also train their
member associations in public relations, management and admin-
istration so that they can play a role in governance networks. For
Turkish and Moroccan associations, PBR and SPIOR are the most
relevant organizations. Data on subsidies indicate that their posi-
tion consolidated in the years prior to this research. In 1998,
SPIOR and PBR received annual subsidies of 157,685 euros and
146,235 euros respectively. By 2006, both had doubled their annual
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subsidies to 317,645 euros and 287,920 euros respectively (Van
Steenbergen 2009: 59). As civil corporations have secure incomes,
they can invest time and energy into attaining funds for incidental
or periodical activities. In addition to subsidies from themunicipal-
ity, they receive incidental subsidies from a range of sources, in-
cluding the central government and charities. These civil corpora-
tions form the central axes of a figuration in which there is a
balance between different types of civil actors.
Table 11.1 Structural subsidies of the Municipality of Rotterdam to
various civil corporations in 2005 (euros)
PBR (Platform for Foreigners) 285.210
SPIOR (Muslims) 314.656
Wah Fook Wui (Chinese) 140.306
ISWS (Surinamese) 24.447
AVANCO (Cape Verdians) 363.916
RADAR (Anti-racism) 385.833
SWA (Antillean) 567.604
De Meeuw (children) 113.733
Train (Surinamese) 178.572
Refugee Work Rijnmond 399.662
Foundation for Refugee Organizations Rijnmond 484.395
PSWR (Surinamese) 769.562
Total 4.027.896
Source: Municipality of Rotterdam
While SPIOR and PBR are most relevant for Turkish and Moroc-
can associations, Rotterdam has many more civil corporations for
immigrants and other population groups (Table 11.1). There is a
civil corporation for Antillean and Cape Verdian associations, a
federation for refugees, and so on. Other corporations cater to wo-
men or residents. Since civil corporations are the cornerstone of
Rotterdam’s governance figuration, I refer to the figuration as civil
corporatism. But how can we explain the figuration’s remarkable
stability? The next section suggests that civil corporations help to
create balances of power among different civil actors and function
as buffers between the government and civil society.
220
Power relations under civil corporatism
Unlike the government of Amsterdam, the Rotterdam govern-
ment provided structural subsidies to organizations from a budget
specifically earmarked for minority integration.1 While recipients
of structural subsidies have to adjust to changing circumstances
and demonstrate their relevance, they do not constantly have to
prove their worth in competition with other civil actors. In this
sense, the civil corporations had similar relationships to the
government as the advisory councils in Amsterdam but, in con-
trast to their counterparts, they did not lose power over time. This
section explores the balance of power between competing and co-
operating civil actors, looking at the relations between large and
small associations, between progressives and conservatives, and
between the government and civil society.
Balance between large and small actors
We saw that in Amsterdam, resources and recognition were con-
centrated on a few actors of a specific type. This is not the case for
Rotterdam, where competition is more benign. To see how com-
petition plays out, I focus on the allocation of the Rotterdam Mee
fund (the With Rotterdam fund, RM). Rotterdam Mee was estab-
lished after the assassination of Theo van Gogh to support civil
initiatives that contribute to civil integration. Table 11.2 shows the
allocation of resources per type of civil actor. The bulk of the funds
was directed at civil corporations and civil society associations.
PBR received the most funding with 34,000 euros; it organized
17 meetings in various neighborhood centers or in the offices of
member associations. The target groups varied: sometimes the
meetings aimed to bring together as many different groups as
possible; at other times they targeted specific groups (such as the
members of a Turkish-Islamic women’s association).
Civil society associations received 44.3 per cent of the total
amount. The seven Moroccan associations included four neigh-
borhood associations, two general Moroccan associations and a
women’s association. They organized events for their constituents
such as debates, information meetings and social gatherings. De-
bates – on issues like the position of women, the stigmatization of
Moroccans and the challenges of child-rearing – were by far the
largest category (65 per cent of meetings, n = 28). The Turkish
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associations were likewise diverse, including two women’s asso-
ciations, two Islamic associations and an association for Alevis.
Table 11.2 Recipients of the Rotterdam Mee subsidy fund for civil
initiatives
Type of organization Number of associations Subsidy amount (euros) % of total subsidy
Civil corporation 6 68,000 22.8
Community work 9 48,000 16.1
Civil consultant 3 22,000 7.4
Immigrant association
Turkish 5 24,000 8.1
Moroccan 7 58,000 19.5
Mixed 4 10,000 3.4
Other ethnicities 16 40,000 13.4
Other types 14 28,000 9.4
Total 64 298,000 100
Source: archives Municipality of Rotterdam, data processed by author
The figures show that civil society associations catering to ethni-
cally specific and typically lower-class constituents could claim
state resources. They were not marginalized by more professional
or larger associations, as was the case in Amsterdam. The civil
corporations in fact helped these smaller associations to tap re-
sources. Subsidy applications typically demand administrative
competence and inside information – precisely what these civil
corporations provide to their member civil society associations.
We thus see that the big players in the governance figuration did
not push out the smaller players but instead helped them to orga-
nize activities and to reap the rewards of incorporation into gov-
ernance networks. Member associations within SPIOR and PBR
received a total of 50,000 euros.2
These results indicate that Rotterdam’s non-profit associations
were capable of competing with professional associations. This
was sometimes due to their having become quasi-professional as-
sociations themselves, and sometimes due to the support they re-
ceived from professional associations (like civil corporations). As-
sociations catering to lower-class groups could thus adapt to
changing circumstances, such as more stringent administrative
demands.
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The balance between progressives and conservatives
We saw that in Amsterdam there are sharp divisions between dif-
ferent types of associations. Tensions exist between associations
with different ethnic and class backgrounds or with divergent po-
litical and religious ideas in Rotterdam as well. In the 1990s, for
instance, a conflict erupted within SPIOR when certain Turkish
associations no longer wished to cooperate with certain Moroccan
associations. There were many other examples of such conflicts
between progressives and conservatives, Berbers and Arabs, Turks
and Moroccans, promoters of secularism and orthodox Muslims,
etc. While these conflicts could have partitioned civil society into
segregated camps, this did not happen. This is because Rotter-
dam’s governance figuration generates strong centripetal forces
that encourage civil society associations from taking intermediate
and mainstream positions and discourage them to take idiosyn-
cratic (very conservative, radical, liberal or extremist) positions.
Whereas in Amsterdam there were sharp divisions between left-
wing associations, orthodox Islamic associations and liberal Mus-
lim leaders, in Rotterdam these divisions were not so clear, and
rivalry was muted.
The incentives to take intermediate positions result from the
presence of civil corporations serving groups with different identi-
ties. An association capable of switching between identities and
involved in diverse activities can tap different sources of funding.
While a conservative Islamic association would normally only re-
ceive help from SPIOR, and a progressive secular association only
from PBR, an association capable of transcending these identities
or switching between them can use the services of both. For exam-
ple, the association Ettahouid evolved over 15 years from an infor-
mal parent initiative to teach Arabic to Moroccan children into an
association with 350 paying members and a constituency of well
over 1,000. This was in part because Ettahouid could extend ser-
vices to its members through Rotterdam’s programs for child-rear-
ing, resident activities, cultural debates and education. Operating
with different identities (as youth, student, resident or immigrant
association), it could tap diverse sources of funding and join many
different networks.
The disincentives to take a radical position result from the im-
mersion of minority associations in larger networks. If an associa-
tion were to radicalize and develop extremist viewpoints, this
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could affect all associations. And due to the relationships between
the different actors, it is likely that information about, for in-
stance, an extremist preacher would quickly circulate through the
governance network. The dense and fine-grained infrastructure
makes it relatively easy for authorities and central figures in civil
society to prevent or respond to the formation of uncivil dis-
courses or mediatized incidents (Box 11.1). Most mosques are con-
servative and opposed to radicalism or extremism. This is the
same in Rotterdam as in Amsterdam. But in Rotterdam, there is a
city-wide network of corporations and associations that detect and
counter these threats, thereby preventing mosques from ventur-
ing too far from the mainstream. The senior civil servant quoted
above explains how these networks operate in case of a threat:
If there are things going wrong or in case of a threat, I receive a
call. Immediately. For instance, when a weird imam – a guest
preacher – arrives, we know it the next minute. SPIOR itself then
intervenes and ensures that the party will not go on… How do
they do that? They throw him out of the mosque. Simple. Well [...
long pause ...]. No, I do not want to comment on that. But let me
say that I know the director very well. I personally took him off
the shipyard. He worked under me for a number of years. He got
his bachelor’s degree and then he moved to SPIOR. We know
each other extremely well (tot in de haarvaten) and that has some,
well, advantages – let me put it like that.
The above quote illustrates a number of features of civil corporat-
ism. Strong ties exist between top civil servants and the directors
of the civil corporations, who in turn maintain close contact with
civil society associations. The government – i.e. elected or ap-
pointed officials – appears only in the background; it nevertheless
maintains sensors in civil society, as it has indirect yet structural
ties to virtually all minority associations in the city.
The balance between government and civil society
Governments are naturally central actors within governance fig-
urations. The government can cut subsidies and marginalize pre-
viously recognized associations, as we saw in the chapters on Am-
sterdam. The most profound rupture in Rotterdam – and probably
the most profound rupture in post-war Dutch municipal politics –
224
occurred in 2002 when Pim Fortuyn’s Leefbaar Rotterdam
achieved a momentous electoral victory. Fortuyn had an outspo-
ken culturalist discourse, as we saw in Chapter 5. After his death,
the aldermen and council members of Leefbaar continued to
speak out against (political) Islam, claiming that the influx of mi-
grants had ruined the city (see for example Uitermark & Duyven-
dak 2008b).
But the antipathy towards minority associations is counterba-
lanced by dependency on these same associations. The coalition
of Leefbaar, Christian Democrats and right-wing Liberals stated in
its plan to promote civil integration that it was very pleased that:
so many immigrant and other associations have indicated that
they are willing to contribute to civil integration and to make so-
cial-cultural improvements… Immigrant associations can play an
important role in establishing contacts, disseminating informa-
tion and motivating groups that are hard to reach. We will more
intensively use existing contacts and establish new contacts with
organizations that have not yet been reached. (Gemeente Rotter-
dam 2002: 6, 11)
We see here yet another example of the ambiguous compulsion of
the civil sphere: representatives from groups that suffer stigmati-
zation are called upon to participate more actively (see also Chap-
ters 6 and 10). Associations are used as vehicles to reach groups
that are supposedly not integrated; their representatives are called
upon to engage in the debate on minority integration in civil are-
nas. The government wanted to “break taboos” in religious and
ethnic communities, to foster civil engagement and to connect
people to Dutch society and culture – all of which requires knowl-
edge of, and access to, minority groups. Minority associations and
civil corporations were therefore not devalued after Labor was
pushed from office – perhaps the opposite was the case. The struc-
tural subsidies to SPIOR and PBR, far from being cut, were cor-
rected for inflation. In addition, they and their member associa-
tions could draw upon the growing resources made available to




The relationships within Rotterdam’s governance figuration were
characterized by balances of power: between different types of as-
sociations, between progressives and conservatives, and between
the government and civil society. While we see the same develop-
ments as in Amsterdam – the growing importance of Islamic in-
stead of ethnic associations, the mediatization of integration poli-
tics, more stringent demands for subsidies – these only resulted
in small alterations and adjustments. Rotterdam’s governance fig-
uration was clearly more durable than Amsterdam’s ethnic corpor-
atism. The next section examines civil corporatism after Leefbaar
took office through an exemplary test of discursive power: the Is-
lam debates.
Discursive struggles during the Islam debates
The Islam debates exemplified the government’s approach to
break taboos, to speak openly and frankly, and to identify prob-
lems. The nine debates were high-profile events that attracted at-
tention from local, national and international media. The formal
goal was to address anxieties over Islam through a public discus-
sion of the relationship between Islam and integration, but antag-
onistic actors pursued divergent objectives. And so ensued an in-
stitutional struggle to determine the conditions of the debate and
a discursive struggle during the debates themselves. In the first,
institutional struggle, four different actors had specific stakes.
1. For Leefbaar Rotterdam, the debates were first and foremost an
opportunity to build up its public profile. Although aldermen are
normally required to defend their government’s position, on this
occasion they agreed to present their personal views. This meant
that the Leefbaar aldermen had center stage to voice their criti-
cisms of minorities. Two Leefbaar aldermen wrote essays very cri-
tical of Muslims (Van den Anker 2005; Pastors 2005). The media
took a strong interest in the essays and extensively documented
the Islam debates and Leefbaar’s position in them. The Islam de-
bates thus functioned as a vehicle to disseminate the culturalist
discourse.
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2. For the other coalition parties – the Christian Democrats (whose
alderman, Leonard Geluk, was formally responsible for integra-
tion) and the right-wing Liberals (a small fraction in the council
but the party of the mayor, Ivo Opstelten) – something else was at
stake. They wanted to show that they had learned from the For-
tuyn revolt. They presented the Islam debates as proof that the
government was not afraid to openly discuss controversial topics
but that they – unlike the discursive revolutionaries of Leefbaar –
also argued for mutual understanding and sensitivity (Geluk
2005).
3. For the state bureaucracy and civil corporations, the Islam de-
bates were first of all a logistical challenge. They furthermore saw
the debates as a chance to empower minorities and specifically
Muslims to participate in civil politics. The actual organization of
the debates was in the hands of a project bureau, PSI (Projectbur-
eau Sociale Integratie, Project Bureau Social Integration). PSI oper-
ated in the corporatist tradition of Rotterdam and provided help
and finances to civil society organizations, including SPIOR and
PBR, to facilitate debate within minority communities.
4. For Rotterdam’s immigrant and Islamic associations, the Islam
debates represented a double challenge. The first was to deliberate
on their position in Rotterdam and within Dutch society. Reports
of the internal debates show that Muslims used the occasion to
express and sharpen their views on the position of Islam. The
thread running through the meetings is that many cultural prac-
tices and beliefs should be abandoned, but Islam itself is pure and
entirely compatible with a successful life in the Netherlands. This
is the discourse of Civil Islam that we observed in the national
debate (Chapter 6) and in Amsterdam (Chapter 10): Islam de-
mands that people invest in education, are honest, help their
neighbors, engage in politics, respect women, respect the law,
raise their children right, respect other beliefs, denounce violence,
and so on (PSI 2004). The second challenge was to respond to the
discursive assaults on Muslims. The debates were being prepared
when the Rotterdam government fell into the hands of a party out-
spoken in its rejection of Islam. National integration politics was
more intense than ever before and revolved almost exclusively
around “Islam” (see Part II). Muslims were routinely and specta-
cularly ridiculed and criticized. The drive of Leefbaar to further
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stretch the discursive boundaries of the debate and to make the
renunciation of Islam common sense was clearly felt as a threat.
This is why many civil society associations initially resisted the
initiative. But the internal debates were eventually used as rehear-
sals for the public debates; many prepared for the discursive con-
frontation with Leefbaar. Ettaouhid even organized a debating
course for 25 of its members to further sharpen their rhetorical
skills.
What actually happened during the debates is of course subject to
interpretation, but it is clear that Muslims had a relatively strong
presence (compared, for instance, to the debate analyzed in Part
II). Volunteers, professionals and members of civil society associa-
tions pushed each other to overcome their doubts about yet an-
other debate on Muslims and to attend. And so they did. Leefbaar
supporters were a minority in the audience (Wijkalliantie 2005).
The composition of the audience was also reflected in the voting.
All participants were asked to stand in one of three boxes –
“agree”, “doubt” and “disagree” – to indicate their positions on
statements. Almost all participants agreed with propositions that
emphasized the cultural obligations of immigrants, such as “abid-
ing the law is not enough, proficiency in Dutch is also needed”
(PSI 2005: 64). Large majorities supported propositions that allo-
cated blame to traditional Muslims rather than to Islam, such as
“the problem is family pressure, not Islam” or “it would be better
for Rotterdam and the next generation if youths would be less con-
cerned about family pressure” (ibid. 71). During the final debate,
participants in the discussions could vote on propositions for a
civil charter. The most popular propositions argued against discri-
mination towards Muslims in the labor market. Other popular
propositions emphasized the obligation of mosques to open up to
Rotterdam society and of public institutions to address diversity
issues (ibid. 124-125). Muslims not only dominated numerically
but also rhetorically. Very few articulate culturalists made public
statements. In some cases, culturalist discourses were delegiti-
mized thanks to their promoters, as in the case of a well-known
extreme-right felon. Four out of seven times a Muslim woman
won the “I have a dream” prize for the best debater of the evening:
a quintessential civil trophy.3
In short, debates initiated by a government that perceived Mus-
lims as a problem became a significant site for the dissemination
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of integration discourses antithetical to Culturalism. We might
even say that discursive power was subverted: Leefbaar had
wanted to address the relationship between Islam and integration,
but participants constantly raised the issue of discrimination and
racism. This ultimately culminated in a set of propositions – again
determined through voting – that stressed the responsibility of
employers and the government in removing obstacles to Muslim
integration.
This small case study of the Islam debates shows that civil so-
ciety associations in Rotterdam did not lose power after Leefbaar
entered office. They rose to the challenge and grasped the oppor-
tunity to counter the discursive assaults. Minority associations and
civil corporations were crucial in this process as they prepared and
mobilized people to make an articulate contribution to the debate.
These mechanisms did not only operate during the Islam debates.
Civil corporations and civil society associations constantly mobi-
lize and organize constituents, both during large-scale events like
the Rotterdam debates and during small projects carried out at the
neighborhood level.
Contradictions of civil corporatism
Rotterdam’s governance figuration has been remarkably stable for
at least two decades. The above sections explained why: the pres-
ence of civil corporations ensured balances of power between vari-
ous actors and created a buffer between the government and civil
society. But while the structure of Rotterdam’s governance figura-
tion has been stable, there are also processes that aggravate its
contradictions.
The first is that political opposition to the institutions of civil
corporatism is strong and may grow stronger. Civil corporatism
does not exclusively support minority associations, but it does pro-
vide much more support to these associations than to non-minor-
ity associations. While such support could initially be legitimized
on the grounds that newcomers need extra support to establish
themselves, the idea that immigrants and their descendants are
newcomers is rapidly becoming anachronistic. Rotterdam’s gov-
ernance figuration lowers the threshold to civil participation for
various minority groups but not for native groups. Since there are
no proposals to extend the institutions of civil corporatism to the
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substantial share of lower-class natives in the population, it is
likely that, in time, civil corporatism will be considered a govern-
ance figuration biased in favor of minorities.
A second contradiction is that civil politics in Rotterdam is not
very exciting or spectacular. The temporary surge of Leefbaar Rot-
terdam pulled civil society associations into the civil sphere and
made civil politics exciting, but after the re-installment of the La-
bor Party in 2006, things returned to normal. Minority associa-
tions tend to avoid confrontations and are generally oriented to-
wards stability and cohesion. This attitude – cultivated by the
institutions of civil corporatism – has promoted stability but may
also turn off younger generations from civil politics. Many civil
society associations and civil corporations have seen a partial dis-
placement of the first generation, but this process has been slow
and uneven, partly because of the conservatism of the older gen-
eration and partly because younger generations are not very inter-
ested in merely reproducing extant institutions. This is in contrast
to Amsterdam where the excitement and volatility of civil politics
entices the more assertive and engaged of the younger generation
to take a stance and to establish their own institutions. Criticisms
of key figures like Ahmed Marcouch and Ahmed Aboutaleb may
fuel anger among minority groups but can also arouse interest in
politics. If the media become more important channels for civil
communication than civil society associations, the institutions of
civil corporatism may lose their capacity to appeal to, and incorpo-
rate, younger generations.
The third contradiction concerns the crumbling of one of the
foundations of civil corporatism: structural subsidies. In 2003,
the government appointed a commission to critically review sub-
sidy relations. It concluded that the allocation and use of subsidies
should be better registered and monitored (Commissie Van Mid-
delkoop 2003). In recent years, the audit office – which judges
subsidies according to their immediately observable efficiency
and efficacy – has acquired a more central position. Since the sub-
sidies to civil corporations create a structure rather than deliver a
product, they may be seen as anachronistic, as stemming from a
time when governments were overly generous and did not de-
mand value for money. Were the government to adopt such a per-
spective, subsidies to civil corporations would likely be discontin-
ued and redistributed according to a competitive logic. It is
therefore likely that Rotterdam merely lags behind Amsterdam
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and that everything solid in Rotterdam’s civil society, too, will
eventually melt into thin air.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the genesis and evolution of civil corporat-
ism in Rotterdam. As civil corporatism remained remarkably resi-
lient, it was necessary – in contrast to earlier chapters – to explain
continuity rather than change. The figuration was stable because
it balanced power relations between different actors. On the one
hand, the institutions of civil corporatism could incorporate many
different kinds of associations – conservative, small and marginal
ones included. Conservative associations were united through
SPIOR, progressive associations through PBR. On the other
hand, the specific form of corporatism in Rotterdam created
strong centripetal forces: associations that fell in the middle of the
progressive-conservative continuum and that mobilized through
multiple identities won the most resources and recognition.
Rotterdam’s governance figuration remained intact during the
greatest political earthquake in Dutch local politics since World
War II. Pim Fortuyn’s Leefbaar Rotterdam sought to change dis-
cursive power relations and to make acceptable what had pre-
viously been frowned upon. It also set itself the goal of reducing
the power of minority associations. But the institutions of civil
corporatism remained resilient. This was not only because the im-
pact of Leefbaar Rotterdam was buffered by corporatist institu-
tions but also because the government itself was ambivalent. It
wanted to dismantle institutions for specific groups but also called
upon these same groups to engage in debate and to foster civil
repair. Leefbaar confronted rather than marginalized minority
associations. And the institutions of civil corporatism enabled
minority associations to rise to the challenge.
Having established that the two cities’ governance figurations
qualitatively differ, we can now more systematically investigate
the nature and implications of these differences. This chapter ar-
gued in passim that Rotterdam’s minority associations, due to the
support of civil corporations, reach more constituents, have more
harmonious relationships and exert more influence on govern-
ment policy than civil society associations in Amsterdam. The
next chapter connects and elaborates on these disparate observa-
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tions and tests the argument that Rotterdam has stronger minor-
ity associations than Amsterdam.
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12 Comparing the power of
minority associations in
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
This chapter offers a comparison of the governance figurations in
Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Whereas Amsterdam’s governance
figuration was volatile and skewed, Rotterdam’s governance fig-
uration was balanced and stable. This chapter’s main argument is
that these differences in the structure of governance figurations
affected the intensity and nature of civil engagement. It argues
that Rotterdam’s governance figuration more effectively fostered
civil engagement in the sense that it produced more constructive
relations among different types of associations, worked against ex-
tremism, promoted participation in civil society associations and
increased electoral participation.
The first section summarizes the findings of the case studies
and elaborates on the argument that Rotterdam’s governance fig-
uration contains a more powerful civil society. The second section
provides a qualitative comparison of the forces that divide and in-
tegrate minority associations. The subsequent sections test the ar-
gument that Rotterdam’s minority associations have greater capa-
city to tap state resources, to organize constituents and to
influence politics. The chapter concludes by arguing that the
minority associations in Rotterdam’s governance figuration
worked more like civil schools while minority associations in Am-
sterdam functioned more like talent shows. Both governance fig-
urations generated specific distributions of power – with the one
in Rotterdam more closely approaching the ideal of a harmonious,
inclusive, egalitarian and engaged civil community.
Governance figurations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Table 12.1 summarizes the findings of the previous chapters. It
shows that Amsterdam saw a succession of different elites. In the
233
1980s and early 1990s, left-wing associations enjoyed central po-
sitions. Although these associations had many highly educated
sympathizers and leaders (such as political dissidents), they were
nevertheless rooted in lower-class immigrant communities and
were active in mobilizing these communities. But ethnic corporat-
ism was plagued by contradictions. Contrary to what we would
expect on the basis of the literature on multiculturalism, left-wing
associations dominated this governance figuration. They did not
open up positions of power to the second generation or conserva-
tives. While these contradictions made ethnic corporatism un-
stable, the final blow came when the government introduced neo-
liberal governance instruments like market simulations and
advertising campaigns. The type of representation that the left-
wing associations had monopolized was made obsolete, and they
were gradually marginalized.
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A new elite emerged in the late 1990s: consultants with profes-
sional competence in neoliberal governance, committed to creat-
ing more positive representations of multicultural society. These
civil consultants derived power not from their capacity to mobilize
immigrant communities but from their mastery of the techniques
of business organization and image management. Civil consul-
tants could acquire central positions because they did not depend
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on crumbling corporatist institutions (advisory councils, structur-
al subsidies) and could profit from growing government budgets
for management and marketing. Unlike the left-wing associa-
tions, they did not advance claims for equality or against racism
but instead emphasized the contributions they were making to
the city. This meritocratic understanding of civil virtue, however,
could not answer the growing anxiety over incivilities perpetrated
by Moroccans and Muslims. The positive understanding of diver-
sity that the municipality and its partners advocated was discredit-
ed by Scheffer’s “The multicultural drama” and the framing of
radical Islam as a threat to the civil sphere.
After 9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh in 2004, we
see the emergence of a new elite that answers these challenges.
Liberal Muslims like Aboutaleb, Marcouch and Karacaer became
celebrities in the wake of these dramatic events. Rather than rep-
resenting their communities (as the elite of ethnic corporatism
claimed to do) or celebrating the power of diversity (as the civil
consultants had done), they criticized and confronted their own
communities. They argued that immigrants, according to their
own religious standards, should civilize themselves as well as
their co-ethnics: good Muslimhood, in this discourse, implies
good citizenship. We thus see a civilizing project taking shape
after 9/11 and crystallizing after the assassination of Theo van
Gogh, with religion and religious institutions being mobilized to
incorporate and discipline lower-class immigrant youths.
Governance relations in Rotterdam were less volatile. The civil
corporations – large, non-profit organizations receiving structural
subsidies to provide professional support to civil society associa-
tions – did not lose their power over time. State support for the
civil corporations catering specifically to minority associations –
PBR and SPIOR – did not decline even during the reign of the
culturalists of Leefbaar Rotterdam. PBR and SPIOR functioned as
central nodes within the network of minority associations they
supported the incorporation of all such associations, as they were
eligible for support irrespective of their political or religious orien-
tations. Civil corporations also encouraged moderation because
associations that take up mainstream positions or mobilize
through multiple identities receive more support than others.
There is also a premium for associations that cater to large consti-
tuencies. Since the government uses its ties with civil corporations
and civil society associations to reach target groups, corporations
235
and associations are rewarded if they reach large constituencies.
In short, in contrast to Amsterdam, centripetal forces were strong.
This summary suggests that Amsterdam’s governance figura-
tions have been more dynamic. But there was also continuity: the
Amsterdam government always tried to shape power relations
within civil society. It initially supported radical left-wing associa-
tions to marginalize conservative associations. It then sponsored
managerial discourses and consultant companies to marginalize
radical left-wing associations. Finally, it invested in associations
and individuals promoting liberal Islam in the hope of marginaliz-
ing the radical Islamic discourse. The result of such selective in-
clusion is that privileged partners have no incentive to establish
constructive relations with other minority associations or to create
large constituencies because their positions depend on support
from the government, not from minority communities. This is
fundamentally different from the governance figuration in Rotter-
dam, where state support does not depend on the extent to which
associations adopt the government’s ideas. In contrast to Amster-
dam, associations receive professional support to sustain their
organizations, not just for activities that address policy priorities.
Civil corporations support associations to build organizational in-
frastructures, expand their constituencies and establish mutual
linkages. This is especially important for conservative associations
and those with lower-class constituencies, as they lack the re-
sources to participate on a level playing field with more estab-
lished groups. On the basis of these observations, I hypothesized
that minority associations in Rotterdam have more power than
minority associations in Amsterdam. The remainder of this chap-
ter examines the four dimensions of power that were identified in
Chapter 7.
Constructive relations
Civil societies are composed of networks that either segregate or
integrate associations. If civil society associations have construc-
tive relations, they become mutually engaged and work together.
Conflicts are not necessarily detrimental but weaken civil society if
actors invest their energies in projects that ultimately do not ma-
terialize or engage in destructive inter-organizational rivalry. What
types of relations do we observe among Moroccan and Islamic as-
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sociations? What mechanisms account for the observed differ-
ences?
Relations among Islamic associations
Cooperation among Islamic associations was much more devel-
oped in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam. One organization, SPIOR,
united Rotterdam’s mosque associations and federations. While
SPIOR had internal frictions and not all mosque associations
were equally involved, it is remarkable that SPIOR was able to in-
corporate the more conservative associations. In Amsterdam, in
contrast, there were two Moroccan mosque federations and sev-
eral Turkish federations with few or conflictual relations between
them. While UMMON was traditionally dominant among the
Moroccan associations, its purported conservatism led to the
founding of its rival, UMMAO. Both are weakly organized com-
pared to SPIOR. Of the several Turkish federations in Amster-
dam, Diyanat and Milli Gorus were the largest. The government
had a close relationship with Milli Gorus, or at least with its liberal
leadership. The involvement of the government was in fact so in-
tensive that both the conservative currents within the federation
and Dutch culturalists opposed this cooperation, which in the end
fell apart (see also Uitermark & Gielen 2010). The direct support of
the Amsterdam government for some civil actors, I conclude, had
a detrimental effect, both for the civil actors and for the govern-
ment. The Amsterdam government maintained contacts with se-
lect Islamic associations but could not call upon a professional
broker with connections to all mosque associations in Amster-
dam. In short, contacts were absent, conflictual or incidental.
Islamic associations either worked against or bypassed each other.
The indirect support of the Rotterdam government, in contrast,
helped to create a network of associations that could be accessed
through a central node, namely SPIOR.
I suspect that the structure of Rotterdam’s governance figura-
tion not only helped to deliver services and increase coordination
but also worked against the formation of discursive milieus where
radicalism and extremism could flourish. The ties fostered by civil
corporatism bind associations together, thereby preventing the
sort of insularity in which fundamentalism or extremism can
flourish. Anecdotal evidence from Rotterdam suggests that such
ties facilitate the early detection of extremism and provide an in-
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frastructure through which uncivil discourses can be quelled be-
fore they grow. While numeorus commentators have argued that
the growing power of anti-Islamic discourses feeds the frustration
and anger that fuel radicalism and extremism, I did not find any
evidence of this in Rotterdam. Muslims in Rotterdam did not res-
pond to the growing power of Leefbaar with violence or radical-
ism; no networks of Islamic radicals were found in the city. The
absence of ties between different types of Islamic associations in
Amsterdam might explain why radicalism and extremism are
more prevalent in this city, despite the conciliatory discourses of
its government. My observations on radicalism and extremism,
while not systematic, point in one direction: Rotterdam’s govern-
ance figuration features more constructive relations, and this mi-
tigates radicalism and extremism.
Relations among Moroccan associations
What was true for Islamic associations also holds true for Moroc-
can associations: the direct and targeted interventions of Amster-
dam’s government to promote cooperation did not produce the
desired result, while Rotterdam’s general and indirect measures
did facilitate cooperation. Especially after the assassination of
Theo van Gogh, the Amsterdam government wanted the Moroc-
can community to take responsibility and to organize itself. It ap-
proached two of its privileged partners – TANS and the Argan
youth center – to initiate a new Moroccan representative body. But
the volunteers soon noticed that many Moroccan associations
were no longer active or were unable to participate in such strate-
gic projects. As the project evolved, the cleavage between the old
elite of the Moroccan Council and the new elite of civil consultants
became apparent; by 2007 the initiators had moved on to other
projects. In contrast to Amsterdam, Rotterdam never had a formal
body representing Moroccans. The institutions of civil corporat-
ism did not encourage (or discourage) civil society associations to
mobilize on the basis of ethnic identity, and Moroccan associa-
tions (in contrast to Turkish ones) were for a long time disinclined
to do so. Nevertheless, a federation of Moroccan associations –
SMOR (Samenwerkende Marokkaanse Organisaties Rotterdam, Co-
operating Moroccan Associations of Rotterdam) – emerged
around 2003. The immediate trigger for the associations to come
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together was concern over the sexual abuse of minors,1 but the
federation consolidated over time.
Government interference and constructive inter-associational relations
How can we explain the fact that Islamic and Moroccan associa-
tions managed to create viable federations in Rotterdam but not
in Amsterdam? Tensions between different associations also ex-
isted in Rotterdam: between Berbers and Arabs, between groups
with different regional backgrounds, between royalists and dissi-
dents, and between different class fractions. As in Amsterdam,
my respondents in Rotterdam often used their interviews to ex-
press frustration with other associations and to spread gossip
about their leaders and activities. But these tensions did not result
in fractures. Such stability and cooperation, I argue, was due to
the lack of government intervention in Rotterdam. Unlike the Am-
sterdam government, the Rotterdam government did not actively
try to improve the position of some associations vis-à-vis others.
Such selective support in Amsterdam led to inequalities among
associations, making it frustrating and unrewarding for less
valued associations to participate. In Rotterdam, there was a more
level playing field as minority associations could draw upon an
institutional infrastructure that was more autonomous and less
subject to government interference. Rotterdam’s support of all as-
sociations facilitated cooperation between Moroccan and Islamic
associations; Amsterdam’s direct support for specific initiatives
frustrated rather than promoted cooperation.
Access to state resources
Governance figurations comprise specific distributions of recogni-
tion and resources. The previous chapters focused specifically on
funds for minority integration and how resources were distribu-
ted among civil actors. Which associations had the will and the
capacity to compete for the resources available within their gov-
ernance figurations? I hinted in Chapter 7 that the presence of
similar subsidy funds in Amsterdam and Rotterdam provides us
with a natural experiment of civil power in the two cities. Table
12.2 compares the distribution of resources in Amsterdam and
Rotterdam: although the criteria for allocating subsidies are vir-
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tually identical, the profile of the recipients is very different. The
bulk of the resources in Amsterdam (almost 80 per cent) is allo-
cated to civil consultants or associations established by consul-
tants. The pattern in Rotterdam is markedly different: while civil
corporations receive the largest share of subsidies (22.8 per cent),
the figure remains comparable to those for Moroccan associations
(16.1 per cent) and community work associations (19.5 per cent).
Civil consultants have a marginal presence (7.4 per cent). This re-
sult indicates that Rotterdam’s non-profit associations are capable
of competing with professional associations. This is sometimes
due to their having become quasi-professional associations (with
permanent staff and developed bureaucracies), and at other times
due to the support they receive from professional organizations
(like civil corporations). As one might expect, these different asso-
ciations also run very different types of projects. In Amsterdam,
only three out of 24 projects were organized for constituents
(rather than target groups). In Rotterdam, 60 out of 149 meetings
were organized for constituents (data not shown).
Table 12.2 Beneficiaries of funds for the promotion of civil initiatives in
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Rotterdam Mee Meldpunt Goede Ideeën, Amsterdam














Civil corporation 6 68,000 22.8 0 0 0
Community work 9 48,000 16.1 2 35,700 6.0
Civil consultant 3 22,000 7.4 17 464,850 77.7
Immigrant association
Turkish 5 24,000 8.1 0 0 0
Moroccan 7 58,000 19.5 1 15,000 2.5
Mixed 4 10,000 3.4 2 59,000 9.9
Other ethnicities 16 40,000 13.4 1 5,000 0.8
Other types 14 28,000 9.4 1 18,750 3.1
Total 64 298,000 100 24 598,300 100
Source: archives Municipality of Rotterdam and Municipality of Amsterdam, data processed by the author
These figures point to some qualitative differences between
government-sponsored civil initiatives in Amsterdam and Rotter-
dam. In most of the Amsterdam initiatives, organizers and partici-
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pants come from different walks of life. The organizers are usual-
ly middle or higher-class natives who earn substantial incomes
from the activities. The target groups, in contrast, are usually low-
er-class immigrants who are expected to participate voluntarily.
While such power differentials between organizers and target
groups also exist in Rotterdam, they are less pronounced. Organi-
zers in Rotterdam are often middle or sometimes lower-class im-
migrants and usually receive modest budgets. In Rotterdam, civil
society associations that cater to constituents are still able to tap
government resources; in Amsterdam, they either do not try or
are unsuccessful.
Organizing constituents
The previous sections showed that Rotterdam’s minority associa-
tions enjoyed more favorable positions within their governance
figuration than Amsterdam’s minority associations. They received
more practical and financial support, had more constructive rela-
tions and enjoyed greater security in their positions. Did these
favorable conditions increase their capacity to reach and organize
constituents? If so, we would expect higher rates of participation
in civil society associations in Rotterdam. The data we have on
participation are unfortunately not identical: researchers in Rotter-
dam asked their respondents in 2000 whether they participate in
associations, while researchers in Amsterdam in 1999 asked
whether respondents are members. The comparison of both cities
nevertheless gives an indication of the relative power of co-ethnic
and cross-ethnic associations and the differences between the civil
participation of Turkish and Moroccan residents. Table 12.3 shows
that immigrants in Rotterdam more often participate in co-ethnic
associations than in cross-ethnic associations. In Amsterdam,
membership in co-ethnic associations is much lower. My field-
work showed that Rotterdam has many co-ethnic associations that
cater to lower-class immigrants. Examples include guest worker
associations that have transformed into neighborhood-based asso-
ciations and mosque associations that have transformed from
purely religious organizations into civil society associations pro-
viding a broad range of services. While similar associations exist
in Amsterdam, my fieldwork showed that they were weakened by
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Table 12.3 Membership of Turks and Moroccans in co-ethnic and




Moroccans (N = 210) 21 41 49
Turks (N = 109) 11 38 45
Rotterdam
Moroccans (N = 544) 55 36 62
Turks (N = 640) 47 35 54
Source: Tillie (2004: 535), Van Londen et al. (2007: 1212)
the developments analyzed in Chapter 8: they lost their structural
subsidies and suffered from the corrosion of professional support.
It is remarkable that the differences in civil participation be-
tween Turks and Moroccans found in Amsterdam were not found
in Rotterdam (Van Londen et al. 2007: 1212). My fieldwork shows
that Moroccan associations in Amsterdam suffered more from the
neoliberalization of governance arrangements than the more resi-
lient Turkish associations, which can explain the differences in
civil participation between the two groups (Chapter 8). In contrast,
Moroccan associations in Rotterdam, as Chapter 11 showed, bene-
fited from structural support and did not suffer the same fate as
their Amsterdam counterparts. The findings suggest a causal
chain: greater support for co-ethnic associations leads to higher
rates of participation within co-ethnic associations, which leads to
higher overall rates of membership in civil society associations.
Can we extend this chain further and say that the capacity of civil
society associations to organize constituents increases their politi-
cal influence?
Political influence
One of the functions of civil society associations is to disseminate
information on politics and to motivate constituents to exercise
their formal political rights (Putnam 1993; Fennema & Tillie
1999). Stronger civil society associations can be expected to in-
crease political and specifically electoral participation (Michon &
Tillie 2003). Do we indeed find higher electoral participation in
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Table 12.4 Turnout at municipal elections among ethnic minorities
in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (%)
Amsterdam Rotterdam
1994 1998 2002 2006 1994 1998 2002 2006
Turks 67 39 30 44 28 42 53 47
Moroccans 49 23 22 35 23 33 39 55
Surinamese/Antillians 30 21 26 24 24 25 25 51
Total electorate 57 46 48 51 57 48 55 58
Source: Dekker & Fattah 2006: 8
Rotterdam than in Amsterdam? Table 12.4 suggests that this is the
case.
The overall pattern, however, is that after 1994, turnout rates for
Moroccans and Turks are higher in Rotterdam than in Amster-
dam. Since the causes of electoral turnout are numerous, it is dif-
ficult to quantitatively estimate the impact of the structure of gov-
ernance figurations or the power of minority associations.
Nevertheless, my fieldwork suggests an important mechanism:
civil corporations and civil society associations constantly try to in-
tensify civil engagement through courses, debates, meetings and
publications. In the run-up to elections, there are countless meet-
ings where politicians present themselves and where associations
provide information on candidates and party programs. The avail-
able evidence suggests that the causal chain mentioned in the pre-
vious section can indeed be extended: greater support for co-eth-
nic associations leads to higher participation within co-ethnic
associations, which leads to higher overall membership, which
leads to higher electoral turnout (see also Michon & Tillie 2003).
Conclusion
This chapter confirmed the hypothesis formulated in Chapter 7:
Rotterdam’s minority associations were stronger than those in
Amsterdam. They had more constructive relations among them-
selves, obtained more resources when they competed with other
civil actors and had larger constituencies. The communities they
served also showed lower levels of extremism and higher rates of
electoral participation. The key to explaining these divergent pat-
terns lies in the structure of the governance figuration in the res-
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pective cities. In Amsterdam, state support was, as a rule, short
term. It was also conditional upon the capacity of associations to
conform to the government’s policy agenda; associations received
support only when they contributed directly to the realization of
policy goals. Since the erosion of ethnic corporatism, the govern-
ment of Amsterdam has faced a fragmented civil society. In Rot-
terdam, in contrast, the power of the government was counter-
balanced by the civil corporations which supported and connected
different types of minority associations. Although the government
posed some administrative and procedural demands, it did not re-
strict support to associations that shared its discourse. The result
of these differences, the case studies showed, is that power rela-
tions in Amsterdam’s civil society were less equal than in Rotter-
dam. Amsterdam’s governance figuration spawned a handful of
stars who enjoyed meteoric careers. Rotterdam, in contrast, had a
figuration that encouraged long-term, tranquil engagement. The
contrast might be grasped through a metaphor: some powerful
minority associations in Amsterdam functioned as civil talent
shows while many minority associations in Rotterdam functioned
like civil schools.
The structure of Rotterdam’s governance figuration made it less
susceptible to the negative effects that social differences and in-
equality can have on relations within civil society. Social depriva-
tion is corrosive because civil engagement requires cultural and
economic capital. But in Rotterdam, civil corporations helped civil
society associations respond to administrative demands, organiza-
tional difficulties and public relations challenges. Especially lower-
class immigrants benefited from these efforts as they gained ac-
cess to the resources and dispositions that higher-class groups ac-
cumulate during their education or in their working environment.
Civil corporations also seem to mitigate the extent to which ideo-
logical or ethnic differences result in conflicts and rivalry. It thus
seems that Rotterdam achieved by institutional design what Am-
sterdam’s goverment attempted to accomplish through concilia-




13 Conclusion: The dynamics of
power
The political scientist Arend Lijphart (1968) famously used the
Netherlands as the quintessential example of how a democracy
could remain stable in spite of considerable differences between
population groups. Today the Netherlands is exemplary of how a
seemingly stable political constellation can drastically change. The
Netherlands moved from accommodation to confrontation, and
the contention over integration was key to this process. It is tempt-
ing to understand these political transformations as if they were a
change in personality. We would then need to find out why ‘the
Dutch’ turned from tolerant to conservative. But such an approach
would wrongly assume that ‘the Dutch’ share the same outlook,
which they then collectively changed. This is clearly not the case;
the views on the multicultural society as reported in surveys have
been remarkably stable over the period under investigation. The
lingua franca of comparative research on integration politics also
doesn’t help to grasp the changes. In this lingo, the Netherlands
moved from “multiculturalism” to “assimilationism”. However,
the image of a coherent model that moves from one pole (multi-
culturalism) to another (assimilationism) does not adequately cap-
ture the contentious dynamics of integration politics. To think in
terms of a shift requires us to overemphasize one particular devel-
opment at the expense of others. Instead of a simple shift – where
one discourse gradually grows more powerful and engulfs the to-
tality of society – there has been a proliferation of integration poli-
tics where different actors push in different directions. To answer
the question posed at the outset – How and why did power rela-
tions transform in Dutch integration politics between 1980 and
2006? – we had to develop an approach that could capture the
contentious dynamics of power within integration politics. I ar-
gued that we needed to identify the milieus where the culturalists’
challenge originated, the resources they mobilized, the coalitions
they formed and the effects they produced. In short, we needed a
field analysis that dissects the forces operating in integration poli-
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tics. This chapter summarizes the results of this analysis in the
first two sections and then moves on to discuss the broader rele-
vance of the study. The Netherlands is not unique and the patterns
observed in this particular case may be more universally relevant
to polities and fields where challengers confront established ways
of doing and speaking.
Subsequent sections summarize the findings of Parts II and III
respectively. The chapter then draws more general theoretical con-
clusions on the transformation of power relations: how can the
theoretical framework developed to study this particular case con-
tribute to our general understanding of discursive struggle? Is it
possible to abstract from the empirical findings and indicate, at an
abstract level, why and how power relations change? The chapter
ends with some reflections on the future of integration politics.
The power of Culturalism
The approach developed in Chapter 2 – a field analysis of civil
politics – suggested a number of causes that can account for the
rise or decline of a discourse’s power. First, a reconfiguration of
relations between different fields can change the rules of the
game in integration politics. Second, a discourse’s bases of sup-
port may change: when actors amend their opinions or when pre-
viously inactive actors start supporting a discourse, the balance of
power shifts. The third possible cause of transformation is the
making or unmaking of alliances between actors: the power of a
discourse depends in part on the extent to which its supporters
manage or fail to work together. Part II examined how these three
factors influenced the ascendancy of Culturalism.
Dramatization – changing rules of the game
Interpretative analysis showed that Frits Bolkestein wrested Cul-
turalism from the stigma of racism in 1991. By distinguishing be-
tween the (legitimate) differentiation of cultures and the (illegiti-
mate) differentiation of races, he and his supporters dissociated
Culturalism from the extreme right. The anti-racist left, cultural-
ists argued, was correct to denounce racism but overzealous in
suppressing criticisms of minority cultures; the memory of the
Second World War and its exploitation by the far left had made
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the Dutch sensitive, understanding and tolerant to the extent that
they had become incapable of defending the achievements of their
own culture. Bolkestein and his supporters thus argued for a pro-
cess of cognitive and emotional liberation that would extend free-
dom of legitimate speech to those who suffer the consequences of
mass migration and the censorship of political correctness. This
new problem, they argued, required honesty and decisiveness –
and thus a departure from the political tradition of seeking com-
promise and consensus (cf. Prins 2004).
This repertoire of contention – to “break the taboo” and to seek
confrontation rather than consensus – grew in importance as me-
dia outlets sought to bring news with a dramatic edge. Newspa-
pers and other media outlets with roots in the pillarized political
past transformed from communication channels for clearly de-
fined constituencies into discursive arenas featuring a wide range
of opinions. It is telling that the right-wing Liberal Bolkestein
could publish his controversial article in 1991 in the traditionally
left-leaning newspaper de Volkskrant. While Bolkestein received
more negative than positive attention, the opposition he evoked
was part of the attraction of his discourse. Whereas politicians pre-
viously felt that a controversial topic like minority integration
should be treated as soberly as possible, growing media attention
played into the hands of culturalists. The rules of pragmatic poli-
tics were challenged as the mass media directed attention towards
incidents and sentiments rather than statistical averages and tech-
nicalities. Two assassinations of prominent culturalists (Pim For-
tuyn in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004) further dramatized
integration politics and fuelled culturalists’ zeal to promote their
discourse. They no longer simply broke taboos but had civil mar-
tyrs to honor and a discourse to redeem in the face of threats.
An expanding and diversifying base of support
It is important to remember that surveys show no significant
shifts in public opinion regarding multiculturalism and minority
integration during the period under investigation.1 The question
is therefore not why “public opinion” shifted or why “the Dutch”
opted for Culturalism. The big changes occurred not in the popu-
lation’s preferences but in the communicative and regulatory in-
stitutions where integration politics was carried out – that is, in
the civil sphere. We thus have to explain why more civil actors
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(politicians, academics, journalists, etc.) promoted Culturalism
over time and how they managed to attract support. As I showed
in Part II, the number and share of culturalists on the opinion
pages of the three largest broadsheet newspapers grew substan-
tially between 1990 and 2005. But what is perhaps more impor-
tant than absolute and proportional growth is the diversification of
the actors who supported the discourse. Initially the political right
was alone in its outspoken support of Culturalism. Then in 2000,
the Social Democratic intellectual Scheffer espoused a civilizing
mission to prevent the formation of an ethnic underclass, a var-
iant of Culturalism that appealed to some parts of the left. Around
the same time, the leader of the Christian Democrats, Jan-Peter
Balkenende, explicitly rejected multiculturalism and argued for
the importance of shared – that is, Dutch – norms and values. In
2002, Pim Fortuyn’s spectacular performances and blunt dis-
course attracted disgruntled and disenfranchised voters. After the
assassinations of Fortuyn and Van Gogh, Culturalism gained ad-
herents among philosophers, writers and, most importantly, im-
migrant politicians and intellectuals critical of Islam. By 2005 –
the end of the period investigated here – Culturalism could thus
count on support from an amazing diversity of previously dispa-
rate actors, ranging from laissez-faire liberals to paternalistic So-
cial Democrats and from Enlightenment philosophers to anxious
lower-class natives. Though they did not have identical views on
integration issues, these actors subscribed to the general tenets of
Culturalism and shared an antipathy towards the consensual poli-
tics that had historically characterized Dutch political culture.
A cohesive coalition
As remarkable as the diversity of actors supporting Culturalism is
the extent to which culturalists from different milieus work to-
gether. With the Traag algorithm for community detection, I iden-
tified the networks that sustain Culturalism and examined the ex-
tent to which they have internal ties and a mutual focus. In spite
of its growing diversity, the coalition supporting Culturalism re-
mained cohesive; as the discourse grew in power, its supporters
increasingly rallied behind its leaders. The power of Culturalism
is therefore not only due to the dramatization of politics and the
expansion of its bases of support but also emerges from cultural-
ists’ capacity to support each other and to invest their power in
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icons. The Somali Muslim apostate and right-wing parliamentar-
ian Ayaan Hirsi Ali represented the quintessential example of
such an icon, as she commanded support from a large number
and broad range of actors. What is more, the opponents of Cultur-
alism also focused on culturalist icons. Rather than promoting
their own notions and ideas or rallying around an icon, they de-
fined themselves through their opposition to culturalists. The cen-
tral culturalists were thus the focal points around which opposi-
tions took shape. In such a figuration, other actors were reduced
to critical footnotes in a civil drama in which culturalists played
the lead roles.
Limits to the power of Culturalism
Thus far, we have confirmed that Culturalism became more
powerful (as we would expect). I have also ventured to explain
how and why this came to be. Although I may not have been ex-
haustive, I identified a number of factors that plausibly contribu-
ted to the rise of Culturalism and, just as importantly, a number of
factors that most likely did not. The goal, however, was not only to
explain the ascendancy of Culturalism but also to probe the limits
and effects of its power. Towards this end, Parts II and III investi-
gated four other integration discourses: the Diversity discourse,
Anti-racism, Pragmatism and Civil Islam. The first two – the Di-
versity discourse and Anti-racism – never had much support to
begin with and were further marginalized as Culturalism grew in
power. Opposition to Culturalism thus came mostly from pragma-
tists and increasingly from the promoters of Civil Islam.
The relationship between Culturalism and Pragmatism is am-
biguous. While culturalists have been challenging pragmatist poli-
tical culture since the early 1990s and managed to seize the initia-
tive in the debate, their success was not really at the expense of
pragmatists. The figures and tables in Chapters 5 and 6 graphi-
cally illustrated the symbiotic relationship of the two integration
discourses: there were shifts in their balance of power, but one
discourse did not replace the other. While culturalists criticized
pragmatists, they also created windows of opportunity for pragma-
tists to show their worth. Pragmatists responded with measured
calm to the alarmist discourses of culturalists: yes, there are prob-
lems, but we need to be careful and strategic (rather than ideologi-
cal or emotional) if we are to find workable solutions. Culturalism
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and Pragmatism derive their power from different sources and
have their strongholds in different settings, but this asymmetry
also provides the basis for their balance of power. The complicity
of the antagonists (see Bourdieu 1984a) involves an unspoken and
unplanned division of labor: culturalists define a problem and
pragmatists then redefine it in such a way that it can be measured
and managed. This is apparent in the debate (where pragmatists
respond to culturalists), in national policy circles (where pragma-
tists measure and monitor the processes that culturalists deplore)
and in local governance relations (where pragmatists propose
measures to cross the divides that culturalists postulate).
The relationship between Culturalism and Civil Islam may at
first seem purely antagonistic: promoters of Civil Islam argue that
commitment to Islam presupposes good citizenship while cultur-
alists argue the opposite. But the relationship between Cultural-
ism and Civil Islam is not simply that of a zero-sum game. The
number and share of immigrants who mobilized both as Muslims
and as members of the Dutch civil community grew considerably
over the period under investigation. Moreover, the analysis of the
debate on the opinion pages showed that the promoters of Civil
Islam, such as Ahmed Aboutaleb and Haci Karacaer, had unu-
sually high approval ratings because they demanded full civil inte-
gration from their ethnic and religious communities. Aboutaleb
was the first Dutch-Moroccan to become an alderman in Amster-
dam and was later appointed as the first Dutch-Moroccan mayor
in the Netherlands – and this in Rotterdam, the city of Pim For-
tuyn.
Balance and asymmetry
The resilience of Pragmatism and the emergence of Civil Islam
indicate that Culturalism grew in power but did not crowd out its
competitors. In fact, the ascendancy of Culturalism seems to have
triggered its own opposition. We may refer to this mechanism as
the dialectic of the civil sphere: discursive assaults solicit discur-
sive counterattacks, which then leads to a balance of power (in the
form of polarization or cross-cutting cleavages) or a transcendence
of divisions (in the form of a discourse that synthesizes elements
from antagonistic discourses). Though it does not guarantee sym-
metrical power relations, the civil dialectic mitigates against dis-
cursive monopolization. The overall picture is thus ambivalent.
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Yes, Culturalism has become more powerful because its suppor-
ters took the initiative and defined the parameters of the debate.
Culturalism could enlist support from professional groups and
class fractions that were previously inactive. Finally, culturalists
supported each other in the debate in spite of their internal diver-
sity. But no, Culturalism did not become dominant. The analysis
of the opinion pages as well as of local governance networks
showed that Culturalism is weak in some settings and vehemently
opposed in others. Moreover, while the critics of Culturalism were
pushed onto the defensive, they were numerous and remained
resilient. Finally, Culturalism did not have a discernible effect on
opinions as expressed in surveys. Dutch public opinion was never
positive towards minorities, multiculturalism or Muslims, but
neither did it become more negative – implying that the dynamics
of power in the civil sphere neither originated from, nor resulted
in, changes in public opinion.2
The field analysis of civil politics developed here suggests that
the transformations entailed a reconfiguration of power relations
among elites. Culturalists turned against the pragmatist culture
that had characterized the Dutch civil sphere and forced the elites
associated with this culture to defend their positions. But while
culturalists both marked and exploited divisions in a proliferating
debate, culturalists and pragmatists agreed that governance insti-
tutions had to be redesigned to better promote integration. Part III
therefore investigated how different discourses had an impact on
power relations within governance relations in Amsterdam and
Rotterdam.
The governance of integration in Amsterdam and
Rotterdam
Part III examined the relationships between the government and
minority associations in the Netherlands’ two largest cities: Am-
sterdam and Rotterdam. Minority associations have an ambivalent
position in governance figurations, as they are confronted with
contradictory demands. On the one hand, minority associations
were seen as potential obstacles to civil integration. Minorities –
culturalists and pragmatists agree – should not retreat into their
own communities but become part of the Dutch civil community;
they should speak as Dutch citizens, not as people whose loyalties
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are primarily ethnic or religious. On the other hand, minority
communities were expected to take responsibility for solving their
integration problems, and for this they need to organize them-
selves and speak out in public debates as Muslims, Moroccans or
Turks. The case studies focused on the force field where these
contradictory demands play out: the interface between the elected
government, civil society and the media. Part III examined the
distribution of resources and recognition within governance fig-
urations and attempted to explain continuity or change within
power relations.
Like power relations within debates, power relations within gov-
ernance figurations were transformed by alterations in the rules of
the game, changes in discourses’ support bases and the (un)mak-
ing of alliances. The rules of the game in local politics were heav-
ily affected by mediatization and neoliberalization. Mediatization
affected power relations, as some actors were better able than
others to present themselves as a force for civil repair. People like
Haci Karacaer and Ahmed Aboutaleb derived power from their
position in the national debate and could claim central positions
within local governance figurations. Neoliberalization – the pro-
cess through which market mechanisms are brought to bear
upon society and the state – altered the rules of the game to the
advantage of a new class of consultants who combined civil en-
gagement with professional competence. Drastic changes also oc-
curred within the support base of different civil actors: the guest
worker associations experienced a contraction in their base of sup-
port, while the pool of potential supporters for Islamic associa-
tions and associations with higher-class constituencies grew. Fi-
nally, both cities experienced drastic changes as alliances were
made and remade. The oppositions that minority associations had
imported from their country of origin (between dissidents and loy-
alists, for example) grew weaker over time, while new divisions
emerged (for example, around the question of whether it was nec-
essary to work with the government or to protest against its poli-
cies).
However, these different developments did not occur to the
same extent or in the same way in both cities. Discourses indeed
had an impact on power relations, but in surprising ways. At first
sight, Amsterdam and Rotterdam represent opposite poles in inte-
gration politics. In the municipal elections of 2002, Pim Fortuyn’s
party achieved a resounding electoral victory in Rotterdam while
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Amsterdam remained under the control of the Labor Party. Rotter-
dam became a laboratory for Culturalism; Amsterdam remained a
bastion of Pragmatism. On the basis of the discourses of the two
city governments, one would expect minority associations to be
marginalized in Rotterdam and incorporated in Amsterdam.
However, Chapter 2 argued that the power and effects of dis-
courses cannot be understood without paying due attention to the
interdependencies among actors. The structure of these interde-
pendencies explains why we encountered the opposite of what
these governments’ discourses would lead us to expect.3
In Amsterdam, the government reinforced transformations of
power through its support of ascendant actors. When left-wing as-
sociations were strong in the 1980s, the government supported
these, and only these, associations. When consultants and profes-
sionals gained ground in the policy field in the 1990s, the govern-
ment recognized and rewarded these actors at the expense of
others. After 9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh, the
government recognized and rewarded liberal Muslims. In each of
these episodes, state resources helped the government’s privi-
leged partners to marginalize their opponents. First the left-wing
associations stymied the conservative associations, then the diver-
sity managers marginalized left-wing associations, and finally lib-
eral Muslims criticized other Muslims for failing to show civil
commitment. While Amsterdam has a reputation for embracing
minority associations, it in fact supported associations selectively
and conditionally.
Rotterdam, in contrast, provided indiscriminate and uncondi-
tional support to civil society associations through its civil corpora-
tions – non-profit organizations that receive structural subsidies to
support and connect a large number of civil society associations.
The two civil corporations most relevant to our case – PBR and
SPIOR – have remained resilient since their inception (in 1981
and 1988, respectively). While it is hardly surprising that institu-
tions persist, it is remarkable that governance relations proved
more stable in the volatile political context of Rotterdam. The com-
parison allowed us to identify the specific structure of Rotterdam’s
governance figuration – referred to as civil corporatism – as the
key to explaining this difference. This structure performed a cru-
cial role in balancing power relations among minority associations
and in reducing the volatility of civil politics. Civil corporations
balanced power relations between different types of associations
255
because, unlike in Amsterdam, they ensured that each associa-
tion, regardless of its identity or discourse, received professional
support and access to larger associational networks. Civil corpora-
tions reduced volatility because the government did not directly
privilege one type of civil society association: associations
dwindled or flourished with changes in their constituencies, but
the kind of elite displacement evident in Amsterdam did not take
place in Rotterdam.
The case studies of Amsterdam and Rotterdam showed that
government discourses can indeed be influential, but only under
specific conditions. Even small discursive shifts in Amsterdam
immediately influenced the distribution of rewards and recogni-
tion because the government could immediately act upon its new
preferences. In Rotterdam, in contrast, governance relations were
resilient even after the culturalists of Leefbaar Rotterdam took of-
fice. The stability and relative autonomy of Rotterdam’s civil so-
ciety enabled it to function as a countervailing power to the
government while the volatility and dependency of Amsterdam’s
civil society turned it into a front line of the government. The com-
parative chapter showed that Rotterdam’s minority associations
had more constructive inter-associational relations, acquired
more state resources to undertake civil projects and, most prob-
ably, organized more constituents and stimulated higher levels of
electoral participation. In short, Rotterdam’s minority associations
were more powerful than those in Amsterdam.
Theoretical ramifications
The primary objective of this study was to map the dynamics of
power in Dutch integration politics. Towards this end, I had to
engage a number of problems that have relevance beyond the
case at hand. In this section, I first consider some methodological
and conceptual issues. I then identify patterns found in Dutch in-
tegration politics that may exemplify more universal patterns of
conflict and contestation. Finally, I draw some conclusions on the
role of government and civil society in fostering civil engagement.
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A general framework for studying specific power relations
The framework developed in Chapter 2 was designed to concep-
tually unpack and empirically investigate power relations in Dutch
integration politics, but it could, with some modification, be used
to study the discursive and institutional politics around issues as
diverse as welfare state restructuring, terrorism and financial reg-
ulation. For instance, were the conceptual framework applied to
the politics of financial regulation, we could compare the strength
of various discourses on financial regulation in different time pe-
riods, both in the very long run and immediately before and after
the economic crisis of 2008. Analogous to the analysis of the inte-
gration debate in Part II, we could ask if promoters of stringent
financial regulation cluster together in a powerful discursive coali-
tion or if they are marginal and divided. Analogous to the analysis
of governance relations in Part III, it would be possible to examine
the allocation of recognition (such as positions in administrations
or on advisory boards) and resources (such as bailouts). While
commentators and scholars have suggested explanations for trans-
formations in this and other fields, the approach developed here
allows us to formulate specific hypotheses about transformations
in discursive power relations, to survey their impact on govern-
ance relations and to develop conjunctural explanations for speci-
fic developments. In this sense, this study is a challenge to be-
come more precise and empirical before arriving at conclusions
on the “dominance”, “hegemony”, “demise”, “bankruptcy” or
“emergence” of one or another discourse, policy approach, frame-
work or ideology.
Particular case, universal pattern?
Although this study emphasized the need for conjunctural expla-
nations that take account of the contexts in which conflicts play
out, it is interesting to examine whether the patterns found in this
study can also be found elsewhere. There is reason to believe that
this is the case. For instance, the finding that a few actors receive
the bulk of references in the Dutch integration debate seems to
suggest that the distribution of attention in debates follows a so-
called power-law distribution that also typifies distributions as di-
verse as city size or the page views of websites4 (cf. Barabási &
Albert 1999; Barabási 2009; see also Collins 1998). Another ex-
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ample of a pattern in the Dutch integration debate that can be
found elsewhere is the recurrent opposition between, on the one
hand, a small and cohesive cluster with strong leaders and, on the
other hand, a diffuse cluster without strong leaders: a figuration
reminiscent of the one Elias and Scotson found in the English
suburb of Winston Parva in the 1950s (Elias & Scotson 1994).
Such similarities encourage exploring whether there are mecha-
nisms at work that produce similar oppositions across widely dif-
ferent contexts (Elias 1994a). Could the particular relations that
we found in the Dutch case signal a more universal figurational
dynamic of discursive transformation? To answer this question, let’s
see how we can describe the Dutch case if we bracket the particu-
larities (literally).
Discursive transformations start with a challenge: one actor or
small group of actors (Bolkestein, Scheffer, Hirsi Ali and the
groups around them) seeks to challenge established routines and
power relations through dramatic appeals to the public. Unlike
the challengers, the “established order” does not really have a face
or even coherence. It responds wherever it is challenged but not
through a coordinated strategy or under the guidance of a charis-
matic leader. The passion and motivation of the challengers – sus-
tained through dense networks and channeled through iconic
leaders – pushes established actors onto the defensive as the hab-
its and routines that underwrite their power are questioned. This
pattern has the same network properties as Elias’s established-out-
sider figuration but with an important difference: the interactions
among the established (in this case, ministers and other guar-
dians of the policy field) form a network pattern that Elias associ-
ates with outsiders (sparse networks). The challengers, in con-
trast, exhibit a network pattern that Elias associates with the
established (dense networks). What we have here is a variation of
the established-outsider figuration, which we could refer to as the
challenger-established figuration.
The challenger-established figuration (observed in the case of
the Dutch integration debate) emerges from two mechanisms.
The first is the formation of a network of previously disparate ac-
tors willing to support leaders who challenge established interests
and the rules of the game. The initial burst into the civil sphere
pulls in previously inactive people who rally behind leaders who
come to stand for change. The second mechanism is that the es-
tablished respond to the challenge but do so without coordination
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or leadership. The result of these two mechanisms is the figura-
tion that recurred at several points in this study5 – a cluster with
few members but with discursive leaders, relatively strong net-
works and high centrality, amidst a number of clusters with many
members but without discursive leaders, with relatively sparse
networks and with relatively low centrality. These different net-
work patterns correspond to different emotions and discourses.
The challengers identify and criticize orthodoxies and do so with
passion.6 Having experienced cognitive liberation, they rally for
change. The challenged, in contrast, respond in a rather ad hoc
manner. They are more likely to resist particular claims than to
offer a comprehensive counterdiscourse.
Describing the Dutch case in these general terms makes it
easier to explore parallels with other cases of political transforma-
tion. Perhaps we can push the argument even further and hypo-
thesize that these figurations emerge not only in political strug-
gles but also in other forms of competition. Innovations in the
artistic or academic fields, for instance, also seem to create a chal-
lenger-established figuration: a handful of actors disrupt the field
through the postulation of a new division, their names become
attached to a particular current (the surrealists, the post-structural-
ists, etc.) or theory (of evolution, of relativity) and develop an an-
tagonistic relation to a diffuse opposition (cf. Kuhn 1962). Similar-
ly, in the business world, ascendant actors can put their stamp on
the market if they manage to hoard certain benefits, such as a new
technology, in restricted networks. Google and its partners provide
one example of a cluster of companies that, through its strong net-
works and strong leader (namely Google), could challenge all es-
tablished actors in the field, setting into motion numerous yet dis-
parate responses to block its ascendancy.
I construct these arguments on the basis of only one case study,
but the goal here is less to come to definitive conclusions than to
point to directions for future research on the dynamics of power.
Future research can systematically investigate whether the chal-
lenger-established figuration can indeed be found in the transi-
tions brought about by actors as diverse as culturalists, Charles
Darwin, Google, etc. If we can develop a more parsimonious voca-
bulary, it becomes possible to properly design comparative re-
search and to highlight differences and parallels across different
fields and cases. My primary goal here was not to develop such a
259
vocabulary, but the results suggest that this is a promising line of
enquiry.
The government, civil society and civil engagement
As I indicated in Chapter 7, I originally expected a strong corre-
spondence between policy discourses and state institutions and
thus anticipated that the government of Rotterdam would pursue
much stricter policies than the government of Amsterdam. In
practice, however, measures and policies towards minority asso-
ciations were stricter and less generous in Amsterdam. Above, I
provided some possible explanations for these remarkable find-
ings. Here I want to explore some of the theoretical and political
implications.
The findings first of all represent a warning to analysts of inte-
gration philosophies (see also Favell 1998). There is a huge litera-
ture that critically interrogates the assumptions of culturalist, mul-
ticulturalist, assimilationist or other integration philosophies. For
instance, both left- and right-leaning commentators have criti-
cized multiculturalism for its alleged tendency to overemphasize
the cultural differences between groups and to underemphasize
the differences within them. The empirical findings presented
here, however, suggest that it can be deceptive to analyze dis-
courses in isolation from the relations of power in which they are
conceived. For instance, the Diversity Discourse of the Amster-
dam government followed the insights of progressive scholarship
to the letter; it was careful not to reify cultural processes or to es-
sentialize identities and did not associate alterity with dangers or
deficiencies (Uitermark et al. 2005). For these reasons, the philo-
sopher Seyla Benhabib applauds the Amsterdam government for
making the shift from the minorities policy to the diversity policy
(Benhabib 2002). However, the minorities policy did not – as
critics of multiculturalism would lead us to expect – benefit the
most conservative groups within minority communities. These
findings suggest that we need to move away from the scholastic
assumption that discourses should be measured according to
scientific or philosophical standards (cf. Bourdieu 2000). This
does not mean that we should abandon judgment but that we
should evaluate philosophies of integration not as ideological tem-
plates but as discourses that are strategically mobilized within,
and transform, relations of power in particular settings.
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Second, these findings are relevant to theories and contempo-
rary policy debates on civil society. Since De Tocqueville’s classic
study of civil life in the United States of the 19th century (de Toc-
queville 1835), commentators have often conceived of civil society
as a space where the state is absent. The state, it is assumed,
smothers civil initiative and creates dependent subjects rather
than autonomous citizens. On the basis of her research on civil
integration in Canada and the United States, Irene Bloemraad
contradicts the idea that the absence of the state creates space for
spontaneous initiatives (Bloemraad 2005, 2006). She suggests
that state support enabled minority associations in Canada to
build an extensive organizational infrastructure and that the
state’s recognition of minorities created symbolic incentives for
immigrants to participate in their new country. My comparison of
Amsterdam and Rotterdam confirms and qualifies this argument.
The comparative chapter showed that it is likely that structural
support for civil corporations in Rotterdam: (1) promoted coopera-
tion among civil society associations, (2) fostered civil and political
participation, (3) muted the negative effects of deprivation on civil
engagement, and (4) attenuated extremism and radicalism. If
these four criteria of a vibrant civil society are accepted, the verdict
is that Rotterdam performed much better than Amsterdam, even
though conventional wisdom suggests that Amsterdam had more
conducive conditions for civil engagement (Fainstein 2000, 2005;
Soja 1996; Gilderbloom 2008). In Rotterdam, structural support
for civil corporations created the conditions in which immigrants,
including deprived immigrants, could participate in civil politics.
Since civil politics requires skills and resources, professional sup-
port from state-funded civil corporations helped to overcome the
problems experienced by newcomers and lower-class groups in
pursuing a shared objective. However, state support is not neces-
sarily beneficial for the development of civil society. If the govern-
ment intervenes directly in civil society, the chapters on Amster-
dam suggested, both weak and strong associations may lose their
roles as organizers and intermediaries. If they have to compete for
resources and recognition with stronger associations, the weakest
associations will be further disadvantaged; the more successful as-
sociations may secure their position in governance networks, but
it is likely that this will be at the cost of losing contact with their
base. Rather than building a large base and differentiated net-
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works, they transform – partially or completely – into commercial
organizations that care more for clients than constituents.
These findings are politically relevant at a time when govern-
ments everywhere are tightening their criteria for subsidizing as-
sociations. While policies to promote civil engagement and citi-
zenship are proliferating in the Netherlands and elsewhere, these
rarely aim to strengthen the institutional tissue of civil society. If
subsidies are considered legitimate at all, there are strict condi-
tions and definitive time limits. Lenin’s slogan, “Trust is good but
control is better”, has become the motto of today’s governments.
Governments and commentators alike nowadays balk at the idea
of indiscriminate and unconditional support for civil society asso-
ciations, for this supposedly breeds insolence and dependence.
But the findings in this study suggest something quite different:
civil society associations in Rotterdam were critical and vibrant
because of the indiscriminate and unconditional support they re-
ceived.
Epilogue
What makes Dutch integration politics so complicated is that
there was never strong support for multiculturalism or anti-
racism. Activists and intellectuals in the 1970s argued against
racism and for minority rights but lost steam as their ideas were
enshrined into policy and law. After the inception of the minor-
ities policy in 1983, minority integration increasingly became a
matter for administrators and specialists, not for activists or ideo-
logues. The technocratization of minority integration reached its
climax during the reign of the purple government, which lumped
together all lower-class immigrants into one giant target group (al-
lochtonen). While allochtonen were supposed to integrate and be-
come responsible citizens, civil integration was narrowly and dis-
passionately operationalized as the position of minority groups on
various negative lists: unemployment, crime, educational failures
and language problems. Although policy memorandums and ad-
ministrators occasionally alluded to ideals of multicultural har-
mony, integration was regarded first and foremost as a practical
affair to be handled with prudence and discretion.
For culturalists, integration was never simply a policy matter. In
the early 1990s, Frits Bolkestein framed the presence of minor-
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ities and specifically Muslims as a threat to the integrity of the civil
sphere. The power of this discourse was evidenced by Bolkestein’s
centrality in the debate; he was so central that it was almost im-
possible to speak of integration without speaking of Bolkestein.
Even his opponents had to refer to his discourse, thereby helping
to disseminate it. But some of Bolkestein’s opponents also wanted
to give him space. They made every effort to distinguish Bolkes-
tein from the extreme right and often praised him for opening up
the debate on integration. Much has changed since then: integra-
tion politics has further proliferated, Culturalism has grown into a
full-blown discursive movement, and new leaders have emerged.
But there have also been continuities. Throughout the period un-
der investigation, culturalists were at the center of the debate, had
relatively dense networks and were more likely to support discur-
sive leaders. Although systematic data collection for this study
ended just after Geert Wilders established his Party for Freedom
(Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), he is only the most recent and radical
culturalist to dominate the debate, to lead a movement and to face
a diffuse opposition.
That no powerful discourse has yet been able to counter the
culturalists from Bolkestein to Wilders signals a discursive and
ideological vacuum. The opponents of Culturalism are conserving
what already exists rather than promoting a new vision. In a way,
culturalists resemble the new social movements of the 1960s and
1970s in that they use powerful symbolism to challenge inert ins-
titutions. And it remains doubtful whether a powerful integration
discourse would make the pendulum swing in the other direction.
What characterized the progressive movements of the 1960s and
1970s as well as the culturalist movement of the 1990s and 2000s
was their uniting of previously disparate groups behind a shared
agenda: their discourses united different class fractions and chan-
neled their anxieties and aspirations. Unlike the progressive social
movements, however, Culturalism in a very basic sense is a con-
servative and reactionary discourse: it seeks to curb threats
through the demarcation of boundaries and the exercise of disci-
pline. And as has undoubtedly become clear from my choice of
words, I feel that there is an urgent need to foster new coalitions
around discourses that do not rely on fear and force. That, how-
ever, is a task beyond the political sociology of integration politics
that I have attempted here.
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Appendix 1: Assigning codes to
articles
The articles in the database were assigned to five different discur-
sive categories: Culturalism, Anti-racism, the Diversity discourse,
Civil Islam and Pragmatism. The distinction between these differ-
ent discourses is, of course, to some extent arbitrary. Some articles
contain elements from two or more discourses while others do
not neatly fit any of the categories. However, through test sessions
and adjustments in the codes’ descriptions, it was possible to gen-
erate sufficient levels of inter-coder reliability. Here I present the
discursive categories that were used and then elaborate on the
coding process.
Several other researchers identified “new realism” or “cultur-
ism” as a dominant integration discourse (see Chapter 1). I speak
of Culturalism and define it as follows:
Culturalism is an integration discourse based on the idea that cul-
tural differences are readily identifiable and have great explana-
tory relevance in analyzing integration issues. Since some (Dutch,
Western) cultural practices are more valuable than others, public
debate should focus on the moral evaluation of cultures, while
public policy should strictly manage the integration of particular
immigrant groups to ensure that they do not reproduce or culti-
vate undesirable cultural norms and values. Culturalists empha-
size that there is an urgent need to discuss integration problems
but feel political correctness and cultural relativism stand in the
way of an open and honest debate.
Culturalism is partly defined in antagonistic relationship to Anti-
racism. While some actors self-identify as anti-racists, I decided to
use a broader definition that includes statements that are in line
with Anti-racism. I thus arrived at the following definition:
Anti-racism is an integration discourse based on the idea that im-
migrants suffer from structural, symbolic violence. It is danger-
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ous and reprehensible to say that some cultures are better than
others, as this is a variant of racism and legitimates policy that
discriminates against certain groups of immigrants. Public de-
bate should focus on the identification of symbolic violence
against immigrants and provide space for immigrants to speak
out for themselves. Public policies should help protect immi-
grants from discrimination and compensate them for the disad-
vantages they suffer due to stigmatization and economic margin-
alization.
Culturalists also oppose multiculturalism. But as no actors in
Dutch integration politics self-identify as multiculturalists, I do
not include this category. Nevertheless, the Diversity discourse
promoted by some local governments, civil society associations
and companies resembles multiculturalism in that its supporters
emphasize that diversity is essentially a good thing. Religious or
ethnic differences should be considered alongside differences of
gender, sexuality, age or ability. All these differences can cause
problems if they are not recognized but can be advantageous if
properly managed. As Chapter 9 shows, these ideas found their
way into policy in the second half of the 1990s. The Diversity dis-
course is defined as follows:
The Diversity discourse evaluates cultural diversity positively and
wants to identify and capitalize upon the potential inherent in a
diverse society. Identification of integration problems may be war-
ranted, but public debates should focus on the positive qualities
of a multicultural society and how to further develop these quali-
ties. Immigrants should be seen as individuals with (bicultural)
identities that provide them with extra knowledge and capacities
that help them valorize possibilities in an increasingly diverse so-
ciety. It may be necessary to select immigrants, as they do not all
bring the same qualities, but migration itself is a natural and po-
sitive process in a globalizing world.
Note that this discourse, or at least its implementation into policy,
is fairly recent. A different and older understanding emphasizes
that diversity does not necessarily lead to conflict but often creates
problems of communication and management. This is the dis-
course that characterized first the minorities policy and later the
integration policy. Although there were differences between the
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two policies, both were based on the idea that ethnic diversity can
create problems if it intersects with economic inequality, political
exclusion and social isolation. The task for policymakers is to pre-
vent this process of minority formation (Van Amersfoort 1974) by
creating linkages between minorities and the majority. I refer to
this discourse as Pragmatism and define it as follows:
Pragmatism is an integration discourse that recognizes cultural
differences but considers these differences as complex and of
limited explanatory relevance in analyzing integration issues. It is
therefore problematic to say that some cultures are better than
others; focusing on differences may actually reinforce integration
problems. Public debate should focus on local and sectoral prob-
lems so that comprehensive policies can be designed to overcome
cultural differences and prevent polarization. Pragmatists empha-
size that integration problems are not just cultural but also socio-
economic and institutional. They argue that a range of measures
are needed to prevent integration problems from spiraling out of
control.
Some currents within Culturalism identify an opposition between
the West and Islam. In response, a number of authors have tried
to transcend this binary and have called upon Muslims to act as
responsible members of the civil community; the main text pro-
vides a number of examples. I refer to this discourse as Civil Is-
lam and define it as follows:
Civil Islam is an integration discourse based on the idea that
Islamic and civil commitment can and should go hand in hand.
Cultural problems are readily identifiable and have considerable
explanatory relevance for analyzing integration issues. But con-
trary to Culturalism, religion – properly understood – can and
does provide solutions, as it demands civil behavior from Mus-
lims. Muslims should be assertive in public debate and clearly
state what they do or do not consider civil behavior. Public policy
should manage the integration of immigrant groups because this
is necessary to help immigrants emancipate as Muslim citizens.
In addition to Civil Islam, I initially also distinguished Islamism,
defined as a discourse based on the idea that Western societies
should be subjected to the rules of the Quran. Actors promoting
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such a discourse appear in the news quite frequently but not on
the opinion pages; only one article in the corpus was an interview
with a Muslim who explicitly argued that sharia laws should be
implemented in the Netherlands (albeit in modified form, as shar-
iacracy).
As is clear from the descriptions of these discourses, it is con-
ceivable that articles do not neatly fall under one or the other cate-
gory. Articles very often include elements from different dis-
courses, while many articles do not really promote any particular
civil discourse. For these reasons, I included three codes for arti-
cles that could not be placed into one of the five discursive cate-
gories: “combination” (when actors draw upon two or more of the
previous discourses), “multiple viewpoints” (when one article fea-
tures at least two actors with divergent viewpoints, as happens in
interviews where two viewpoints are articulated in opposition) and










Three research assistants helped to code the articles. One was only
involved in the early stage of the coding process; the two others
were involved in the entire process. With different combinations
of coders, we tested whether and how we could reach agreement
on specific articles and sets of articles. We found that only be-
tween 30 and 40 per cent of the articles were straightforward in
the sense that all four coders assigned the same code. This is
hardly surprising, as discourses are defined in relation to each
other while many authors try to formulate unique viewpoints. But
it did pose methodological problems.
Apart from discussing interpretations, refining and expanding
the codebook was another way to tackle these problems. The brief
descriptions of different discourses were expanded, and examples
were included to indicate how coders should proceed when arti-
cles contained elements of two or more discourses. Around two
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hundred articles were coded during test sessions. The two princi-
pal coders coded the remaining articles. After they had done their
work, I took a sample of articles to test whether they had assigned
the same codes as I would have done. This was the case for 71 and
74 per cent of the articles, respectively. This is a reasonable score
but slightly lower than the r of 0.8 that is commonly used. I there-
fore tried to find out if some codes were more problematic than
others.
It turned out that a fairly large proportion of the inter-coder dis-
agreement resulted from codes 7 (combination) and 9 (unclear). If
these two codes are excluded from the analysis, an inter-coder
agreement of respectively 78 and 85 per cent was reached. I thus
decided to only use those codes for which there was sufficient
agreement, i.e. codes 1-6 and 8. For the remaining articles (those
assigned codes 7 and 9), I did not accept the assigned codes. I
reread those articles and tried to assign them to codes 1-6 or 8. If
the articles did not fit any of these categories, I assigned code 9.
There was no disagreement over Code 6 (Islamism) but since this
category contained only one article, I also assigned this to the resi-
dual category.
To improve the validity of the results, I searched for systematic
bias for codes 1-6 that would explain inter-coder disagreement. I
usually found none. For instance, I would sometimes assign a
code 3 to an article that a coder had categorized as 2, but at other
times it was the other way around; the disagreements were un-
likely to change the outcome of the analysis, as they seemed ran-
dom. There were two exceptions. One coder – the one with whom
I had a 78 per cent agreement after the exclusion of codes 7 and 9
– often assigned code 5. He assigned this code to all authors pro-
moting state pluralism, even if they also identified a number of
migration-related problems. I changed the code to 2, 3 or 9 de-
pending on the emphasis of the article. A second exception is that
I more often assigned code 4. I “saw”more anti-racist articles than
both coders did: in several cases I had assigned code 4 to authors
who spoke out against stereotyping or sensationalism without
using words like discrimination, racism or stigmatization. I ac-
cepted the coders’ results and included in the codebook the re-
mark that an article would not be categorized as anti-racist (dis-
course 4) if it communicated one or more of the following
messages: integration comes from two sides (discourse 2), there
are mutual prejudices (discourses 2 or 3), integration problems
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result at least in part from cultural differences (discourses 1, 2 or
3), integration can succeed if careful and comprehensive policies
are implemented (discourse 2), differences should be seen as op-
portunities rather than threats (discourse 5). With this elaboration,
I revisited all the articles that had been coded as anti-racist.
The labels for the discourses are to some extent arbitrary, but I
wish to comment on my reasons for using the label “Civil Islam”.
I prefer this label to the common notions of “moderate” or “liber-
al” Islam. By Civil Islam I mean an interpretation and practice of
Islam that confirms and meets norms generated in the civil
sphere. This implies that there is no single definition of Civil Is-
lam as it is contextually defined. In the Netherlands, Civil Islam
implies acknowledgment of the equality between men and wo-
men, tolerance of homosexuality, active participation in political
processes, unqualified refutation of illegal behavior (especially ter-
rorism), a contextual (i.e. not absolutist) interpretation of religious
texts and an understanding attitude towards criticisms of Mus-
lims. Clearly, these features reflect the values of Dutch core
groups. In Turkey, to give a contrasting example, Civil Islam
would have different features. For instance, compatibility with na-
tionalism could well be a yardstick for civil value while tolerance
for homosexuality would not.
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Appendix 2: Assigning codes to
relations between actors
To map relations among actors in the integration debate, the cor-
pus was coded with the computer program MaxQda for text analy-
sis. Student assistants were assigned the names of 134 opinion
makers. These names were selected according to a process of trial
and error. An initial list of 20 opinion makers whom I expected to
feature prominently was expanded with names encountered dur-
ing the course of research. For instance, it became apparent dur-
ing the initial coding sessions that administrators (like ministers)
featured more prominently than I expected; I therefore decided to
include all ministers with responsibility for integration issues dur-
ing the period under investigation (1990-2005). The references of
the 134 pre-selected actors to other, non-selected players were also
coded. For instance, the sociologist Bram de Swaan was not in-
cluded in the list of opinion makers, but his references to pre-
selected actors are coded, as are references of pre-selected actors
to him. References of non-selected actors to non-selected actors
are not included. Note that this method leads to the neglect of
actors with little resonance; we can get an idea of the relations of
central figures and the actors with whom they are related, but not
of all actors within the debate.
Apart from the direction (passive or active), references are dis-
tinguished according to their nature (positive, negative and neu-
tral). In many cases, it is difficult to decide whether a remark is
“negative”, “neutral” or “positive”. For instance, the phrase “Bolk-
estein opened the discussion” can be read as a factual statement,
as an accusation (when the author feels that the topic is inap-
propriate for public debate) or as a mark of approval (when the
author welcomes public debate on this topic). The position of the
author usually becomes clear in the course of the article. In this
case, a score of “neutral” would be attributed to Bolkestein’s re-
mark, while subsequent quotes that reveal the position of the
author would be coded separately. There are many other examples
of ambivalent fragments. Irony is quite frequent, and sometimes a
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remark can simultaneously convey a negative and a positive judg-
ment. As a rule, negative and positive codes are assigned only
where references are unambiguous.
In total, 1,111 names feature in the analysis, of which 977 were
not pre-selected. Most are natural persons, but the list also in-
cludes institutional actors, like political parties and research insti-
tutes. Abstract entities like “Muslims”, “multiculturalists” or “the
Dutch” are not included. References that do not specifically refer
to a person but to an event associated with that person are also not
coded (for instance, “since the murder of Theo van Gogh…” or
“The Gumus issue…”). The total number of coded fragments is
5,397. I checked all the codes of assistants to filter out duplicates
and to establish whether the direction (positive, negative, neutral)
had been attributed correctly and consistently. The codes were as-
signed in MaxQda, registered in Excel and subsequently exported
to R, a software environment for statistical analysis. Vincent Traag
processed the data in R as part of a collaborative project (see Uiter-
mark et al. 2009).
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Notes
1 Introduction: Integration politics and the enigma
of power
1. The start date of 1980 was chosen, as this is when the minorities policy first
began to take shape. The end date of 2006 was chosen as it marks the mu-
nicipal elections and the end of systematic data gathering. Depending on the
availability of data and the relevance of particular historical periods, the em-
pirical analysis more closely focuses on some periods than others.
2 The struggle for civil power
1. The influence of the institutions of pillarization is explored in Chapter 4.
2. See Brubaker (1992) for a classic statement and Bauböck et al. (2006) for a
comprehensive overview.
3. Whereas Alexander (2006) considers elections and opinion polls as sublime
instruments to articulate the will of the civil community, Bourdieu argues
that these institutions facilitate sublimated domination because they affect
the serial atomization of the population and discriminate against groups
that lack the capital to form and express a political opinion (Bourdieu 2005).
4. I owe this insight to Phil Gorski.
5. I refer specifically to sociologists and philosophers who are engaged in the
debate on the opinion pages of the broadsheet newspapers between 2003
and 2006. Note that I do not make a claim about all sociologists and philo-
sophers in the Netherlands. Most sociologists and philosophers do not con-
tribute to the debate on the opinion pages.
6. “The structure of a field, understood as a space of objective relations be-
tween positions defined by their rank in the distribution of competing
powers or species of capital, is different from the more or less lasting net-
works through which it manifests itself. It is this structure that determines
the possibility or impossibility (or, to be more precise, the greater or lesser
probability) of observing the establishment of linkages that express and sus-
tain the existence of networks. The task of science is to uncover the structure
of the distribution of species of capital which tends to determine the struc-
ture of individual or collective stances taken, through the interests and dis-
positions it conditions.” (Bourdieu in Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 114-115)
7. Although it is convenient to speak of an interpretation of reality, it is impor-
tant to realize that the act of interpretation involves the construction of rea-
lity. Ideas, notions and symbols have “evocative power” because they draw
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“discrete units out of indivisible continuity, difference out of the undifferen-
tiated” (Bourdieu cited in Schinkel 2003: 78).
8. When I quote from newspaper articles, I do not include page numbers.
Most of the times newspaper articles cover just one page and therefore the
reference to page numbers does not add any information. When a newspa-
per article covers two or more pages, it is not possible for me to ascertain on
which page a quote was printed since I collected most of the newspaper
articles through the Lexis-Nexis database.
9. There is a spatio-temporal dynamic to discourse production that we could
visualize on a map in terms of the intensity of the interactions that infuse
its ideas, notions and symbols with emotional meaning (cf. Collins 2004).
Take the example of anti-racist discourse. There would be a big, dark red
spot on a map if there is a meeting where hundreds of people gather to-
gether to express their anger over racism. There would be many dots that
are somewhat lighter and smaller to designate the instances where com-
mitted anti-racists share their ideas in small groups. The lightest spots on
the map would be casual observers of everyday anti-racist symbolism, such
as readers of an article on an anti-racist protest or observers of the billboards
against racism that hang amidst the commercial billboards in soccer sta-
diums (during matches of the Champions League, not in the Dutch compe-
tition). If we would want to complicate this picture further, we could also use
a different color to identify the opposition to anti-racist discourse. During
gatherings or in articles, promoters of Culturalism can, for instance, pro-
mote the idea that accusations of racism are unfounded or exaggerated.
Such instances of anti-anti-racism could then be designated with, say, a blue
color. Actual maps would be far too complex to make, but thinking in terms
of these visualizations nevertheless helps to grasp the situational differentia-
tion of discourse.
10. Although the concept of discourse is central to my analysis and serves as the
main analytical entry point into the complexities of integration politics, I do
not claim any ontological or causal primacy for discourses as opposed to
actors or institutions. There is no point in saying that discourses structure
actors or the other way around because they emerge together, develop to-
gether and eventually falter together. The same thing goes for the relation-
ship between power and actors: power exists only in and through actors, but
actors exist only in and through power.
11. Moreover, since there are many resources of power that can be mobilized in
any figuration, power relations are necessarily ambivalent. One classical ex-
ample is that established elites control institutions but that ascending elites
can stir up popular discontent. The result is a play of forces that both estab-
lished and ascending elites can influence but that neither of them can com-
pletely control.
3 Introduction to Part II: Civil power and the
integration debate
1. The location within the newspaper was irrelevant to the selection, meaning
that articles not printed in the debates sections also qualified for inclusion.
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For instance, some articles were published in the sections for domestic af-
fairs. When I write about the opinion pages, this should thus be understood
as shorthand for pages where opinion articles are published.
2. I speak of “clusters” rather than “communities” as it remains to be seen
whether the actors grouped together indeed form a community in the sense
that they have positive ties and leaders. The clusters generated with the algo-
rithm for community detection should not be confused with the clusters
generated through cluster analysis.
3. When one actor is very central to the debate, commentators regularly as-
sume that the debate is divided between those who support the actor and
those who oppose it. While this representation provides a convenient
scheme of perception, it does not accurately capture oppositions for at least
three reasons. First, supporters and opponents of a central actor may be
divided among themselves. Second, opponents that clash over one issue
may cooperate on another issue. Third, criticism is much more frequent
than praise on the opinion pages, and this is true for all actors, not just the
most central ones. This means that the intuitive idea that the debate is orga-
nized into opponents and supporters leads commentators to overestimate
the power of the former.
4. Very often articulation power manifests itself negatively when actors want
the world not to evolve in the way that their opponents desire and when they
are motivated to stop what they – each in their own ways – experience as an
attempt to devalue the ideas, symbols and notions that they cherish. Broe-
ders et al. (2008) also speak of articulation power, but their definition of this
concept is more similar to my overarching notion of discursive power. My
definition of articulation power comes close to Koopmans’s definition of vis-
ibility (Koopmans 2004a), but I do not opt for this concept, as it seems to
give the impression that all those who appear in civic arenas have resonance.
As the analysis below suggests, articulation, resonance and consonance are
analytically and empirically distinct.
5. The database includes several variables, such as gender, ethnicity, publica-
tion date, newspaper and affiliation. For the last variable, I grouped together
actors with similar affiliations in 16 sectors. These sectors are internally di-
verse, but nevertheless it is possible to identify with considerable precision
from which sectors discourses draw support and to explain why actors
rooted in these sectors express their support.
6. It does not matter whether these references are positive, neutral or negative.
Even if actor A completely rejects the discourse of actor B, actor A helps to
disseminate the discourse of B and contributes to the prominence of B.
Especially when actor A responds directly to an intervention of actor B, actor
A has to operate, to some degree, within the discursive parameters set by B.
For instance, if an actor A feels appalled by an argument of actor B that
Western civilization is superior to Islam and wants to warn that such bin-
aries promote stigmatization, actor A has to reiterate the binary in order to
refute it.
7. “Circa” 30 because some interviews that were conducted for Part III were
also used here. I also conducted many interviews and informal conversa-
tions that were not tape-recorded and transcribed.
8. Some of the information is drawn from internet sources such as Wikipedia.
Before using information from an internet source (usually for something
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trivial, such as place of birth or place of education), I checked it against other
internet, newspaper or academic sources.
4 The evolution of the Dutch civil sphere
1. One illustration of this development is that a right-wing politician like Frits
Bolkestein had privileged access to the opinion pages of de Volkskrant in the
beginning of the 1990s – something that before would have been unthink-
able. The contention over this article spread also into NRC, the only news-
paper for which we have systematic data in this period (the number of arti-
cles in the corpus jumps from five in 1990 to 25 in 1991). We see the same
type of interaction between newspapers after Scheffer’s intervention in
2000. Although “The multicultural drama” was published in NRC, it also
intensified the debate in Trouw and de Volkskrant (the number of articles in
the corpus jumps from, respectively, two, three and six in 1999 to 19, 16 and
24 in 2000). One analytical implication of this de-segmentation is that we
can analyze these three newspapers as a single setting: previously segre-
gated discursive milieus have transformed into a single – if still differen-
tiated – civil arena. Therefore, I do not differentiate between newspapers
unless there is an ad hoc reason to do so.
5 The ascendancy of Culturalism
1. Although there was no dominant conception of a Dutch culture, a modicum
of cultural essentialism is necessary to accommodate minorities and to as-
similate them into a pragmatist political culture. Catholics and Protestants
had to be portrayed and organized as blocs in order for their leaders to rep-
resent them, and the effect on the ground was a combination of intense
rivalry and mutual aversion. In the colonies, the Netherlands adopted a gov-
ernmental strategy where local leaders were accommodated, carving up the
colonial population into distinct groups that are easily identified and (hence)
managed. Similarly, the consultative structures created as part of the minor-
ities policy divided immigrants into minority groups with distinct identities
that often had very little meaning to the groups in question (see Chapter 4).
“Muslims” occasionally were identified as a specific segment of immigrants
but most times minorities were identified on the basis of their nationality. In
short, cultural essentialism was present, but it was not the Dutch culture
that was essentialized.
2. The systematically collected data stretches from 1991 to 2006. I use anecdo-
tal evidence to historically frame developments in this period. If I were to
pinpoint a new turning point, it would be 2008, when Geert Wilders domi-
nated the news with his film Fitna. Since Wilders dominated the debate, the
question is no longer what integration is and how it should be achieved but
whether it is at all possible for Muslims to become part of the Dutch civil
community.
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3. The idea that foreigners in general and Muslims in particular are funda-
mentally different from Westerners is, of course, not new. It has been fos-
tered by orientalists, novelists and correspondents for centuries, both in the
Netherlands and in other former colonial powers (Said 1978; for the Dutch
case, see Maussen 2009).
4. “Two years ago I was in the Soviet Union with other party leaders. In Alma
Ata I had brief personal talks with Elco Brinkman, Thijs Wöltgens and Hans
van Mierlo. I said that the minority issue will be the most important political
challenge of the next ten or twenty years; a challenge that transcends the
scope of any single party. I reiterated this a month ago in parliament. I now
say it again. So no partisan bickering” (Bolkestein 1992).
5. The principal author of the minorities report had frequently ridiculed – un-
der a pseudonym in a professional journal Migrantenstudies (see Vyvary
2003) – cultural relativism and xenophilia.
6. Editors and journalists writing for NRC, de Volkskrant and Trouw produced a
total of 18 articles of which eight were coded as culturalist (44.4 per cent).
7. “The multicultural drama” prompted an intensification of the debate in the
three broadsheet newspapers but not in De Telegraaf. The number of articles
in the corpus jumps from two, three and six in 1999 to 19, 16 and 24 in
2000 in, respectively, NRC Handelsblad, de Volkskrant and Trouw. The total
number of hits is extremely low in De Telegraaf for both 1999 and 2000: 11
and 8, respectively. Two articles in 1999 would have qualified for inclusion
in the corpus (one interview with the successful Moroccans of Towards a
New Start – see Chapter 9, another interview with Muslim women with
head scarves on their emancipatory struggles) and one article in 2000 would
have qualified (an interview with a historian on the electoral success of Jörg
Haider in Austria and the difference between Haider and Bolkestein).
8. Gedogen normally refers to the practice of not enforcing the law when this is
not in the interest of public order or public health. Dutch drug policy is in
part based on this principle. But gedogen also more generally refers to a leni-
ent and understanding attitude that was at the basis of the accommodation
politics described in Chapter 4.
9. One-third of the votes for the party were cast by people who had not voted in
the previous elections (NRC Handelsblad 2002).
10. It is remarkable that the size of the culturalist cluster does not steadily in-
crease; in the period in which Scheffer dominated the debate, the culturalist
cluster was comparatively bigger than in the preceding and subsequent peri-
ods. Unlike Bolkestein and Hirsi Ali, Scheffer was not a parliamentarian for
the right-wing Liberals, and he did not postulate an opposition between Is-
lam and the West.
11. Note that it is not at all trivial that we find this pattern. For example, in their
analysis of international relations, Traag and Bruggeman found that there
were eight blocs of actors (Traag & Bruggeman 2009).
277
6 Contesting Culturalism: Anti-racism, Pragmatism
and Civil Islam
1. Articles that were labeled as “unknown” or “other” were not included in the
analysis. Two outliers were omitted from the analysis in order to reduce the
tightness of the clustering in the plot and thereby ease interpretation.
2. The plot features a discourse that I refer to as “Diversity.” Its promoters
focus on the positive aspects of diversity for societies, companies or cities,
arguing that growing cultural diversity is positive for business and govern-
ment organizations, as it helps to generate new ideas and to connect to in-
creasingly diverse customers and citizens. Because the Diversity Discourse
is comparatively weak and is discussed in detail in Chapter 9, I do not exam-
ine it here.
3. Such as Radar, LBR (Landelijk Bureau Racismebestrijding, National Agency for
Fighting against Racism) and NCB (Nederlands Centrum Buitenlanders,
Dutch Center for Foreigners).
4. One could object that the data pertain to a very specific setting (the opinion
pages), and it is indeed true (not to say trivial) that accusations of racism
have been made in other settings, such as on websites. But it is highly un-
likely that different results would ensue if we included television programs
or tabloids, since these settings seem even less likely to offer a stage for anti-
racist discourse than the opinion pages of the broadsheet newspapers (Van
Dijk 1991).
5. Policies were not simply “multiculturalist” but also did not become “assim-
ilationist.” Although it is certainly true that, after the emergence of Fortuyn,
there were more administrators who wanted to force immigrants to inte-
grate, at the same time there was an intensification of efforts to help minor-
ities, and especially Muslims, to organize and express themselves (see espe-
cially Chapter 10). It is understandable that analysts have used these
concepts in comparative research, but they tend to reify what is better under-
stood as a dynamic field where different actors push in different directions.
6. Paul Scheffer is one example. Most of his 13 articles were coded as cultural-
ist, but five were coded as pragmatist. Although he laments the elites (in-
cluding his colleagues at NRC) for “denying the revolt” by Fortuyn voters
(Scheffer 2002), in other articles he takes a pragmatist approach. Several
days after the assassination of Theo van Gogh, for instance, he severely criti-
cized Job Cohen for attempting to quell rather than deal with the tensions
and anxieties. He criticized Cohen and other politicians for failing to enforce
the law and for letting “some neighborhoods” come under “the grip of vio-
lence”. But Scheffer also said that there was a need for a new feeling of
collective belonging, a “new we” that would include Muslims on the condi-
tion that they do not put the law of religion above the law of the constitution
(Scheffer 2004). These articles serve to reconcile differences and to resolve
the cultural conflicts that other, more radical culturalists seek to win.
7. Most of the debate, however, did not revolve around Muslims; as Figure 3.1
shows, terms like “minorities” and “foreigners” were much more frequently
used in combination with “integration” than the term “Muslims”.
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8. To be more precise: he said that he would no longer allow Muslims into the
country if it were possible to make juridical arrangements to this effect.
However, he did not think this would be feasible.
9. This article was not coded as Civil Islam because Cheppih explicitly indi-
cated that he wanted to offer an alternative to liberal democracy. He des-
cribes his alternative as sjoerocratie, a model of deliberative democracy with
elements of sharia, including physical punishment. He thereby suggested a
contradication between liberal democracy and Islam, which means that the
article cannot be categorized as Civil Islam. The sentence cited here, how-
ever, is typical of the more critical variants of Civil Islam.
10. Ahmed Aboutaleb and Haci Karacaer are exceptional in that they are very
prominent and very critical of their own communities. Other Muslims with-
in the Labor Party, such as Fatima Elatik (council chair in the Amsterdam
neighborhood of Zeeburg) and Nebahat Albayrak (State Secretary of Justice),
voiced similar discourses but were more critical of culturalists and milder
towards Muslims.
11. This interview was conducted with three leaders of Milli Gorus responsible
for the negotiations over the construction of the Wester Mosque after the
members of the group around Karacaer had left or were forced to step down.
12. Three of Aboutaleb’s articles in the database were coded as Civil Islam, and
three were coded as Pragmatism.
13. For instance: “I say to my brothers and sisters: ‘did you ever see a boxing
match?’ If you punch open the eyebrow of your opponent, then you keep
hitting on the wound to knock out your opponent. That is what Wilders
does... Our country, our democracy and our legal state deserve an open de-
bate with Wilders and others. I will fight for it until the lost drop. For I am a
Muslim” (Karacaer 2007). Another example: “To acquire knowledge is a
duty of each Muslim and each Muslim woman. Mind you women! [points
finger into the air]. It is mentioned there [in the Quran] specifically [says in
Arabic:] Muslim and Muslim woman. So when someone writes to me
‘please do not force me to learn Dutch because I am so old,’ then you know
my answer” (Aboutaleb in a speech at the Argan youth center in 2006).
14. I cite from Ham and Uitermark (2007) since quotes in this piece were ap-
proved for publication by the interviewees.
7 Introduction to Part III: Civil power and
governance figurations
1. “Around” 30 and 50 because some interviews that were conducted for Part II
were also used here. I also conducted many interviews and informal conver-
sations that were not tape-recorded and transcribed.
2. The data pertain to subsidies allocated as part of the minorities or integra-
tion policy. In some cases this means that any initiative promoting integra-
tion can apply for a subsidy; in other cases it means that only minority asso-
ciations can claim these resources.
3. While associations without subsidies are unlikely to have central positions
within governance networks, some may nevertheless operate very success-
fully on the margins. Some religious associations, for instance, do not re-
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ceive subsidies but are nevertheless very important as discursive milieus.
The thriving orthodox El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam is one example,
but we could also mention a number of smaller and more traditional Moroc-
can and Turkish mosques. These associations have a relatively large base of
contributing constituents and sometimes also have foreign sponsors such as
the Turkish state in the case of Diyanet mosques or Arab royalties in the
case of orthodox mosques. A number of associations do not rely on funding
for minorities or integration but attract funds from corporate sponsors,
charities or government agencies. Such funds are not labeled “subsidies”, as
they have the character of commissioned or tendered projects, though they
amount to support for particular civil discourses.
4. The timing of both surveys is significant: they were conducted after Amster-
dam’s guest worker associations had been marginalized and before religious
associations were embraced.
5. The CITO test is a standardized test that virtually all pupils have to take just
before they finish elementary school. Scores range between 501 and 550.
8 The minorities policy and the dominance of the
radical left: Ethnic corporatism in Amsterdam in
the 1980s
1. Kommittee Marokkaanse Arbeiders Nederland, Committee for Moroccan
Workers.
2. Hollanda Türkiyeli Isçiler Birligi, Turkish Worker Association in the Nether-
lands.
3. Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu, Federation of Democratic Worker As-
sociations from Turkey.
4. Federatie van Koerden in Nederland, Federation of Kurds in the Netherlands.
The first Kurdish association to receive subsidies was the Koerdische Arbei-
dersvereniging (Kurdish Worker Association) in 1987.
5. Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi, Party of Nationalist Action.
6. The abolition coincided with the founding of the Amsterdam Center for For-
eigners (Amsterdams Centrum Buitenlanders, ACB), an expertise center that
still supports minority associations. The transfer of responsibilities from in-
termediate institutions to the government sets Amsterdam apart from Rot-
terdam. As Chapter 11 shows, Rotterdam’s governance figuration has his-
torically been characterized by the presence of large and powerful civil
corporations that mediate between the government and civil society associa-
tions. In Amsterdam these intermediate institutions played a marginal role,
and consequently the government interacted directly with civil society asso-
ciations. In 1981, even before the minorities policy was officially established,
the Amsterdam government, in consultation with the Ministry of Welfare
and the Amsterdam Center for Foreigners, redirected funds away from the
welfare foundations and to migrant associations. The ACB is the closest
thing to a civil corporation in Amsterdam. It receives a structural subsidy
from the province of Noord Holland and occasionally wins contracts from
the government of Amsterdam.
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7. It is important to stress that this approach is perhaps multicultural in a prag-
matic sense but not multiculturalist in an ideological sense. It was convenient
to have intermediaries to reach culturally distinct groups in need of welfare
provisions, but there is no sign that administrators were keen on preserving
ethnic cultures. The recognition of cultural identities was secondary to, and
instrumental for, the technocratic goal of administering welfare provisions
as efficiently and widely as possible. Associations were involved to improve
the process of policy formulation, implementation and delivery, not to en-
sure that they cultivate and exhibit their cultural particularities. In the ob-
scure words of the first and last comprehensive white paper on minority
integration: “The preservation of cultural identity can in no way be consid-
ered as a static fact that is unrelated to presence in the Netherlands.” In
Dutch: “[het] behoud van de eigen culturele identiteit [kan] geenszins wor-
den opgevat als een onveranderlijk gegeven dat losstaat van het verblijf in
Nederland” (Gemeente Amsterdam 1989: 16).
8. Since the political orientation of associations is often dynamic or ambiva-
lent, we cannot work with a fine-grained coding scheme, though a rough
distinction between different types can be made (see also Kraal & Zorlu
1997; Fennema & Tillie 1999; Maussen 2006, 2009; Vermeulen 2006; and
the various reports of the leftist monitoring group Kafka). I use the word
conservative to refer to associations that do not demand radical social
change and that seek to preserve social, religious or ethnic hierarchies. This
includes most mosques but of course not those that have a radical Islamist
agenda. There are, however, very few Moroccan or Turkish mosques that
seem to have such a radical agenda. They are mostly rather precarious insti-
tutions that try to preserve ties and dispositions that are of little value in
mainstream Dutch society. The Turkish Grey Wolves are an exception, but
they are ethnic fascists rather than religious fundamentalists. I categorize
these associations as “radical conservatives”.
9. In the 1980s, the guest worker associations received structural subsidies
from the municipality but also from the Ministry of Welfare and, occasion-
ally, from the Ministry for Foreign Aid. They also received income from
membership contributions, ticket sales for cultural events, and donations.
10. Project subsidies are allocated for specific activities. Periodical subsidies are
allocated for specific activities during a particular time frame (usually six or
12 months but not more). Periodical subsidies have to be requested annually
or bi-annually (several months before the decision is taken), while project
subsidies can be requested throughout the year.
11. Walter Nicholls observes a similar process in his research of France’s poli-
tique de la ville. He describes it as “associationalism from above” (Nicholls
2006).
9 Diversity management and the gentrification of
civil society: Civil liberalism in Amsterdam in the
1990s
1. The Hudson Institute is sometimes credited with the invention of diversity
policy. In 1987, it stated that “the proper management of [a] diverse work-
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force is a key priority, not because enterprises are becoming kinder or gen-
tler but because they want to survive and grow” (quoted in Sandon 2006).
2. The most important difference is that Essed emphasized the structural
dimension of racism and postulated that organized, white interests were
standing in the way of equality and diversity. Ramdas directed his criticisms
against spokespersons for minorities and emphasized that minority group
cultures and solidarities were standing in the way of democracy and liberty.
3. The types of structural analyses that could be found in the policy framework
of 1989 (see previous chapter) are completely absent from the diversity
memorandum of 1999. However, the document is not entirely silent about
high levels of unemployment, low educational performance and high pov-
erty levels. It posits that policies to reduce disadvantages remain necessary
in the light of these ongoing problems. But low educational attainment and
unemployment are no longer seen as injustices inflicted upon certain
groups but as a waste of talent and human resources. To remedy these prob-
lems is not “only social, it is most of all smart” (Gemeente Amsterdam
1999: 3). Racism and discrimination are also mentioned in the document
but are now part of a more general – and less serious – problem of “mutual
prejudice”. Especially Moroccan boys and women with head scarves have
been negatively portrayed in the media, and this requires active efforts by
the government and its partners “to create positive images of groups of Am-
sterdammers” (ibid. 1999: 29).
4. According to a municipal website, there were eight think tanks for social
cohesion in November 2008 (Denktank Sociale Cohesie 2009).
5. This does not mean that no immigrants work in these associations. The dis-
tinction between a “varied” and “Dutch” association is not clear-cut. I opera-
tionalized the ethnicity of an association by looking at the names on the
application and on the association’s website. One foreign name would be
enough to refer to an association as “varied”. The labels may be debatable in
individual instances, but the overall pattern is clear: associations with Dutch
(and to a lesser extent varied and Moroccan) leaderships win at the expense
of those with migrant leaderships. Similar problems occur with the
operationalization of the distinction between commercial bureaus and civil
society associations. None of the projects here are presented to the munici-
pality as a “commercial” project, and many depend on the efforts of volun-
teers. In this sense, no activity is purely commercial. However, very often
consultancy fees are charged, or there is a direct connection between the
commercial activities of an agency and its subsidized activities.
6. According to the subtitle of their website (TANS 2009).
7. This surge is high compared to Turks (130 per cent), Surinamese (60 per
cent) and native Dutch (35 per cent). The number stood at 2,100 in 2005.
Like students from other large migrant groups, Moroccans often choose
studies like law, administration and economics (O & S 2007: 6).
8. “Problem youth” appears mainly in policy discourse. “Street culture” is a
popular term among the left and social scientists (e.g. De Jong 2007). The
media often report on Moroccan youth gangs. Geert Wilders speaks of “Mor-
occan street terrorists”. Ahmed Marcouch refers to “thugs”. Oudkerk first
coined the phrase kut-Marokkanen (which roughly translates as “fucking
Moroccans”), but it has since been euphemized into k-u-t-Marokkanen or
put in between inverted commas.
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9. The city also ran a campaign against discrimination. In 2007, posters on the
street showed people who look like a Jew, a Muslim woman, a Moroccan
young man and a Surinamese man, with captions suggesting that they are
discriminated against (“because of my creed”; “because of my head scarf”;
“because of my name”; “because of my skin color”). The posters advertised
the municipal reporting point for discrimination. While this showed that the
municipality was concerned about discrimination, it also revealed that the
government had monopolized the fight against it. Amsterdam did not politi-
cally or financially support associations struggling against racism or discrimi-
nation but instead established a reporting point in its own bureaucracy – in
contrast to Rotterdamwhere themunicipality provided structural subsidies to
a monitoring center for racism and an agency against discrimination.
10 Governing through Islam: Civil differentialism in
Amsterdam after 9/11 and the assassination of
Theo van Gogh
1. This represented a conception of the city’s population already long in the
making: the population is no longer composed of ethnic groups nor of di-
verse individuals but of more or less civil groups. The translation of these
conceptions into institutions is far from trivial for several reasons. Most ob-
viously, it takes time for new political conceptions to materialize into
bureaucratic categories, and my research was conducted while this process
was ongoing. Another reason is that the formal separation of church and
state disallows the government from directly subsidizing liberal Islam or
any other form of religion. It is not uncommon to subsidize associations
connected to mosques or churches but only for non-religious activities, like
computer courses or language lessons. This means that the government can
either not fulfill its desire to support liberal Islam or do so indirectly.
2. Other members of the working group were writers Nazmiye Oral and Yas-
mine Allas – both non-practising Muslims strongly in favor of making Mus-
lims more self-critical. Pieter Winsemius of the right-wing Liberals (VVD)
and Labor Party notable Felix Rottenberg also participated.
3. According to a note to the municipal council of 16 November 2006, page 5.
4. The philosophical legitimation for this is the principle of “compensating
neutrality”, which stipulates that some forms of religion can be stimulated
to increase choice. If one then accepts the idea that fundamentalist or radical
Islam is much more powerful than liberal Islam, it is justified, according to
the principle of compensating neutrality, to support the latter. It is an inter-
esting paradox that the very same administrators who argue that most Mus-
lims are not fundamentalist or radical argue that fundamentalist or radical
Islam is so strong that the government needs to compensate for the weak-
ness of liberal Islam.
5. Attempts to civilize cultural practices through the mobilization of religious
discourse were not unique to Slotervaart; throughout the city similar initia-
tives were taken, with and without government support. For instance, the
women’s association of Milli Gorus received subsidies from the SIP Fund
(see Chapters 8 and 9) for a project on emancipation. In this particular proj-
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ect, an imam explained to men that much of the behavior they consider as
“religious” is, in fact, “cultural” and quite possibly in contradiction to the
Quran. The women’s website is full of texts (by men) that argue that the
well-being of women is central to Islamic belief. Let me cite one particular
instance of the appropriation of Islam for civilizing missions.
In the minutes of one meeting published on the internet we can read that
two panelists – an imam and a chairman – start by asking what the life of
others means to the assembled men. The men answer that their lives are
never more important than the lives of others but that sometimes the lives
of others are more important than theirs. Then they are asked what they
think about when they hear the word “honor”. Most of the men think of
women, some think more specifically of wives, daughters or mothers. One
also thinks of tradition and an old saying: the most important things in a
man’s life are a horse, a wife and a weapon. They then talk more about who
exactly carries the honor (consensus: women) and who has to defend it (con-
sensus: men). When the conversation moves to flirting, one audience mem-
ber says that it is not allowed according to Islam, another feels it is allowed if
the boy and girl marry. And what if honor is violated? One man has the
impression that “she must die”, others suggest marriage or prevention, and
one stresses that sufficient proof must exist (because the prophet empha-
sized this). Then comes the question what the men would do if someone
from their family had lost their honor. Here I translate the report literally
(with irregularities):
Participant 1: he person should question himself first. What is my share
in this?
Participant 2: We raise the children. If my daughter does that, then I am
responsible. But I did not raise my wife. What is my share
[of the responsibility] when my wife walks down the
wrong path?
[interruption] You should also question yourself to see if
you give enough attention to your wife.
Participant 3: To give a frightening example, that person could be killed.
Participant 4: I would take a weapon and kill.
Chairman: You say “I will kill my wife or sister”? If it is your little
brother, do you kill him too?
Participant 4: I mean, that is what society thinks.
Chairman: No, you talked on your own behalf. It has changed now,
because it is about your brother.
Participant 4: …?
Other participant:Why do we discuss? Because the Dutch want it that way?
Our religion is pure and that is why it forbids these kinds
of things.
Imam: I do not know what you are saying; what has this to do
with the topic? These are our problems.
Chairman: We prepare these programs and questions. It has nothing
to do with the wish of the Dutch. The Dutch do not have
honor and honor killings, but our society does. And such
bad things are done on behalf of Islam. We work to pre-
vent these problems. These programs are not made to
please the people or the government.
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Then the discussion moves to gender discrimination and gossiping and what
todowhenpeople say yourhonorhasbeenviolated (cited inMilliGorus2006).
The association itself is responsible for the transcription and translation
(from Turkish), so information may be distorted. Whether or not the account
is precise, it is clear that Islam is mobilized against behavior considered un-
civil according to standards generated in the Dutch civil sphere. It is all the
more interesting that the imam, Osman Paköz, joined the association in
2004 after lobbying by the German headquarters of the European organiza-
tion. According to Üzeyir Kabaktepe, this imam “seemed all right at first but
then he protested more and more against our liberal policies” (cited in Dros
2007). We thus see a deeply conservative imam (according to Kabaktepe)
promoting an emancipatory discourse.
11 The rise of Culturalism and the resilience of
minority associations: Civil corporatism in
Rotterdam
1. As indicated in Chapter 8, structural subsidies refer to subsidies for which
reservations are made in the municipal budget; this funding is secure as
long as politicians do not ask the government to withdraw support and as
long as civil servants do not have suspicions of fraud or misuse.
2. PBR and SPIOR are the nodes that tie networks of associations together, the
brokers between the government and civil society. They can thus be seen as
powerful, though both organizations have internal mechanisms for power
sharing. Note that this is very different from the situation in Amsterdam
where the most assertive groups monopolized the recognition and resources
channeled to and through the advisory councils. Such monopolization was
impossible in Rotterdam, as civil corporations have elections, and their cred-
ibility as intermediaries hinges upon their capacity to reach and organize
large and diverse constituencies. Because power is spread over a large num-
ber of different associations, it is difficult to identify an elite, a group that
clearly has more power than its competitors. The two corporations also bal-
ance each other. On the one hand, they constantly compete for the support
of minority associations and recognition from the government. On the other
hand, they have a productive relationship, as they both win if the govern-
ment seeks to support or target minority associations.
3. I do not think it is a coincidence that four Muslim women won the prize.
More than natives (mostly men) or Muslim men, they have developed a dis-
course sensitive to the anxieties about Islam and to experiences of discrimi-
nation. Central to this discourse is the purification strategy (see Chapter 6),
which helps them to cleanse religion of culture. They used this strategy to
great effect during the debates, while authorities like Tariq Ramadan backed
attempts to draw a hard line between (uncivil and profane) culture and (civil
and sacred) religion. The distinction provided these women and many other
Muslims with the chance to undergo a process of simultaneous civil and
religious purification – they argued that their communities may indeed
have problems but that these result from the pollution caused by tradition
rather than from any inherent defects in their religion.
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12 Comparing the power of minority associations in
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
1. It is a public secret that there are groups of young Moroccan men and boys
who prostitute themselves. One family in the northern part of the city had
raised the issue, and a number of individual associations, welfare organiza-
tions and professionals indicated that the problem was structural and that
collective action was needed. A number of professionals and associations
tried to assess the nature and extent of the problem, and their search led
them to the circle around Pim Fortuyn, who had never made a secret of his
sexual relationships with young Moroccan men. When he was once asked
whether he ever talks to Muslims, he responded with the answer “Talk? I
sleep with them!” Most commentators interpreted this remark as just an-
other extravagant quirk, but within the Moroccan community there was a
rumor that the sexual encounters had been videotaped and that Fortuyn and
other Rotterdam homosexuals made use of the services of a clandestine net-
work that actively recruits young Moroccans. The associations wrote several
letters to administrators and police to demand an investigation. They were
unsuccessful, but a side effect of this mobilization was that it created link-
ages between different segments of the Moroccan community and rein-
forced the ties of the most central associations with professionals and civil
servants.
13 Conclusion: The dynamics of power
1. The share of the population supporting the development of a multicultural
society in which minorities retain much of their religious and ethnic iden-
tity has been remarkably stable since the late 1980s (Vijver et al. 2007). Sys-
tematic, longitudinal data on opinions on Muslims has only been available
since 2004, but there is no straightforward trend in the direction of more or
less negativity (TNS-Nipo 2008).
2. The existence of a mechanism that works against discursive monopolization
may help to solve a puzzle that I alluded to in the beginning of this study:
why did the growing power of Culturalism not result in more negative opin-
ions about the feasibility of a multicultural society? I hypothesize that the
reason for this is not simply that people are slow to change their opinions
but that their opinions are shaped in a force field that does not decisively
transform in one or the other direction.
3. The analysis focused on the stark differences in the relationship between
civil society associations and the government. But when we examine devel-
opments in civil society (and not civil society’s relationship to the govern-
ment), there are striking parallels between the two cities. In both Amster-
dam and Rotterdam, the left-wing associations that had been dominant in
the 1980s had lost much of their power by 2005. The network of progressive
organizations in which they were embedded lost momentum: their base of
support contracted, while they suffered from increasingly strict administra-
tive demands. Islamic associations, in contrast, were resilient or even gained
in power. Mosque associations appealed to the conservative segments of the
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first generation, while new associations were created by the second genera-
tion. The case studies showed that the ambiguous compulsion of the civil
sphere also operates in local governance figurations: precisely because con-
servative and Islamic associations are relatively close to groups deemed to be
outside society and beyond the government’s reach, these associations gain
recognition as intermediaries and representatives. Moreover, younger gen-
erations are more likely to identify as Muslims than as ethnics. Civil Islam
is still a marginal discourse in the national debate, but among Moroccan and
Turkish immigrants and their offspring, it is a very strong discourse. Immi-
grants develop interpretations that enable them to identify simultaneously
as members of the Dutch civil community and as devout Muslims. While in
the past, secular associations distinguished themselves through the support
of women’s emancipation and integration, such themes are now increas-
ingly being taken up by Muslims. Both in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, first-
and second-generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants mobilized Islam
against those civil sins that culturalists associate with minorities, including
misogyny, authoritarianism, apathy, criminality and indolence.
4. Note that the method for coding relations could lead to the overestimation of
power concentration (see Appendix 2). I do not think that a different method
would generate substantially different findings but will verify this in future
work.
5. In the debate on integration on the opinion pages but also, it seems, in Rot-
terdam during the Islam debates (where the challengers of Leefbaar faced a
diffuse yet sizeable opposition).
6. The orthodoxy is not simply out there, waiting to be challenged; it is rather a
discursive creation of the challengers who identify – through such floating
signifiers as “multiculturalists”, “old politics”, etc. – and thereby construct
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Integration politics in the Netherlands has changed dramatically between 
1990 and 2005. Whereas ethnic and religious differences were hitherto paci-
fied through accommodation, a new and increasingly powerful current in 
Dutch politics problematized the presence of minorities. This development 
represents a challenge to sociologists and political scientists: how to map 
and explain drastic changes? Arguing that extant approaches are better at 
explaining continuity than change, this book develops a relational discourse 
analysis to understand dynamic power relations in national as well as local 
politics.
Justus Uitermark is Professor of Community Development at the Sociology 





















From Accommodation to Confrontation
Justus Uitermark“This meticulously researched and theoretically sophisticated book develops 
an original, provocative sociological interpretation of contemporary political 
struggles in the Netherlands around ‘integration politics’. Uitermark frames 
his interpretation not only in relation to the specificity of Dutch trends but as a 
broader contribution to theories of power in modern society. His book offers a 
brilliant analysis of a key dimension of early 21st century political life.”
Neil Brenner, Professor of Urban Theory, Harvard University
“The study of Justus Uitermark is a must-read for all those international observers 
who ask themselves: ‘What happened to the Netherlands and its longstanding 
tradition of tolerance?’”
Jean Tillie, Professor of Electoral Politics, University of Amsterdam
